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Introduction
Investment in human capital has been identified in literature as one of the key
sources of long-term economic growth (see, for instance, Hanushek and Kimko
2000, Barro 2001, Krueger and Lindahl 2001, Hanushek and Woessmann 2012
and Castello-Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana 2012). By investment in hu-
man capital, we refer to improvements in the skills of the labour force neces-
sary for production so that human capital is a multidimensional concept and
refers to the skill set that makes workers more productive. Knowledge is the
most important of these, but other factors like habits, social and personality
attributes and health also matter (Goldin 2016).
But the skills required for production have not always been the same
throughout history. The technological advances embodied in the successive
industrial revolutions identified in literature have been modifying the com-
plementarity between human and physical capital and, therefore, the relevant
skills for production.1
Several works have highlighted the potential impacts of the recent process
of technological change on the labour market (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014;
Autor et. al. 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Frey and
Osborne 2013; OECD 2016). The literature emphasises that technological
progress, in particular the advance in digital technologies, communication
and robotics can create jobs and increase benefits for many workers. But at
the same time, it means that certain activities run a high risk of becoming
obsolete, since some of them, such as routine tasks, or those which can be
replaced by code, can be easily automated, leading to what is commonly
known as technological unemployment. A first branch of papers specifically
1See Gordon 2016 for a review of the process of technological change since 1750.
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analyse the impact of technological change on the displacement of a large
part of existing occupations (Brynjolfsson and 2014, Frey and Osborne 2013,
OECD 2016).
On the other hand, other studies focus on the type of tasks that are most
likely to suffer this displacement as well as the types of tasks which could be
increasingly demanded by the new technologies (Autor, et. al, 2003; Spitz-
Oener, 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). This last approximation to the
effect of technological change on labour markets is usually called the task
content approach. In general, this literature concludes that jobs intensive in
cognitive tasks, particularly in the case of non-routine cognitive tasks, such
as abstract thought, creativity, the ability to solve problems and communi-
cations skills which are normally performed by highly-skilled workers, would
be stimulated by this process. Therefore, labour placement, as well as labour
productivity, will be increasingly linked to the ability of workers to develop
these kinds of cognitive tasks.
Clearly, this phenomenon puts pressure on the educational systems which
should be able to move in line with the technological trends, providing an
increasingly intensive training in cognitive skills required for current jobs.
In this sense, an exhaustive analysis of the educational systems and of the
most important inputs to improve the cognitive skills of students becomes
extremely important.
In the last decades, in the field of education, developed countries have
accumulated a large amount of empirical data on the performance of students
in the school period, not only across-countries (for example, through the
Program for the International Evaluation of OECD students, PISA) but also
within the country. Thanks to this greater availability of data, the empirical
literature on education has grown exponentially.2
From the previous literature an extensive consensus has been generated,
both on the part of policy makers and researchers, that teacher quality is a
key input in the process of student learning (Hanushek, 2003; Hanushek and
Rivkin 2007; Hanushek, 2010; Hanushek and Rivkin 2010; among others).
Indeed, several papers state that teacher quality represents the single school
2See, Hanushek 2003 for a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on Educa-
tion.
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input with the highest incidence in the educational results (Hanushek, 2003,
Klein et al., 2010; Gates, 2011; and Hiatt, 2009.). For instance, Hanushek
(2010) demonstrates that the difference between a good and a bad teacher is
equivalent to advancing knowledge in an academic year. On the other hand,
Chetty et al. (2011) states that having good teachers improves not only the
standardized test scores but also generates long-term effects, both economic
and social.
However, there is much less agreement on what aspects determine the
quality of teachers, as well as reduced theoretical literature that analyses
the process of teacher selection. The main limitation in the study of teacher
quality stems from the fact that teacher quality is unobservable.3 Moreover,
previous evidence suggests that observable characteristics of teachers do not
present a clear correlation with the achievements reached by the students
(Rockoff, 2004; Jepsen, 2005; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2007; Hanushek 2010
among others). In this sense, there is still a lot of scope to investigate the
importance of teacher quality as an educational input and, fundamentally,
how to influence teacher quality in order to improve educational results.
The aim of this dissertation is precisely to shed light on these issues. On
one hand, the objective of this paper is to identify the kind of task which is
most in demand in the current labour market. On the other hand, we study
how the educational system provides these skills by focusing on the analysis
of the quality of teachers. The dissertation consists of three chapters, each
of them written in the style of an academic paper.
The first chapter analyses the employment profile trends in Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries according to the task content performed by
the workers in their jobs for the last twenty years. The main motivation for
this chapter stems from the fact that most of the literature regarding the
potential impact of technological change on labour markets is based on de-
veloped countries. However, evidence for emerging countries and particularly
evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean is much more limited. Indeed,
as far as I know, the study in this dissertation is the first that makes this
analysis for a representative set of Latin American and Caribbean countries.
3The assumption of the non-observability of the teacher skill is suggested in previous
studies. See for instance Hanushek (2010) and Rothstein et al.(2014).
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Latin American and Caribbean countries show very different character-
istics to developed countries which could potentially lead to different trends
in technological advance and task profile of the labour markets. Indeed,
the economic structure and, consequently, specialization is different between
developed and emerging countries. Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries are also characterised by lower wages and therefore lower incentives for
automation with respect to developed countries. Finally, Latin American
countries usually show lower performance in comparative test of cognitive
skills which could imply constraints from the labour supply to move toward
a task profile more intensive in cognitive tasks.4
Therefore, focusing on the evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean,
the main research question of the chapter is if the technological change has
also provoked a growing demand of cognitive skills for workers in emerging
countries, or if on the contrary, this growing demand for cognitive skills is
not yet registered in these countries.
To do that, the chapter aims to produce an approximation of the im-
pact of technological change on the labour market. Specifically, I build an
indicator that captures the relative importance of four types of tasks, cog-
nitive versus manual tasks and routine versus non-routine tasks, based on
the information provided by Occupational Information Network (O*NET)
and household surveys. The empirical approach follows the task content
methodology proposed in the seminal paper of Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The analysis finds that in the last two decades the relative importance of
non-routine cognitive tasks in the workplace has increased in line with the
reduction of manual tasks. These conclusions are in line with the stylised
findings highlighted in the literature for developed countries, on which the
empirical analysis had focused. That is, our first chapter shows us that the
growing demand for non-routine cognitive occupations in the labour mar-
ket is a trend that is occurring in all countries, regardless of their level of
development.
We also study whether the increased demand for new tasks in the labour
market affects the risk of polarisation of the labour market by looking at
4See, for example, the gaps in cognitive skills between emerging and developing coun-
tries in the PISA test (OECD, 2015) and the PIAAC survey (OECD, 2013).
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labour income. We show that wages reflect a higher relative remuneration
for cognitive tasks. Therefore, occupations intensive in cognitive abilities
represent a growing demand and higher remuneration compared to occupa-
tions intensive in manual tasks. In this context, since cognitive abilities have
a better insertion in the labour market, the educational system needs to take
this into account by providing and developing more of these.
Particularly, the second chapter analyses, why do some countries obtain
better educational results than others? This chapter analyses this relevant
question, focusing on the role of teacher quality. In this chapter, I propose
and calibrate a micro-founded theoretical model of teacher selection of het-
erogeneous agents, that differ in the general skill and the teacher skill, for a
set of 22 OECD countries.
As mentioned above, there is a scarcity of theoretical literature that anal-
yses the process of teacher selection. The proposed model helps us to under-
stand the mechanisms through which individuals decide to become teachers
and how educational institutions select them. Clearly, understanding this se-
lection process in depth is the first step to understanding the variables that
characterise the quality of teachers in a country, and therefore, to designing
educational policies to improve school performance. Note that, improving the
performance of students matters since they not only gain individual benefits
through better working placements and returns from investment on educa-
tion (see for example Cameron and Heckman 1993, 1998) but also aggregate
benefits through greater economic growth in the country (see, among others,
Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012).
Based on the model, I build time series of teacher quality (TQ) for each
country, analyse its main drivers and study the importance of TQ in ex-
plaining differences in student achievements. My proxy of TQ measured in
different years helps me to analyse whether teacher quality trends can explain
the evolution of student achievements at a country level. To my knowledge,
no previous studies include this analysis because time series of country mea-
sures of teacher quality were not available. Having time series of teacher
quality for a set of countries is important because the reasons behind the
cross-country dispersion in student outcomes could potentially be the learn-
ing culture or the educational institutions. With my time series of TQ, I am
controlling for these unobservable country fixed effects.
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The theoretical model shows that in equilibrium, the relationship be-
tween teacher salaries and TQ is non-linear and even non-monotonic which
helps us to understand the ambiguous findings in the empirical literature
between teacher salaries and student achievements. The evidence suggests
that salaries are not a reliable proxy of teacher quality, since most studies
do not find a statistically significant effect between salaries and student out-
comes.5 However, the reason for this could be that different countries could
be in different parts of the equilibrium curve. This is so because on one
hand, previous empirical analysis based on cross-section data within a given
country probably captures a small segment of the equilibrium curve since
teacher wage dispersion is usually small within the country. On the other
hand, the parameters controlling the teacher selection process differ across
countries and, as I explain later on, the equilibrium curve is quite sensitive
to these parameters.
My proposed measure of TQ is strongly positively correlated with cross-
country dispersion in student outcomes, even controlling for student and
school characteristics, family background, macroeconomic context and un-
observable country and timing fixed effects. In the chapter, I perform several
counter-factual exercises in order to discuss the importance of TQ in explain-
ing cross-country differences in student outcomes, as well as to understand
the main factors behind the TQ differences across countries.
The first counter-factual exercise shows us that cross-country differences
in TQ explain approximately 22% of the observed cross-country variance
in student outcomes. The importance of TQ is quite similar to the family
background effect and clearly higher than the relevance of other school inputs.
The second counter-factual exercise helps to understand the main vari-
ables affecting the quality of teachers. Previous literature teaches us that
teacher quality matters, but little is known regarding its main determinants.
Counter-factual exercises based on the model allow me not only to identify,
but also to quantify the main drivers of cross-country differences in TQ. This
exercise shows that initial distributions of population skills are crucial in ex-
plaining current differences in TQ across countries, while teacher salaries and
labour market conditions are of lesser importance.
5Hanushek (2003) provides an extensive review on this issue.
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Notice that the theoretical model used in this dissertation is like a small
laboratory that allows us to understand the behaviour of the different agents
in the educational system, as well as the interactions between them. Con-
sequently, the model provides us with a conceptual framework that enables
us to evaluate quantitatively several educational policies. This is precisely
what I do in the third chapter.
The third chapter analyses the trade-off between teacher quality and
teacher quantity by studying the efficient allocation of the educational wage
bill -where the wage bill takes into account the interaction between teacher
wages and the number of teachers. To do that, I use a modified version of
the model developed in chapter 2 -since now teacher wages and class size are
both endogenous. And as in the previous chapter, since the theoretical model
includes supply and demand of teachers, the analysis is a general equilibrium
framework which takes into account how supply and demand interact.
The main motivation of this chapter stems from the fact that educational
literature has been generally oriented towards the study of the effectiveness
of various educational policies considered individually. This type of analy-
sis has been stimulated in turn by the increasing use of random controlled
experiments for the evaluation of policies. However, papers which compare
various alternatives for the use of a single resource are much less frequent.
This chapter specifically analyses the efficient allocation of the educational
wage bill in order to improve student achievement. This analysis is of spe-
cial relevance given that, due to the scarcity of resources, it is necessary to
improve the efficiency of the public sector by directing efforts towards those
factors that have a greater impact on school performance.
Focusing the attention on the wage bill is important for at least two
reasons. First, the wage bill represents, on average, approximately 65% of
total educational expenditure in OECD countries (see OECD, 2017). Sec-
ond, teachers represent the educational input with the greatest impact on
students’ academic performance (Hanushek, 2003, Klein et al., 2010; Gates,
2011; Hiatt, 2009), and salaries area good tool to attract the best teachers.
Therefore, the efficiency of the education sector may well be closely related
to decisions on salary compensation.
The discussion regarding the allocation of the educational wage bill is
characterised by a clear trade-off between teacher quality and teacher quan-
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tity. On one hand, higher salaries could act as an incentive to attract and
retain the best teachers to the education sector (Dolton and and Marcenaro
Gutierrez, 2011; Loeb and Page, 2000).6 On the other hand, a rise in the
number of teachers allows a reduction of class size which is usually linked to
a better study environment, and therefore, to better student outcomes (Card
and Krueger, 1992; Hoxby, 2000; Woessman, 2005). When faced with a lack
of resources, policy makers need to choose between both alternatives.
In this chapter, we calibrate the theoretical model of teacher selection for
22 OECD countries between 2006 and 2015. Then, based on these calibra-
tions and the estimated educational production function, we compute the
optimal allocation of the educational wage bill in each country. Addition-
ally, based on the predicted student outcomes imposing the observed and the
optimal allocation for the wage bill, we build an index that measure the inef-
ficiency in the allocation of quantity and qualities of teacher -and thus, that
measure the inefficient wage bill of each country in our sample. The results
state that the average inefficiency in the allocation of the wage bill for the
group of countries considered is 16%. That is, resources currently allocated
to the educational wage bill could have a significantly greater impact on edu-
cational outcomes by improving their allocation between wages and teaching
hours. Moreover, in most countries, the inefficiency gap is generated by a
bias to prioritise the quantity more than the quality of teachers.
Finally, at the end of the dissertation, I present general conclusions of the
whole research.
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12 INTRODUCTION
Introduccio´n (Spanish)
La inversio´n en capital humano se ha identificado en la literatura como una
de las principales fuentes de crecimiento econo´mico a largo plazo (ve´anse,
por ejemplo, Hanushek y Kimko 2000, Barro 2001, Krueger y Lindahl 2001,
Hanushek y Woessmann 2012 y Castello-Climent y Hidalgo-Cabrillana 2012).
Por inversio´n en capital humano, nos referimos a las mejoras en las habili-
dades de la fuerza de trabajo necesarias para la produccio´n, de modo que el
capital humano es un concepto multidimensional y definidas como el conjunto
de habilidades que hacen a los individuos productivos. El conocimiento es la
ma´s importante de estas dimensiones, pero otros factores, como los hbitos,
los atributos sociales y de personalidad as´ı como la salud tambie´n importan
(Goldin 2016).
Pero las habilidades requeridas para la produccio´n no siempre han sido
las mismas a lo largo de la historia. El avance tecnolo´gico encarnado en las
sucesivas revoluciones industriales identificadas en la literatura ha modificado
la complementariedad entre el capital humano y el f´ısico y, por lo tanto, las
habilidades relevantes para la produccio´n. 7
Varios trabajos han destacado los posibles impactos del reciente pro-
ceso de cambio tecnolo´gico en el mercado laboral (Brynjolfsson y McAfee
2014; Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu y Autor 2011; Frey
y Osborne 2013, OCDE 2016). La literatura enfatiza que el progreso tec-
nolo´gico, en particular el avance en las tecnologas digitales, la comunicacio´n
y la robo´tica, puede crear empleos y aumentar los beneficios para muchos
trabajadores. Pero, al mismo tiempo, significa que ciertas actividades corren
un alto riesgo de quedar obsoletas, ya que algunas de ellas, como las tareas
7Ver Gordon 2016 para una revisin del proceso de cambio tecnolgico desde 1750.
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rutinarias o las que pueden ser reemplazadas por co´digos, se pueden automa-
tizar fa´cilmente, dando lugar a lo que comu´nmente se conoce como desempleo
tecnolo´gico Una primera rama de documentos analiza espec´ıficamente el im-
pacto del cambio tecnolo´gico en el desplazamiento de una gran parte de las
ocupaciones existentes (Brynjolfsson y 2014, Frey y Osborne 2013, OCDE
2016).
Por otro lado, otros estudios se centran en el tipo de tareas que resulta
ma´s probable que sufran este desplazamiento, as´ı como en los tipos de tareas
que podr´ıan ser cada vez ma´s demandadas por las nuevas tecnolog´ıas (Au-
tor, et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu y Autor, 2011). Esta u´ltima
aproximacio´n al efecto del cambio tecnolo´gico en los mercados laborales gen-
eralmente se denomina enfoque del contenido de tareas. En general, esta
literatura concluye que los trabajos intensivos en tareas cognitivas, particu-
larmente en el caso de tareas cognitivas no rutinarias, como el pensamiento
abstracto, la creatividad, la capacidad de resolver problemas y las habili-
dades de comunicacio´n que normalmente desempean los trabajadores alta-
mente calificados, estar´ıan siendo estimulados por este proceso. Por lo tanto,
la insersio´n laboral, as´ı como la productividad laboral, estara´n cada vez ma´s
unidas a la capacidad de los trabajadores para desarrollar este tipo de tareas
cognitivas.
Claramente, este feno´meno ejerce presio´n sobre los sistemas educativos
que deber´ıan ser capaces de moverse en l´ınea con las tendencias tecnolo´gicas,
proporcionando y desarrollando las habilidades cognitivas requeridas para
los trabajos actuales. En este sentido, un ana´lisis exhaustivo de los sistemas
educativos y de los inputs ma´s importantes para mejorar las habilidades
cognitivas de los estudiantes se vuelve extremadamente importante.
En las u´ltimas de´cadas, en el campo de la educacio´n, se ha acumulado una
gran cantidad de datos emp´ıricos sobre el desempeo de los estudiantes enel
per´ıodo escolar, no solo en datos comparables entre pa´ıses (por ejemplo, a
trave´s del Programa de Evaluacio´n Internacional de Estudiantes de la OCDE,
PISA) pero tambie´n dentro de los pa´ıses. Gracias a esta mayor disponibilidad
de datos, la literatura emp´ırica sobre educacio´n ha crecido exponencialmente.
8
8Ve´ase, Hanushek 2003 para una revisio´n exhaustiva de la literatura emp´ırica sobre
educacio´n.
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De la literatura anterior se ha generado un amplio consenso, tanto por
parte de los responsables pol´ıticos como de los investigadores, de que la cali-
dad docente es un input clave en el proceso de aprendizaje de los estudiantes
(Hanushek, 2003; Hanushek y Rivkin 2007; Hanushek, 2010; Hanushek y
Rivkin 2010, entre otros). De hecho, varios art´ıculos indican que la calidad
del docente representa el insumo escolar con mayor incidencia en los resul-
tados educativos (Hanushek, 2003, Klein et al., 2010, Gates, 2011 y Hiatt,
2009.). Por ejemplo, Hanushek (2010) demuestra que la diferencia entre un
buen y un mal profesor es equivalente a avanzar el conocimiento en un ao
acade´mico. Por otro lado, Chetty et al. (2011) afirma que tener profesores
de calidad mejora no solo los resultados de los exa´menes estandarizados, sino
que tambie´n genera efectos a largo plazo, tanto econo´micos como sociales.
Sin embargo, hay mucho menos acuerdo sobre qu aspectos determinan la
calidad de los docentes, as´ı como una literatura teo´rica reducida que anal-
iza el proceso de seleccio´n docente. La principal limitacio´n en el estudio de
la calidad docente se deriva del hecho de que la calidad del docente es in-
observable.9 De hecho, la evidencia anterior sugiere que las caracter´ısticas
observables de los docentes no presentan una correlacio´n clara con los logros
alcanzados por los estudiantes (Rockoff, 2004; Jepsen, 2005; Hanushek y
Rivkin , 2007, Hanushek, 2010 entre otros). En este sentido, todav´ıa hay
mucho margen para aprender sobre la importancia de la calidad del docente
como insumo educativo y, fundamentalmente, co´mo influir en la calidad do-
cente con objeto mejorar los resultados educativos.
El objetivo de esta tesis es precisamente arrojar luz sobre estos temas.
Por un lado, el objetivo de este documento es identificar el tipo de tarea que
tiene mayor demanda en el mercado laboral actual. Por otro lado, estudiamos
co´mo el sistema educativo proporciona estas habilidades centra´ndonos en el
ana´lisis de la calidad de los docentes. Con ese fin, esta tesis consta de tres
cap´ıtulos, cada uno de ellos escrito con el estilo de un documento acade´mico.
El primer cap´ıtulo analiza las tendencias del perfil de empleo en los pa´ıses
de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe de acuerdo con el contenido de la tarea re-
alizada por los trabajadores en sus trabajos en los u´ltimos veinte an˜os. La
principal motivacio´n para este cap´ıtulo proviene del hecho de que la mayor´ıa
9El supuesto de no observabilidad de la habilidad docente se sugiere en estudios previos.
Ver, por ejemplo, Hanushek (2010) y Rothstein et al. (2014).
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de la literatura sobre el impacto potencial del cambio tecnolgico en los mer-
cados laborales se basa en los pa´ıses desarrollados. Sin embargo, la evidencia
para pa´ıses emergentes y particularmente para Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe
es mucho ma´s limitada. De hecho, segu´n mi conocimiento, este trabajo es el
primero que hace este ana´lisis para un conjunto representativo de pa´ıses de
Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe.
Los pa´ıses de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe muestran caracter´ısticas muy
diferentes respecto a los pa´ıses desarrollados que podr´ıan conducir a difer-
entes tendencias en el avance tecnolo´gico y en el perfil de tareas de los mer-
cados laborales. De hecho, la estructura econo´mica y, en consecuencia, la
especializacio´n sectorial es diferente entre pa´ıses desarrollados y emergentes.
Los pa´ıses de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe tambie´n se caracterizan por salarios
ma´s bajos y, por lo tanto, menores incentivos para la automatizacio´n con re-
specto a los pa´ıses desarrollados. Finalmente, los pa´ıses de Ame´rica Latina
suelen mostrar un menor rendimiento en las pruebas que miden las habili-
dades cognitivas de la poblacio´n, lo que podr´ıa implicar restricciones de la
oferta de trabajo para avanzar hacia un perfil de empleo ma´s intensivo en
tareas cognitivas.10
Por lo tanto, utilizando la evidencia de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe, la
principal pregunta de este primer capo´tulo es si el cambio tecnolo´gico tambie´n
ha provocado una demanda creciente de habilidades cognitivas en los pa´ıses
emergentes o, por el contrario, esta demanda creciente de las habilidades
cognitivas au´n no se ha producido en estos pa´ıses.
Para ello, el captulo tiene como objetivo producir una aproximacio´n del
impacto del cambio tecnolo´gico en el mercado laboral. Especficamente, se
construye un indicador que capta la importancia relativa de cuatro tipos
de tareas, tareas cognitivas versus tareas manuales y rutinarias versus no
rutinarias, basadas en la informacin provista por Occupational Information
Network (O*NET) y la encuestas de hogares. El enfoque emp´ırico sigue la
metodologa del contenido de tareas propuesta en el trabajo de Acemoglu y
Autor (2011).
El ana´lisis encuentra que en las u´ltimas dos de´cadas la importancia rela-
10Nota, ver por ejemplo, las brechas en las habilidades cognitivas entre y pa´ıses en
desarrollo en pruebas PISA (OCDE, 2015) y la encuesta PIAAC (OCDE, 2013).
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tiva de las tareas cognitivas no rutinarias en el lugar de trabajo ha aumentado
en l´ınea con la reduccio´n de las tareas manuales. Estas conclusiones esta´n
en concordancia con la evidencia existente en la literatura para los pa´ıses
desarrollados. Es decir, nuestro primer cap´ıtulo nos muestra que la creciente
demanda de ocupaciones cognitivas no rutinarias en el mercado laboral es una
tendencia que esta´ a nivel global, independientemente del nivel de desarrollo
de los pa´ıses.
Tambie´n estudiamos si el nuevo perfil en la demanda de tareas en el mer-
cado laboral afecta el riesgo de polarizacio´n del mercado laboral mediante
el estudio del ingreso laboral. Mostramos que los salarios reflejan una re-
muneracio´n relativa ma´s alta para las tareas cognitivas. Por lo tanto, las
ocupaciones intensivas en habilidades cognitivas representan una demanda
creciente y una mayor remuneracio´n, en comparacio´n con las ocupaciones
intensivas en tareas manuales. En este contexto, dado que las habilidades
cognitivas tienen una mejor insercio´n en el mercado laboral, el sistema ed-
ucativo debe tener esto en cuenta al proporcionar y desarrollar ma´s de este
tipo de habilidades.
El segundo y tercer captulos se concentran en el sistema educativo. Par-
ticularmente, el segundo cap´ıtulo analiza, ¿por que´ algunos pa´ıses obtienen
mejores resultados educativos que otros –donde los resultados educativos se
miden utilizando datos de habilidades cognitivas? Este cap´ıtulo analiza esta
relevante pregunta centra´ndose en el papel de la calidad del docente. En este
segundo cap´ıtulo, propongo y calibro un modelo teo´rico micro-fundado de
seleccio´n de profesores con agentes heteroge´neos, que difieren en la habilidad
general y la habilidad de ser (un buen) profesor, para un conjunto de 22 pases
de la OCDE.
Como se menciono´ anteriormente, hay una escasez de literatura teo´rica
que estudie el proceso de seleccio´n de docentes. El modelo propuesto nos
ayuda a comprender los mecanismos a trave´s de los cuales las personas de-
ciden convertirse en docentes y co´mo las instituciones educativas los selec-
cionan. Claramente, entender este proceso de seleccio´n en profundidad es
el primer paso para comprender las variables que caracterizan la calidad de
los docentes en un pa´ıs, y por lo tanto, para disear polticas educativas para
mejorar el rendimiento escolar. Es necesario tener en cuenta que mejorar el
rendimiento de los estudiantes importa ya que no solo se generan beneficios
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individuales a trave´s de mejores puestos laborales y mejores rendimientos
laborales (ver por ejemplo Cameron y Heckman 1993, 1998) sino tambie´n
beneficios agregados a trave´s de un mayor crecimiento econo´mico en el pa´ıs
(ver, entre otros, Hanushek y Kimko, 2000; Hanushek y Woessmann, 2012).
A partir del modelo, se construyeron series temporales de la calidad do-
cente (TQ) agregada para cada pa´ıs, y se analizaron sus principales deter-
minantes al tiempo que se estudio´ la importancia de la TQ para explicar
las diferencias en los logros de educativos los estudiantes. Mi aproximacio´n
de la TQ medida para diferentes pa´ıses en diferentes aos me ayuda a enten-
der si las tendencias de la calidad del docente pueden explicar la evolucio´n
de los logros de los estudiantes a nivel nacional, medidos con los datos de
PISA. Hasta donde tengo conocimiento, no hay estudios previos que incluyan
este ana´lisis debido a que no existen series temporales previas de medidas
de calidad docente a nivel del pa´ıs. Tener series temporales de calidad de
docentes para un conjunto de pa´ıses es importante porque las razones detra´s
de la dispersio´n entre pa´ıses en los resultados de los estudiantes podran ser
potencialmente elementos inobservables como la cultura de aprendizaje o las
instituciones educativas. Contar con series temporales de TQ, nos permite
controlar las estimaciones realizadas por estos efectos fijos inobservables a
nivel de pa´ıs.
El modelo teo´rico muestra que en equilibrio general, la relacio´n entre
salarios docentes y calidad docente (TQ) es no lineal e incluso podr´ıa ser
no mono´tona. Este resultado teo´rico nos ayuda a comprender por que´ la
literatura emp´ırica que analiza los salarios de los docentes y los logros ed-
ucativos no es concluyente. La evidencia sugiere que los salarios no son un
indicador fiable de la calidad del docente, ya que la mayor´ıa de los estudios
no encuentran un efecto estad´ısticamente significativo entre los salarios y los
resultados de los estudiantes.11 Sin embargo, una razo´n que podr´ıa explicar
esta divergencia en resultados ser´ıa que distintos pa´ıses esta´n en diferentes
partes de la curva de equilibrio. Esto es as´ı porque, por un lado, el ana´lisis
emprico previo basado en datos transversales dentro de un pa´ıs determinado
probablemente captura un pequeo segmento de la curva de equilibrio ya que
la dispersio´n salarial del docente suele ser pequea dentro de los pa´ıses. Por
otro lado, los para´metros que controlan el proceso de seleccio´n de docentes
difieren entre pa´ıses, lo que determina que la curva de equilibrio salario do-
11Hanushek (2003) proporciona una revisio´n extensa sobre este tema.
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cente y calidad docente sea diferente entre los pa´ıses debido a que la misma
es bastante sensible a cambios en los para´metros exo´genos.
La medida propuesta de TQ tiene una correlacio´n fuerte y positiva con
la dispersio´n entre pa´ıses en los resultados de los estudiantes, incluso con-
trolando por las caracter´ısticas de los estudiantes y las escuelas, los an-
tecedentes familiares, el contexto macroecono´mico y los efectos fijos no ob-
servables del pa´ıs. En el cap´ıtulo, realizo varios ejercicios contrafactuales
para discutir la importancia de TQ para explicar las diferencias entre pa´ıses
en los resultados de los estudiantes, as´ı como para comprender los principales
factores detra´s de las diferencias de TQ entre los pa´ıses. El primer ejercicio
contrafactual nos muestra que las diferencias entre pa´ıses en TQ explican
aproximadamente el 22% del total de la varianza observada entre pa´ıses en
los resultados de los estudiantes. La importancia de TQ resulta similar al
efecto de contexto familiar y claramente ma´s alta que la relevancia de otros
insumos escolares.
El segundo ejercicio contrafactual ayuda a comprender las principales
variables que afectan la calidad de los docentes. La literatura previa nos
ensea que la calidad docente importa, pero se sabe poco sobre sus principales
determinantes. Los ejercicios contra-fa´ctuales nos permiten cuantificar los
principales determinantes de las diferencias entre pases en TQ y demuestran
que las distribuciones iniciales de las habilidades de la poblacio´n son cruciales
para explicar las diferencias actuales en la TQ entre los pases, mientras que
salarios docentes y condiciones del mercado laboral tienen una importancia
menor.
El modelo teo´rico utilizado es como un pequeo laboratorio que nos per-
mite comprender el comportamiento de los diferentes agentes en el sistema
educativo, as´ı como las interacciones entre ellos. En consecuencia, el modelo
nos proporciona un marco conceptual que nos ayuda evaluar cuantitativa-
mente varias pol´ıticas educativas. Esto es precisamente lo que hago en el
tercer cap´ıtulo.
El tercer cap´ıtulo analiza la relacio´n entre la calidad y cantidad docente
mediante el estudio de la asignacio´n eficiente de la masa salarial educativa,
y donde la masa salarial tiene en cuenta la interaccio´n entre los salarios do-
centes y el nu´mero de docentes. Para ello, utilizo una versio´n modificada
del modelo desarrollado en el captulo 2, ya que ahora los salarios de los do-
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centes y el taman˜o de las clase son ambos endo´genos. Y como en el cap´ıtulo
anterior, dado que el modelo teo´rico incluye la oferta y la demanda de do-
centes, el ana´lisis es un marco de equilibrio general que tiene en cuenta co´mo
interactu´an la oferta y la demanda.
La principal motivacio´n de este cap´ıtulo radica en el hecho de que la liter-
atura educativa se ha orientado generalmente hacia el estudio de la efectivi-
dad de diversas polticas educativas consideradas individualmente. Este tipo
de ana´lisis ha sido estimulado a su vez por el uso creciente de experimentos
controlados aleatoriamente para la evaluacio´n de pol´ıticas. Sin embargo, los
documentos que comparan varias alternativas para el uso de un u´nico recurso
son mucho menos frecuentes. Este cap´ıtulo analiza espec´ıficamente la asig-
nacio´n eficiente de la masa salarial educativa para mejorar el rendimiento
estudiantil. Este ana´lisis es de especial relevancia dado que, debido a la
escasez de recursos, mejorar la eficiencia del sector pu´blico implica dirigir
los esfuerzos hacia aquellos factores que tienen un mayor impacto en el de-
sempen˜o escolar.
Centrar la atencio´n en la masa salarial es importante por al menos dos
razones. En primer lugar, la masa salarial representa, en promedio, aprox-
imadamente el 65% del gasto total en educacio´n en los pa´ıses de la OCDE
(ver OCDE, 2017). En segundo lugar, los docentes representan el imput ed-
ucativo con mayor impacto en el rendimiento acade´mico de los estudiantes
(Hanushek, 2003, Klein et al., 2010; Gates, 2011; Hiatt, 2009), y los salarios
son una buena herramienta para atraer y retener a los mejores docentes.
Por lo tanto, la eficiencia del sector educativo puede estar estrechamente
relacionada con las decisiones sobre la compensaciones salariales.
La discusio´n sobre la asignacio´n de la masa salarial educativa se carac-
teriza por una clara disyuntiva entre la calidad y la cantidad de docentes.
Por un lado, los salarios ma´s altos podr´ıan actuar como un incentivo para
atraer y retener a los mejores docentes al sector educativo (Doltonand y
Marcenaro Gutirrez, 2011; Loeb y Page, 2000).12 Por otro lado, un aumento
en el nu´mero de docentes permite una reduccio´n del taman˜o de clase que
generalmente esta´ asociada a un mejor ambiente de estudio y, por lo tanto,
a mejores resultados de los estudiantes (Card y Krueger, 1992; Hoxby, 2000;
Woessman, 2005).
12Los resultados del Cap´ıtulo 2 tambie´n respaldan esta idea.
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En este cap´ıtulo, calibro el modelo teo´rico de seleccio´n de docentes para
22 pases de la OCDE entre 2006 y 2015. Luego, con base en estas calibra-
ciones y la funcio´n de produccio´n educativa estimada, calculamos la asig-
nacio´n o´ptima de la masa salarial educativa en cada pa´ıs. Adema´s, compara-
ndo los resultados estudiantiles medidos con PISA utilizando la cantidad
y calidad de profesores teo´rica as´ı como los observados en los datos, con-
struimos un ı´ndice que mide la ineficiencia en la asignacio´n de cantidad y
cualidades del docente y, por lo tanto, mide la ineficiencia salarial de cada
pa´ıs de nuestra muestra. Los resultados indican que la ineficiencia promedio
en la asignacio´n de la masa salarial para el grupo de pa´ıses considerado es
del 16%. Es decir, los recursos actualmente asignados a la masa salarial ed-
ucativa podr´ıan tener un impacto significativamente mayor en los resultados
educativos al mejorar su asignacin entre salarios y horas lectivas. Adema´s,
en la mayora de los pa´ıses, la brecha de ineficiencia se genera por un sesgo al
priorizar la cantidad respecto a la calidad de los docentes.
Finalmente, al final de la tesis, se presentan las conclusiones generales de
toda la investigacio´n.
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Chapter 1
Technological change and
Labour market trends in Latin
America and the Caribbean: A
task content approach
1.1 Introduction
Technological change, such as the advance in digital technologies, communi-
cation, and robotics, can lead to an improvement in the general well-being
of the population and reduce poverty, thanks to the increase in global pro-
ductivity of the economy.
The potential benefits of technological advance are important for both,
workers and for consumers. Digital technologies, for example, can create jobs
and increase benefits for small and medium-sized producers through the ex-
pansion of access to information and communication mechanisms, especially
in those sectors which could be, or already are users of that technology. An
example of this could be the creation of commercial platforms connected via
the internet through which buyers and sellers can be brought together with
0This is a joint work with Ignacio Apella (World Bank)
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minimum transaction costs.
From the point of view of consumers, the benefit coming from technologi-
cal change is associated with the potential reduction in the price of products
downstream - as a consequence of the profits gained from greater efficiencies
and the increase in the range of goods and services available, thus generating
a positive variation in consumer surplus. The majority of these consumer
gains come from reduced marginal costs of production and distribution when
the productive sector incorporates technological innovation and automates
productive processes taking advantage of the economies of scale which are
generated.1
However, if this process is not accompanied by complementary invest-
ments, that is, institutional reforms and public policies aimed at capitalizing
on the advantages that this process permits, then, the technological advance
could also deepen a situation of inequality. Indeed, technological advance,
together with the reduction of access cost to new forms of production, gener-
ates a potential displacement of a part of the traditional labour force through
machines administered from computerized systems, while at the same time
paving the way for the creation of new types of jobs.
Technical progress, in particular, the advance of robotics, means that cer-
tain activities run a high risk of becoming obsolete, since some of them, such
as routine tasks, or those which can be replaced by a code, can be easily auto-
mated, leading to what is commonly known as technological unemployment.
Depending on whether the machines are capable of replacing only unskilled
work, skilled work, or all work, the consequences will be distributed differ-
ently.
In this sense, this new setting poses some challenges or new complemen-
tary investments for the labour force in order that the benefits offered by the
technological change are realized. In other words, it demands an increment
in the productivity of workers through an increase in their human capital
in order to ensure their adaptation to and compliance with the new forms
of production. In effect, the benefit generated by the use of the new pro-
duction technologies is not automatic. Not only does access to information
1However, the transfer of a technological improvement to final prices assumes a certain
grade of competition in each market. In a market with a high concentration, profits from
efficiency will be transferred to the profit margins of the companies.
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services and digital communication need to be improved, but also new basic
skills need to be incorporated through the updating of education systems
and continuous training.
Several recent works have called attention to the potential impacts of the
recent process of technological change on the labour market (Brynjolfsson
and McAfee 2014; Autor et. al. 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu and
Autor 2011; Frey and Osborne 2013; OECD, 2016). Particularly, these works
highlight not only the possibility that technological change could displace a
big part of the current occupations (Frey and Osborne 2013, Brynjolfsson
and McAfee 2014, OECD, 2016) but also delve into the type of tasks that
are most likely to suffer this displacement and, on the contrary, the types of
tasks which could be increasingly demanded by the new technologies (Autor,
et. al. 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). The last
approximation to the effect of technological change on labour markets is
usually called as the task content approach.
Previous literature based on the task content approach states that jobs
intensive in cognitive tasks, particularly in the case of non-routine cognitive
tasks not only that they would suffer to a lesser extent the phenomenon of
technological displacement but, on the contrary, they would be stimulated
by this process (Autor et al., 2003, and Spitz-Oener, 2006, Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011, Keister and Lewandowski, 2016). Therefore, labour placement,
as well as the labour productivity, will be increasingly linked to the ability
of workers to develop cognitive tasks.
However, most of the literature regarding the potential impact of tech-
nological change on labour markets is based on developed countries. Evi-
dence for emerging countries and particularly for Latin American and the
Caribbean is much more limited. Emerging countries show different char-
acteristics than developed countries which could potentially leads to differ-
ent trends of technological advance and task profile of the labour markets.
Indeed, the economic structure/specialization is different between developed
and emerging countries. Emerging countries are characterized by lower wages
and therefore lower incentives for automation compared with developed coun-
tries. Finally, emerging countries usually show lower performance in compar-
ative test of cognitive skills which could imply constraints from the labour
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supply to move toward a task profile more intensive in cognitive tasks.2
Therefore, the stylized facts for developed countries are not necessarily
true for emerging countries. Then, the following question arise: Do tech-
nological change also have determined a growing demand of cognitive skills
for workers in emerging countries? This chapter aims to provide elements to
answer this question based on the evidence for Latin America and Caribbean
in the last two decades.
In this line, the objective of this chapter is to study past tendencies in
the level of employment according to the types of tasks that the workers
did in their jobs, in order to approximately assess the possible impact of
technological change on labour demand and to prompt a discussion on the
possible responses to this challenge in public policies. To do that, we apply
the task content methodology proposed to Acemoglu and Author (2011) to
a set of 9 Latin American and the Caribbean countries (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay)
which we understand represent quite well the different characteristics of the
whole region.
This chapter provides new evidence which suggest that labour markets of
the Latin American and the Caribbean countries are not exempt from this
process. During the last 20 years, the labour force in the region has moved
from developing more in the area of intensive manual tasks to instead that of
performing cognitive tasks. This allows us to states that, on average across
the whole market, jobs are changing and with that the type of skills, and
workers, required. This phenomenon is a characteristic of the change pro-
cesses in the production functions of economies, in particular, of the adoption
of new technologies such as robotics, which permit manual labour to be sub-
stituted in certain tasks.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theoret-
ical framework of analysis related to the relationship between technological
change and the rhythm of substitution of productive factors. The third sec-
tion presents the methodology and information used. The fourth section
analyses the main results obtained for a set of nine Latin American and the
2See, for example, the gaps in cognitive skills between emerging and developing coun-
tries in the PISA test (OECD, 2015) and the PIAAC survey (OECD, 2013).
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Caribbean Countries. The fifth section discusses the challenges that these
tendencies imply for public policies. Finally, some final reflections are made.
1.2 Theoretical framework
The impact of technological advance on the performance of the labour market
is discussed at length in the literature (Autor et al., 2003 and 2013; Frey and
Osborne, 2013; among others) in which it is suggested that there is a reduc-
tion in the level of employment in occupations high in routine tasks, that is,
occupations which consist principally in tasks which follow well-defined pro-
cedures that can easily be performed by some sort of algorithm. This shows
that not only technological advance, but also the reduction in cost of access-
ing these new production technologies, generates a potential displacement of
a part of the labour force through machines administered by a computer-
ized system. Therefore, technological change, in particular the advance of
robotics, could give rise to an increase in technological unemployment.
Frey and Osborne (2013) distinguish between occupations at high, medium
and low risk of being automated, and argue that close to 47% of the total
work of the United States can be placed within the high-risk category. For its
part, the World Bank (2016) estimates that an average of 50% of the current
work in Latin America might not continue being performed by people in the
future.
However, not all jobs are susceptible to being automated. The analysis
of this phenomenon requires jobs to be differentiated, not by their levels of
qualifications or skills, as may be suggested, but by the combination of tasks
which are performed. This analysis framework, known as ”task content”, is
the proposal of Autor et al. (2003) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), among
others. According to these authors, the tasks are not strictly the skills with
which the worker is equipped, but those which are closely related with them.
Specifically, a task is defined as an activity which enables the creation of a
product (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). However, the workers need a series of
skills to be able to carry out these tasks. As an example, an architect needs
great numerical and mathematical skills to perform cognitive tasks which
are generally non-routine, such as the design and development of plans. The
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skills may be seen as the ability of the workers to perform particular tasks.
Tasks can be classified in two large categories: routine or non-routine. A
task is routine if its performance implies a clear and repetitive set of invariable
actions. Many tasks, such as the temperature control of a steel production
line or the transfer of a car part to its place in an assembly line, among others,
have this characteristic. Since these tasks require the methodical repetition
of a constant procedure, they can be clearly specified in a computer program
and performed by a machine.
On the other hand, a non-routine task is that whose performance requires
various actions to vary in time, and requires the ability to adapt to the
context, using language, visual recognition and social interaction, among
others. Following Polanyi (1966), this skill that says that a driver cannot
be completely replaced; the knowledge that a person has about their own
body differs completely from their knowledge of physiology; and the rules
of rhyme and prose do not explain in themselves what a poem conveys. In
this sense, the passage of a car through the traffic of a city, or the writing
of a poem, fall into the category of non-routine tasks. The reason being
that those tasks require the abilities of visual, socio-emotional and motor
processing that cannot be described in terms of a set of programmable rules.
At the same time, the tasks in each of these two categories may be of
a manual or cognitive nature, that is, that they are related to either phys-
ical work or to knowledge. From this, it is possible to establish four main
categories of tasks:
1. Routine manual tasks: normally performed by low- or medium-skilled
workers. Such tasks are highly codifiable and replaceable by automa-
tion, such as assembly line workers and manual factory workers.
2. Non-routine manual tasks: commonly performed by poorly-qualified
workers. The performance of these tasks requires the ability to adapt
to the situation, the language, visual recognition or social interaction.
Drivers, mining workers and construction are examples of occupations
which perform these types of tasks intensively. These workers have a
low or zero probability of being computerized although Frey and Os-
borne (2013) suggested that some of these tasks, such as transport and
logistics and administrative support, are at risk of being automated.
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3. Routine cognitive tasks: are carried out by medium-skilled workers.
In some occupations more than others, computers may be a substitu-
tion factor since they demand explicit and repeated sets of activities
which could be coded in a computer program. The tasks performed by
secretaries, salespeople, administrative staff and bank cashiers, among
others, fall within this group.
4. Non-routine cognitive tasks: normally performed by highly-skilled work-
ers. These tasks, which are often divided into two large subcategories,
such as those of analysis and of personal relations, require abstract
thought, creativity, the ability to solve problems and communication
skills. Computers may complement the performance of these tasks,
increasing the productivity of the skilled workers. These tasks are
commonly performed by professionals such as managers, designers, en-
gineers or information technology specialists, teachers, and researchers,
among others.
All occupations, with differing levels of intensity, involve one or a com-
bination of the tasks described. The intensity of the tasks may appear very
heterogeneous between occupations. As an example, a car driver performs
non-routine manual tasks the majority of the time but also performs per-
sonal non-routine cognitive tasks and routine cognitive tasks. In contrast
a scientist dedicates the majority of their time to the performance of non-
routine cognitive tasks but also preforms routine tasks with a lower frequency
(cognitive and/or manual).
Owing to the decline in costs of access to new technologies, computer-
controlled machinery could replace those workers that perform largely routine
tasks, especially manual ones. This phenomenon is not new. This substitu-
tion has been seen since the first industrial revolution, but the technological
revolution has developed in such a way that machines can perform cognitive
tasks that decades ago were only performed by people. Following Bresnahan
(1999), during the last three decades computers have replaced tasks associ-
ated with calculation, coordination of activities and communication, bank
cashiers, telephone operators and other operators of repetitive information-
processing tasks.
On the other hand, the ability of computers to replace workers em-
ployed in the performance of cognitive tasks is limited. The combination
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of tasks which demand flexibility, creativity, problem-solving and communi-
cation skills (non-routine cognitive tasks) are less susceptible to being auto-
mated. The need to establish a series of explicitly-programmed instructions
constitutes a restriction.
Because computer technology is more adept at replacing workers who
routinely perform routine tasks than non-routine tasks, it becomes a comple-
mentary factor for the development of non-routine tasks, and is even capable
of increasing marginal productivity. To give an example, the ability to use
a bibliographic search program through a networked computer increases the
efficiency and quality of researchers that use such references as inputs.
Not all tasks are susceptible to being replaced by machines. The decision
of the productive sector related to the optimum combination of production
factors is found to be associated not only with the flexibility of the substi-
tution between factors but also with the relative price of them. The simple
model proposed by Autor et al. (2003) and also by Frey and Osborne (2013)
allows these decisions to be formalized.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for work and capital in
the following manner:
Q = (Lr + k)
1−βLβn (1.1)
Where Lr and k are the work intended to be performed by the tasks
susceptible to automation and the capital that these tasks can realize, re-
spectively. Both factors are perfect substitutes. Ln represents the value of
the work required so that the tasks are not susceptible to automation. As-
suming that the price of the product is the numeraire and that wr, ρ, and
wn are the salary of the work that can be automated, the price of the capital
and the salary of the complementary work, respectively, of the first order
conditions we can find the following expression.
PMgLr = PMgk = (1− β)(Lr + k)
−β
L−βn
= wr = ρ (1.2)
Where θ = (Lr+k)
Ln
is the relationship between tasks susceptible and not
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susceptible to being automated within the production function. The optimal
condition demands equality between the quotient of the marginal productiv-
ities of the factors and the relative prices:
PMgLr
PMgk
= 1 =
wr
ρ
(1.3)
Assuming a reduction of the price of capital, ρ, that implies that the
technical substitution relationship is less than the relative prices, encouraging
the company to seek a reallocation of productive factors in order to achieve
economic efficiency. To do so, the company replaces labour with capital.3
Simultaneously, a modification of the relative prices is generated, generating
an increment of the redistribution Lr in relation to Ln. Of the first order
conditions, we also have that:
(1− β)θ−β = ρ (1.4)
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and differentiating completely
we have that:
dlnθ
dlnρ
= − 1
β
(1.5)
Thus, a substitution effect is generated in favour of tasks susceptible to
automation, and within these, in favour of those made by capital.
This change of relative prices, in addition to the effect generated by the
substitution, would generate incentives around the type of job. Following
Goos and Manning (2007), for the case of Great Britain, it is possible to
see a tendency in the polarization in the work market, with growth in high-
income cognitive work and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by
a reduction in routine tasks with medium incomes. In this sense, given a
reduction in the prices of computing equipment, problem-solving skills are
3In the case of additive production functions, the only effect in the face of an exogenous
price shock is the substitution effect.
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becoming relatively more productive, which explains the growth in occupa-
tions which require the performance of cognitive tasks by a qualified labour
force (Katz and Murphy, 1992 and Acemoglu, 2002).
1.3 Methodology and sources of information
To carry out this analysis, the information available in the O*NET (Occu-
pational Information Network) database was used in conjunction with the
Households surveys. This database provides information referring to the
content of tasks of the occupations. Since 2003, O*NET data have been
collected in the United States for approximately 1000 occupations based on
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), and it has been updated
periodically.4
Following the work of Acemoglu and Author (2011) four sets of O*NET
data are used: skills, work activities, work context and skills. Each of them
contains descriptors that try to measure the importance, level or scope of the
activity from a scale. For this, data from O*NET 2003 and 2015 are used in
order to capture the content change of the tasks within each occupation over
time.
In order to estimate the content of the tasks in the occupations, the el-
ements of the tasks provided by O*NET are mapped to the corresponding
occupations of four digits in the International Standard Classification of Oc-
cupations (ISCO). This is combined with individual labour force data from
household surveys. In general, each country has a specific version of the
ISCO or, at least, in cases where a national classification is used, an ISCO
equivalence is applied. On the other hand, O*NET follows a modified ver-
sion of the Standard Occupational Classification (ONET-SOC). In order to
be able to combine the appropriate occupational attributes to the household
survey data, an equivalence table between these two classifications is used.
In many cases the correspondence tables do not determine a one-to-one
4O*NET is the successor of DOT (Dictionary of occupational titles) which is no longer
updated. O*NET was launched in 1998 on the basis of the BLS Occupational Employment
Statistics codes. In 2003, it was changed to SOC which implies that the consistent measures
of task content are calculated from 2003.
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correspondence between the occupation categories of O*NET and the house-
hold surveys. In these cases, the strategy used by Hardy et al. (2015) was
followed. Four situations can be identified.
In the first case, there are situations where an occupational code of a
specific classification corresponds to only one occupational code of the clas-
sification we want to map to. In this case the characteristics are attributed
directly to the first code of the second classification.
In the second case, a specific code of a classification corresponds to more
than one code of the classification we wish to map to. In this case, the
characteristics of the same original code are attributed to all the occupations
of the second classification.
In third case, various occupations from the original code correspond to
the same code in the classification we are mapping to. In this case, the
average value of the characteristics associated to the codes of the original
classification are attributed to this last code.
The final case is where various codes in the original classification corre-
spond to various codes in the mapped classification. In this situation, again
an average value of the characteristics associated to the corresponding codes
of the original classification is attributed to each code in the mapped classi-
fication.
Once the mapping has been done, following Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
and Hardy et al. (2015), five measures of content or intensity of main tasks
are constructed: cognitive non-routine analytical and interpersonal, routine
cognitive and manual and non-routine manuals. These are building based on
the attributes of the activities that the occupation requires. In this sense,
some attributes (elements) that are representative of each task were selected.
They are presented in Table 1.1.
After assigning each attribute to each task, and these to the information
from the surveys, the values of each element t are normalized in order to
enable information to be comparable across time, using the following formula:
∀j ∈ J tstdi,j =
ti − µj
δi
(1.6)
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Table 1.1: Construction of the measurement of the content of tasks
 
Tasks  O*NET information (t)  
Non-routine cognitive (analitycal)  
Analyzing data/information  
Thinking creatively  
Interpreting information for others  
Non-routinecognitive (interpersonal)  
Establishing and maintaining personal relationships  
Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates  
Coaching/developing others  
Routine Cognitive  
Importance of repeating the same tasks  
Importance of being exact or accurate  
Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)  
Non-routine manual  
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment  
Spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools or controls  
Manual dexterity  
Spatial orientation  
Routine Manual  
Pace determined by speed of equipment  
Controlling machines and processes  
Spend time making repetitive motions  
Source: Own elaboration based on Acemoglu and Author (2011)
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where J is the combination of the 16 tasks listed in Table 1.1 for the
occupation i and µj and δj represent, respectively, the weighted average and
the standard deviation of the task j in the total of the period 1995-2015
computed as follows:
∀j ∈ J µj =
∑N
i ti,jwi∑N
i wi
(1.7)
∀j ∈ J δj =
(∑N
i wi(ti,j − µj)∑N
i wi
)1/2
(1.8)
where wi is the relative weighting attributed to the occupation i.
To construct the measures of intensity of each task each one of the el-
ements of the same group of tasks is added up and each one of the five
measures of intensity is standardized.
1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 Relative importance of each task in the job
In this section, we present the empirical results related to the change in the
tasks performed by the average employment of the selected countries between
the middle 90s and 2015. The aim is not only to identify the changes but
also the factors that promoted these changes and the effects on the wage
distribution.
Figure 1.1 shows for each country, the variation of the content of each
type of task in the average employment between the middle 90s and the year
2015.
Observing the variation between the extreme years in each country, a
clear common tendency of change in the profile of the average employment
of the region is appreciated, although with some differences that need to be
highlighted.
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Figure 1.1: Change of the content of the tasks carried out in
employment by country. Mid-’90 - 2015.
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In terms of the content of non-routine cognitive tasks, both analytical and
interpersonal relations, all the countries analysed, with the only exception
of the Dominican Republic, show an increase in the content of these tasks
in average employment. This finding is in line with the process of changing
tasks performed by workers in a context in which there is a risk of automation
of many of them. As mentioned above, non-routine cognitive tasks are not
susceptible to automation and therefore it is in this group of activities that
space is generated for the work force.
In the case of manual tasks, both routine and non-routine, their relative
importance within average employment decreased during the period of study
in all countries, again with the exception of the Dominican Republic. For
its part, Bolivia is a particular case, because although there is a drop in
non-routine manual tasks, there is also a small increase in routine manual
tasks.
On the other hand, the importance of routine cognitive tasks in average
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employment rises in five of the nine selected countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador and Uruguay. On the contrary, in the case of Bolivia,
Mexico, Peru and the Dominican Republic, the content of routine cognitive
tasks in average employment decreased during the last twenty years.
The results found suggest that in Latin America and the Caribbean there
was a change in the profile of employment, in terms of the intensity of the
tasks that are carried by employees in their occupations, passing from jobs
intensive in manual tasks to a greater intensity or content of cognitive tasks.
The only exceptions to this common trend in our set of countries are the Do-
minican Republic, where the profile of employment changed in the opposite
direction and Bolivia, where the content of routine manual tasks increased
during the period under study.
In general, the region has shown a growth in the relative importance of
non-routine cognitive tasks, both analytical and interpersonal, during the
last twenty years. At the same time, the average intensity of manual tasks,
both routine and non-routine, decreased. All these changes are in line with
the findings reached in the most developed countries (Autor et al., 2003, and
Spitz-Oener, 2006), and with the results of Keister and Lewandowski (2016)
for the case of countries of Central Europe.
However, the evolution of the relative importance of routine cognitive
tasks allows some space for a discrepancy in some countries of the region.
Autor et al. (2003) show that the development of this type of tasks lost
relevance in the US employment and Spitz-Oener (2006) obtained similar
results for the case of Germany. However, a review and update by Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) for the case of the United States found different trends
during specific periods. In the same way, for several countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, Keister and Lewandowski (2016) identify an increase in the
intensity of routine cognitive tasks.
The importance of the increase in the content of routine cognitive tasks
in the average employment in the countries of the region lies in the risk
of automation that these types of task present. Indeed, the fact that the
workforce carries out this type of task with greater intensity poses a risk in
the medium term of displacement of a part of the workers due to automation.
As mentioned previously, these type of tasks are carried out by workers at the
intermediate level of education and who achieve an average labour income,
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which implies that, in the face of an automation and displacement process,
a situation of distributive inequality would deepen.5
1.4.2 Factorial decomposition of the change in the con-
tent of tasks
The variations in the content of observed tasks raise some concerns related to
the mechanisms that operate in changing the profile of average employment
in each of the countries analysed. In this sense, it is possible to identify three
major channels through which the changes in the importance of each task in
average employment are generated.
The first one is associated with the movement that workers make between
economic sectors, commonly called the between sector effect (BS). As an
example, a migration of workers from an economic sector such as agriculture,
traditionally intensive in manual tasks, to the service sector, which is more
intensive in the development of cognitive tasks, leads to a change in the
profile of tasks performed at the average employment of the countries.
Following Apella and Zunino (2017), this movement of workers between
economic sectors can be motivated by different causes such as the change
in the terms of trade that affect the sector as a whole and puts them at a
disadvantage compared to international competition, changes in global trade
centres and the emergence of other countries with greater comparative ad-
vantages in the sector, the urbanization processes that take place as people
leave their jobs in rural areas and migrate to large cities to join the indus-
trial sector, of services or commerce, among others. However, technological
change does not play a minor role in this process. The incorporation of new
production technology in sectors which traditionally are associated with the
5It could be suggested that it is the youngest generation of workers which has the
greatest capacity to adapt to technological change, developing cognitive tasks more in-
tensively which complement the new technologies. On the other hand, older generations
could have greater difficulty in redefining tasks which are performed in their occupations,
exposing themselves to greater risk of technological unemployment. In this context, a
complementary approach is the analysis of the evolution of the content of tasks in the
average occupation according to the cohort of birth of the workers.We advance in this line
for the specific cases of Argentina and Uruguay in Appendix IV.
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development of manual tasks forces workers to seek employment opportuni-
ties in other branches of activity.
The second factor is the movement of workers between occupations within
the same branch of activity, called the between occupations effect (BO).
As an example, one could mention the case of a worker who abandons his
occupation as a bank teller, intensive occupation in routine cognitive tasks
and begins to work as a taxi driver (non-routine manual). This example
allows us to recognize the importance that technological change can have
on the profile of average employment, encouraging movements of workers
between occupations.
The third channel which drives into variations in the average content
of the tasks performed by workers is the specific modifications within each
occupation in time, usually called intra-occupations effect (WO). In other
words, the incorporation of new production technology in each occupation
forces workers to reassign their roles within the workplace. The adoption of
assembly machinery which is automated and administered from a computer
program requires those tasks previously performed by the labour force to
be reassigned. For example, dedicating the majority of their time to tasks
relating to sales and merchandising.
In order to examine in detail the importance these transmission channels
have had in the changes observed on the content of the different types of tasks
performed in the average workplace in our set of countries, there follows below
a factorial decomposition exercise. In order to do this, we took as reference
the total changes in the intensity of the tasks between the starting point of
the analysis (middle 90s) and the ending point (middle 2010s) for our set
of countries identifying the three possible separate effects, mentioned above
and the interaction among them:
1. Structural change or effect between sectors (BS). The hypothesis be-
hind this effect is that part of the change in the intensities of the tasks
which the labour force performs is associated with a movement of the
labour force between the sectors or branches of activity, being partly
motivated by technological change, but also as mentioned by other ex-
ogenous factors.
2. Change between occupations or effect between occupations (BO). This
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effect is related to the movements of workers between distinct occupa-
tions with different combinations of tasks.
3. Changes within each occupation (WO). In this case we try to capture
the contribution of the changes which are produced within each occupa-
tion, in terms of the combination of tasks required for the performance
of the same.
4. The interaction of all of the above (INT).
In the Appendix I the decomposition exercise methodology is described
in detail while the results are presented in Figure 1.2.
Beginning with the between sectors effect, it is observed that the move-
ments between branches of activity are an important factor to explain the
increase in the content of routine cognitive tasks in Chile and the decrease
in the relative importance of routine manual tasks in Uruguay and Mexico.
Likewise, the same effect explains a significant share of the increase in the
content of routine manual tasks in Bolivia.
Observing the changes in the share of employment among branches of
activity in the last twenty years (see Appendix II for details), it can be seen
that, both in Chile and in Mexico, there was a significant fall in employment
in industry and in primary activities (sectors of intensive activity in manual
tasks), increasing employment in the real estate sector and services (intensive
sectors in routine cognitive tasks). Similarly, in Uruguay there is a significant
movement of employment from the industrial sector to the services sector.
Contrary to the trend observed in the rest of the region, in Bolivia, the
increase in the importance of routine manual tasks in average employment
corresponds to a significant rise in employment in the primary sector, which
showed an increase of 30% between the years 1995 and 2015.
Related to the between occupation effect, this turns out to be one of the
main channels through which there is a change in the profile of employment
in the region. Indeed, it is extremely important to explain the increase in the
content of non-routine cognitive tasks and the drop in the content of manual
tasks in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay.
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Finally, the change in the relative intensity of tasks resulting from specific
changes to each occupation, that is to say, due to the intra-occupation effect,
plays an important role in five countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, El Sal-
vador and Uruguay. However, the tasks on which this effect has importance
varies substantially in each country. In Argentina, changes in the combina-
tion of tasks that occur within each occupation explain the increase in the
content of cognitive tasks, both routine and non-routine, and the drop in the
importance of manual tasks. A similar picture, but to a lesser extent, occurs
in Uruguay and El Salvador, where this effect explains the increase in the
content of routine cognitive tasks in average employment and the reduction
of routine manual tasks. In Mexico, this effect explains the increases in the
relative importance of non-routine cognitive tasks, particularly those related
to interpersonal relationships, and routine cognitive tasks. Lastly, in Bolivia,
the intra-occupation effect is important to explain the increase in the content
of routine cognitive tasks.
In a context of change in the importance that some types of tasks have in
the average employment and therefore in need of readaptation by the labour
force, there is a risk of polarization of the labour market. In this sense,
the automation of certain tasks, especially the routine ones, could modify
the structure of the labour market, being at the extreme represented by two
large groups of workers. On the one hand, individuals of high qualifica-
tion who work in occupations intensive in non-routine cognitive tasks, high
productivity, and high income. On the other hand, a group of low-skilled
workers, relegated to occupations intensive in non-routine manual tasks, and
therefore low productivity and low incomes. This would happen while the
workers of qualification and levels of average income generally devoted to the
development of routine tasks (manual and cognitive) face the risk of a lower
demand for employment or lower income.
Figure 1.3 presents, for the average of Latin America and the Caribbean,
the task content for each decile of income per working hour according to the
four large task groups previously defined for two different moments: middle
90s and 2015 (the same figure for each specific country is included in the
Appendix III).
In line with the patterns observed in other countries, it can be appreciated
that in the countries of the region most of the workers in the upper deciles
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Figure 1.2: Factor decomposition of the change in the content of
tasks performed in average employment. Middle 90s - 2015
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Figure 6. Factor decomposition of the change in the content of tasks performed in average 
employment, according to countries. Middle ’90 - 2015 
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Figure 1.3: Latin America and the Caribbean: Content of tasks
according to decile of labour income. Middle 90s - 2015
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Figure 7. Latin America and the Caribbean: Content of tasks according to decile of labor 
income. Middle 90s - 2015 
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performed non-routine cognitive tasks, while workers in the lower part of the
distribution carried out manual tasks. As can be seen from the figure, the
content of routine manual tasks in occupations has decreased for workers in
all deciles of labour income. This result is in line with the previously discussed
and the replacement of these tasks by automatic production mechanisms.6
On the other hand, the importance of non-routine cognitive tasks has
grown in all income deciles. In this process, two important facts are observed.
On the one hand, while in the mid-1990s only the workers of the last two
deciles intensively developed this type of task, in 2015 deciles 7 and 8 were
incorporated. On the other hand, the gap between non-routine cognitive
tasks and the manual ones widened, suggesting that among the deciles of
higher incomes the transition from manual tasks to cognitive tasks, especially
non-routine ones, was particularly intense.
Observing the left tail of the distribution, it is appreciated that although
the gap between the content of non-routine cognitive tasks and the rest was
reduced, these tasks remain the least developed among the workers of the
lowest income deciles. This phenomenon suggests that workers with lower
labour incomes are engaged in occupations intensive in manual tasks. In-
deed, non-routine manual tasks are the most important among workers in
the lowest income deciles. While the content of this type of tasks was re-
duced in almost all the distribution, it remained almost unchanged among
the workers belonging to the first two deciles, giving some indication of a
concentration of this type of tasks in the lowest deciles.
Considering the last twenty years, it is possible to observe a transition
towards a content structure of tasks in which non-routine cognitive tasks are
developed mainly by the four highest income deciles (and increasingly remote
from the average) and tasks Non-routine manuals concentrate on the lowest
income deciles.
6In Appendix V, we depth into the analysis of a possible polarization of the labour
market for the cases of Argentina and Uruguay. Particularly, in order to provide an
approximation of the effect that the changes in intensity of the tasks performed by the
labour force have on the well-being of the workers, we have estimated the significance of
the relative importance of each task on the explanation of two key variables of workers‘
well-being: probability of becoming unemployed and level of income. The estimations and
its analysis are included in the Appendix.
1.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 47
Even though labour markets are not yet polarized, in the future this
phenomenon will clearly depend on the degree of progress of automation on
routine cognitive tasks. Occupations intensive in this type of tasks, such as
credit analysts, office assistants, cashiers, sellers, editors, including transla-
tors, are those through which workers with average qualification levels and
incomes are located. In fact, in most of the developed economies, intensive
occupations in routine cognitive tasks tend to have remunerations that are
located in the mean of the distribution (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Goos et
al., 2014).
Our findings for the region are different from what has been described
in developed countries. Both in the 90s and in 2015, routine cognitive tasks
have a significant relative importance between the deciles of labour income
of the center and higher distribution (from the fifth decile). Indeed, while in
the mid-90s the content of this type of tasks was important in all deciles from
the fourth, after twenty years these tasks lost importance in the occupations
performed by workers in the income lowest deciles.
For this reason, given the increase in the content of routine cognitive tasks
in the average employment in the region, the risk of future polarization of
the labour market will depend on the degree of automation of these.
1.5 Implications for public policy
The process of technological change that is going through not only the region
but also the world is a potential source of productivity increases. However,
this poses some challenges from the point of view of the labour market that
conditions its use. The process of technological change could generate a
reduction in the employment demand for those on middle incomes (in gen-
eral associated with routine manual tasks), establishing a polarization of the
labour market, creating two large groups of employment: one of poorly-paid
activities, related to the performance of non-routine manual tasks, and the
other of higher incomes related to non-routine cognitive tasks.
In this technological race, there is a clear challenge laid out for public
policy associated with the need of low-skilled workers to reassign their tasks
towards others not susceptible to automation, that is, towards those that
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require an intensive use of creative or social intelligence.
In the last 20 years the labour markets of the Latin American and the
Caribbean region have experienced a substantial change, moving from man-
ual work to cognitive work, which can largely be attributed to changes in
the share of occupations in the total employment, the modernization within
the occupations themselves and, in some cases, to a movement of workers
between sectors. As in the United States, Germany, and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, the importance of non-routine cognitive tasks
in the average workplace has shown signs of considerable increase in Latin
American Countries. Two effects of technological change and its reduced
access cost can be seen: one more short term and one of medium or long
term but which requires immediate action.
The first is associated with a lower requirement for routine manual tasks
and therefore, an increase in technological unemployment in some segments
of the labour force. The second is related to the challenge of preparing
the younger generations, in their process of acquiring human capital, for
the performance of occupations which do not exist yet but will certainly
incorporate a major component of non-routine cognitive tasks.
In relation to technological unemployment, the policies aimed at con-
fronting the negative effects of the movement of employment from intensive
production in routine manual work towards intensive production in techno-
logical capital and cognitive work are of crucial importance. The transition
may be confronted from two different perspectives, one from the point of
view of labour demand and the other from supply.
From the perspective of labour demand, that is to say the actual pro-
ductive sector which chooses the combination of factors which maximizes
its benefits, the transition could be attenuated through regulations which
limit the substitution of labour force by capital. These regulations could be
enhanced by the political economy itself in each economy. As an example,
unions play an important role in the political economy with the ability to
apply pressure on the productive sector and the state in order to prevent
changes in production functions. An example of that is the frustrated at-
tempt of the Central Bank of Argentina in 2016 that the commercial banks
gradually substitute printed summaries of accounts with those in digital for-
mat. This constituted a risk of reduced labour demand for the postal and
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delivery workers. Confronted with such a risk, the truck drivers union op-
posed, and managed to block the implementation of the initiative proposed
by the monetary authority. In another similar case, in 2008 in Uruguay, an
attempt was made to replace the bus conductors with automatic ticket dis-
pensing machines, but the transition was never completed in order to avoid
the effect that it would have on the level of employment in that occupation.
Alternatively, the authorities could design fiscal incentive mechanisms,
such as subsidiary schemes for sectors or occupations which require tasks of
a routine nature. In this way, the state would indirectly modify the relative
prices of the production factors, discouraging the replacement of labour force
by capital.
However, whichever initiative is adopted from this perspective, it must
take into account the social costs and benefits which are generated. In this
sense, it is essential to analyse the costs of these decisions (for example, in
terms of increased production cost and reduced well-being of the consumers
who pay higher market prices) and the benefits (maintaining employment
levels in certain occupations). In the same way, it is important to stress that
technological change is a continuous phenomenon and therefore the access
cost will continue to decrease. That implies that the trend towards automa-
tion is growing over time, which implies that the costs of its deterrence shall
too. In other words, to maintain its effect, this type of intervention will
need to increase over time as the process of technological change advances,
accepting ever greater costs of intervention.
Alternatively, public policy could focus its efforts on labour supply. In this
sense, the consistent challenge in the strengthening of the spaces or instru-
ments of re-adaptation of the labour supply, that is, redesigning continuous
training systems taking into account the new labour demands. That should
consider the promotion of public-private cooperation, not only in terms of
financing, but also in terms of defining the training strategy and taking ad-
vantage of economies of scale on training tasks. For that, it is necessary to
clearly identify the factors which put the success of this type of initiative at
risk, above all, between older workers.
The medium-term challenge, but which in reality needs to be addressed
immediately, is the preparation of the young generations, in their process
of accumulation of human capital, for the performance of roles which still
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”do not exist”. Beyond the potential creative destruction of employment,
and its consequential technological unemployment, this process could be a
step towards an increase in global productivity of the economy and to the
generation of new occupations which are currently unknown.7
Economic growth takes place as jobs become more productive, but also
as more productive jobs are created and those less productive disappear. In
the latter instance, these benefits may be as a consequence of new products,
new methods of production and transport and new markets, but they appear
through a constant restructuring and redistribution of resources, including
the labour force. Since economies grow as high productivity jobs are created
and low productivity jobs disappear, the relationship between increases in
productivity and the creation of jobs is not mechanical. Even if in the short
term the innovations may imply increases or reductions in levels of employ-
ment, in the medium term the increase in employment will tend towards
being closely aligned with economic growth.
In a context where many of the jobs that shall be performed by the
children of today still do not exist, it is not possible to plan specific training
for such occupations. The challenge, however, consists of preparing their
cognitive skills in such a way as to generate their capacity to create and
adapt to whatever situation presents itself.
To achieve this, it is essential to rethink the educational system at all lev-
els, achieving rapid adaptability of subjects to labour demand as it arises. In
this sense, we suggest that it is necessary to switch focus from one which bases
educational systems on the paradigm of acquiring knowledge (memorizing)
to one which prioritizing the development of cognitive and socio-emotional
skills, through problem-solving, as a foundation to gain technical skills in a
continuous form.
The challenge consists in recognizing the importance and generating the
paths for the development of a mechanism of study associated with the de-
velopment of critical thought (argue, think, analyse), that is, the generation
of transferable/adaptable skills which are useful in different activities, that
is, with a great capacity for fast adaptation.
7It is possible to expect a deepening of these trends, in favour of non-routine cognitive
tasks to the detriment of routine manual tasks, as technological change advances and it
may be appropriate and adapted by the productive sector of developing countries.
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It is crucial that all students of the educational system develop and learn
their basic cognitive skills, above all the numeric skills and problem-solving,
since cognitive deficiencies developed at an early age are extremely difficult
to overcome later in life. This must be accompanied by a constant update
process, not only of the tools but also of the vocabulary itself. As an ex-
ample, Internet access has a minimum requirement of a new kind of literacy
(cognitive and digital).
1.6 Conclusions
Technological innovation, such as the advance of the digital technologies,
communications and robotics, may imply an improvement in the general
well-being of the population and reduce poverty by increasing the overall
productivity of the economy. However, if this process is not accompanied by
complementary investments, that is to say institutional reforms and public
policies directed at making the most of its advantages, the technological
advance could also deepen a situation of inequality.
From a study of the employment profile trend in the last 20 years in Latin
American and the Caribbean countries it is possible to see a significant in-
crease in the relative importance of cognitive tasks in the workplace to the
detriment of manual tasks. In effect, these changes are generated through
changes produced within the occupations in terms of the combinations of
types of tasks which are performed to produce a good or service; the move-
ment of workers between occupations, within the same branch of activity;
and structural changes, that is, movements of workers between branches of
activities. We find that the movement of workers between occupations within
the same branch of activity is extremely important to explain the increase
in the content of non-routine cognitive tasks and the drop in the content of
manual tasks in most of the countries analysed.
Moreover, in line with the patterns observed in other countries, we find
that in the countries of the region most of the workers in the upper deciles
performed non-routine cognitive tasks, while workers in the lower part of the
distribution carried out manual tasks. Considering the last twenty years, the
gap between non-routine cognitive tasks and the manual ones widened, sug-
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gesting that among the deciles of higher incomes the transition from manual
tasks to cognitive tasks, especially non-routine ones, was particularly intense.
It is possible to expect a deepening of these trends, in favour of non-
routine cognitive tasks to the detriment of routine manual tasks, as techno-
logical change advances and it may be appropriate and adapted by the pro-
ductive sector of developing countries. Clearly, this will imply a reduction in
specialized labour demand in routine manual tasks, generating technological
unemployment in the short term. However, any technological change which
replaces workers with machines will have effects on all the product and fac-
tor markets. An increase in production efficiency which allows the costs of
production methods to be reduced could generate an increased demand in
other goods and services.
Therefore, technological progress has two effects on the level of employ-
ment. In the first place, a destructive effect, as technological change replaces
the labour force; and in second place, an effect of creating new jobs, as the
number of production units that internalize new technologies increases and
productivity increases, complementary employment in these sectors expands
and other occupations are generated that meet new demands for goods and
services. In this context, it is key to define two different strategies, one short
term and one long term but which requires immediate action.
With respect to the potential situation of technological unemployment
it is important to orchestrate mechanisms which permit a strengthening of
the continuous training system in a way that allows the re-adaptation of
the labour supply. In other words, it is important to redesign the systems
of continuous training considering the new labour demands. This should
take into account the promotion of public-private cooperation not only in
terms of financing but also the definition of a training strategy and the use
of economies of scale in training.
The long-term challenge, but which in reality needs to be addressed im-
mediately, is the preparation of the young generations, in their process of
accumulation of human capital, for the performance of roles which still ”do
not exist”. Growing cognitive skills are required to satisfy the rise in the
demand for non-routine cognitive tasks. In this sense, Latin American and
the Caribbean countries need to improve the quality of education systems
and reduce the educational gap between different sectors of the population,
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because increasingly, the educational level will be key variable to have a good
job placement. The next two chapters of this dissertation concentrate on the
challenge for education systems of increasing the cognitive skills of students.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Appendix I. Task Decomposition exercise
The decomposition is computed for each country according to the formula:
ITi∈T (IT 2015i − IT 1995i ) =
∑
j∈S
t15i,j,15h
15
j −
∑
j∈S
t95i,j,15h
95
j
ITi∈T (IT 2015i − IT 1995i ) = BSi +BOi +WOi + INTi
where
∀i∈T BSi =
∑
j∈S
[t95i,j,95(h
15
j − h95j )]
∀i∈T BOi =
∑
j∈S
(t15i,j,95 − t95i,j,95)h95j
∀i∈T WOi =
∑
j∈S
(t15i,j,15 − t15i,j,95)h95j
∀i∈T INTi =
∑
j∈S
(t15i,j,15 − t95i,j,95)(h15j − h95j )
where,
• t15i,j,15 and t95i,j,95 represent the average value of the intensity of task i for the
workers in sector j, in the year y=[1995,2015], calculated from the use of
O*NET 2015 and 1998, respectively
• h15j represents the share of workers in sector j in the total employment in
year y.
• T is the set of the five tasks defined above.
• S is the set of 13 sectors, defined from SIC to one digit.
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1.8.2 Appendix II. Employment by economic sector.
Employment variation between Middle 90s and 2015
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Source: Own elaboration based on Household surveys  
Argentina Bolivia
Descripción Variación 2015-1998 Descripción Variación 2015-1995
Comercio -2.9% Comercio -12.2%
Industria -2.5% Otros servicios -8.5%
Act. Financieras -0.4% Industria -8.3%
Act. Inmobiliarias -0.3% Minas y canteras -1.0%
Actividad primaria -0.2% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -0.4%
Minas y canteras 0.1% Org. extranjeros -0.2%
Electricidad, gas y agua 0.4% Act. Financieras -0.1%
Org. extranjeros 0.5% Act. Inmobiliarias -0.1%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.6% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.0%
Hoteles y restaurantes 0.6% Hoteles y restaurantes 0.3%
Construcción 1.2% Construcción 0.7%
Otros servicios 2.9% Actividad primaria 29.9%
Brasil Chile
Descripción Variación 2013-1996 Descripción Variación 2015-1996
Actividad primaria -10.3% Actividad primaria -5.5%
Industria -4.4% Industria -5.3%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -2.1% Act. Financieras -4.3%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.5% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.0%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.4%
Act. Financieras 0.4% Construcción 0.5%
Hoteles y restaurantes 1.7% Minas y canteras 0.6%
Comercio 2.7% Otros servicios 1.7%
Otros servicios 3.1% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.2%
Construcción 3.6% Comercio 2.9%
Act. Inmobiliarias 5.8% Act. Inmobiliarias 6.8%
El Salvador México
Descripción Variación 2014-1998 Descripción Variación 2014-1996
Industria -3.8% Actividad primaria -6.8%
Actividad primaria -2.7% Industria -2.2%
Construcción -0.5% Transporte y almacenamiento -0.5%
Act. Financieras -0.3% Electricidad, gas y agua -0.1%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -0.2% Minas y canteras -0.1%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Otros servicios 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0% Comunicaciones 0.3%
Electricidad, gas y agua 0.2% Construcción 0.7%
Comercio 0.9% Comercio 1.9%
Otros servicios 1.0% Act. Financieras 2.1%
Act. Inmobiliarias 1.5% Act. Inmobiliarias 2.1%
Hoteles y restaurantes 3.8% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.6%
Perú República Dominicana
Descripción Variación 2013-1997 Descripción Variación 2014-1996
Actividad primaria -3.8% Industria -7.9%
Comercio -1.5% Actividad primaria -2.4%
Industria -0.2% Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.2% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.1%
Otros servicios 0.0% Minas y canteras 0.2%
Act. Financieras 0.0% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.2%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Act. Financieras 0.7%
Minas y canteras 0.5% Construcción 1.2%
Act. Inmobiliarias 0.6% Act. Inmobiliarias 1.6%
Construcción 1.1% Otros servicios 1.8%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 1.3% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.3%
Hoteles y restaurantes 2.3% Comercio 2.3%
Uruguay
Descripción Variación 2015-1995
Industria -11.1%
Act. Inmobiliarias -2.9%
Act. Financieras -0.5%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.2%
Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0%
Hoteles y restaurantes 0.8%
Comercio 1.3%
Construcción 1.6%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 1.9%
Actividad primaria 2.1%
Otros servicios 7.0%
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Source: Own elaboration based on Household surveys  
Argentina Bolivia
Descripción Variación 2015-1998 Descripción Variación 2015-1995
Comercio -2.9% Comercio -12.2%
Industria -2.5% Otros servicios -8.5%
Act. Financieras -0.4% Industria -8.3%
Act. Inmobiliarias -0.3% Minas y canteras -1.0%
Actividad primaria -0.2% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -0.4%
Minas y canteras 0.1% Org. extranjeros -0.2%
Electricidad, gas y agua 0.4% Act. Financieras -0.1%
Org. extranjeros 0.5% Act. Inmobiliarias -0.1%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.6% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.0%
Hoteles y restaurantes 0.6% Hoteles y restaurantes 0.3%
Construcción 1.2% Construcción 0.7%
Otros servicios 2.9% Actividad primaria 29.9%
Brasil Chile
Descripción Variación 2013-1996 Descripción Variación 2015-1996
Actividad primaria -10.3% Actividad primaria -5.5%
Industria -4.4% Industria -5.3%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -2.1% Act. Financieras -4.3%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.5% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.0%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.4%
Act. Financieras 0.4% Construcción 0.5%
Hoteles y restaurantes 1.7% Minas y canteras 0.6%
Comercio 2.7% Otros servicios 1.7%
Otros servicios 3.1% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.2%
Construcción 3.6% Comercio 2.9%
Act. Inmobiliarias 5.8% Act. Inmobiliarias 6.8%
El Salvador México
Descripción Variación 2014-1998 Descripción Variación 2014-1996
Industria -3.8% Actividad primaria -6.8%
Actividad primaria -2.7% Industria -2.2%
Construcción -0.5% Transporte y almacenamiento -0.5%
Act. Financieras -0.3% Electricidad, gas y agua -0.1%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones -0.2% Minas y canteras -0.1%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Otros servicios 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0% Comunicaciones 0.3%
Electricidad, gas y agua 0.2% Construcción 0.7%
Comercio 0.9% Comercio 1.9%
Otros servicios 1.0% Act. Financieras 2.1%
Act. Inmobiliarias 1.5% Act. Inmobiliarias 2.1%
Hoteles y restaurantes 3.8% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.6%
Perú República Dominicana
Descripción Variación 2013-1997 Descripción Variación 2014-1996
Actividad primaria -3.8% Industria -7.9%
Comercio -1.5% Actividad primaria -2.4%
Industria -0.2% Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.2% Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 0.1%
Otros servicios 0.0% Minas y canteras 0.2%
Act. Financieras 0.0% Electricidad, gas y agua 0.2%
Org. extranjeros 0.0% Act. Financieras 0.7%
Minas y canteras 0.5% Construcción 1.2%
Act. Inmobiliarias 0.6% Act. Inmobiliarias 1.6%
Construcción 1.1% Otros servicios 1.8%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 1.3% Hoteles y restaurantes 2.3%
Hoteles y restaurantes 2.3% Comercio 2.3%
Uruguay
Descripción Variación 2015-1995
Industria -11.1%
Act. Inmobiliarias -2.9%
Act. Financieras -0.5%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.2%
Org. extranjeros 0.0%
Minas y canteras 0.0%
Hoteles y restaurantes 0.8%
Comercio 1.3%
Construcción 1.6%
Transporte,  almacenamiento y comunicaciones 1.9%
Actividad primaria 2.1%
Otros servicios 7.0%
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1.8.3 Appendix III. The content of tasks according to
decile of labour income. Mid-’90 - 2015, by coun-
try.
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Figure 1.4: Content of tasks according to decile of labour income. Middle
90s - 2015 (by countries)
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AnexoII. Contenido de tareas según decil de ingreso laboral. Mediados de los ’90 – 2015, por 
país. 
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Chile 
 
 
El Salvador 
 
 
México 
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Perú 
 
 
República Dominicana 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
Fuente: elaboración propia en base a O*NET y Encuestas de Hogares 
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1.8.4 Appendix IV. Changes from an intergenerational
perspective (The cases of Argentina and Uruguay)
It could be suggested that it is the youngest generation of workers which has
the greatest capacity to adapt to technological change, developing cognitive
tasks more intensively which complement the new technologies. On the other
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hand, older generations could have greater difficulty in redefining tasks which
are performed in their occupations, exposing themselves to greater risk of
technological unemployment. In this context, a complementary approach is
the analysis of the evolution of the content of tasks in the average occupation
according to the cohort of birth of the workers. For that, Figure 1.5 shows
the evolution of the relative intensity of each type of task in the average job,
according the birth cohort of the workers.
With respect to the intensity of the non-routine cognitive tasks in the job,
both with the analytical and the interpersonal tasks, a clear stable trend can
be seen for the cohorts before 1971. For its part, the relative importance of
this type of task in occupations chosen by cohorts following this year shows a
clearly positive trend. This suggests that older workers have greater difficulty
in adopting and performing non-routine cognitive tasks than the young. For
its part, the rapid growth in the importance of analytical cognitive tasks
between the youngest generations could be attributed to two complementary
factors: i) a greater capacity to adapt to change in the combination of tasks
that are required, and ii) a composition effect, that is, the entrance of younger
generations to the labour market is delayed since they spend more years in
education and therefore their weighting in the average increases as they enter.
Conversely, in observing the variation in the relative importance of rou-
tine manual tasks in employment this suggests that although this shows a
stable trend for all cohorts greater than 1971, the incline becomes negative
for younger cohorts. Something similar, though of a lesser magnitude, is
observed in the intensity of non-routine manual tasks.
In both cases, during the period under study a greater decline can be
seen in the youngest cohorts, which suggests that on one hand, the young are
directing their entrance into the labour market towards occupations which
are less intensive in terms of non-routine manual tasks, and on the other
hand, that as this group of workers has a greater capacity for adaptation
they replace occupations intensive in these types of tasks with those more
cognitively intense.
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Figure 1.5: Intensity index of the tasks in the job (tj)according to the cohort.
Years 1995/98 2015
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Changes from an intergenerational perspective 
It could be suggested that it is the youngest generation of workers which has the greatest 
capacity to adapt to technological change, developing cognitive tasks more intensively which 
complement the new technologies. On the other hand, older generations could have greater 
difficulty in redefining tasks which are performed in their occupations, exposing themselves to 
greater risk of technological unemployment. In this context, a complementary approach is the 
analysis of the evolution of the content of tasks in the average occupation according to the 
cohort of birth of the workers. For that, Figure 6 shows the evolution of the relative intensity of 
each type of task in the average job, according the birth cohort of the workers. 
 
Figure6. Intensity index of the tasks in the job (𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 )according to the cohort. Years 1995/98 – 
2015.  
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With respect to the intensity of the non-routine cognitive tasks in the job, both with the 
analytical and the interpersonal tasks, a clear stable trend can be seen for the cohorts before 
1971. For its part, the relative importance of this type of task in occupations chosen by cohorts 
following this year shows a clearly positive trend. This suggests that older workers have greater 
difficulty in adopting and performing non-routine cognitive tasks than the young. For its part, 
the rapid growth in the importance of analytical cognitive tasks between the youngest 
generations could be attributed to two complementary factors: i) a greater capacity to adapt to 
change in the combination of tasks that are required, and ii) a composition effect, that is, the 
entrance of younger generations to the labor market is delayed since they spend more years in 
education and therefore their weighting in the average increases as they enter. 
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Conversely, in observing the variation in the relative importance of routine manual tasks in 
employment this suggests that although this shows a stable trend for all cohorts greater than 
1971, the incline becomes negative for younger cohorts. Something similar, though of a lesser 
magnitude, is observed in the intensity of non-routine manual tasks. 
In both cases, during the period under study a greater decline can be seen in the youngest 
cohorts, which suggests that on one hand, the young are directing their entrance into the labor 
market towards occupations which are less intensive in terms of non-routine manual tasks, and 
on the other hand, that as this group of workers has a greater capacity for adaptation they 
replace occupations intensive in these types of tasks with those more cognitively intense. 
With respect to the relative importance of routine cognitive tasks, again the youngest cohort is 
that which d fines the trend of the change, while the older generations remain relatively 
constant in the tasks which they perform in their occupations. 
e) Routine cognitive tasks 
Argentina     Uruguay 
 
Source: Our own estimation based on household surveys and O*NET 
 
In summary, during the last two decades, the workplace in Argentina and Uruguay has 
experienced some changes in terms of the type of tasks which workers perform in their jobs. In 
this sense, we can detect an increase in the relative importance of non-routine cognitive tasks 
and a reduction in the intensity of manual tasks. In contrast with that seen in developed 
countries, work intensive in routine cognitive tasks has shown signs of growth. These variations 
correspond to various explanatory factors. On one hand, the process of technological change 
which incentivizes the modification of the optimum combination of tasks within an occupation. 
At the same time, and for the case of Uruguay, there is also still an effect of sectoral change, 
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With respect to the relative importance of routine cognitive tasks, again
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the youngest cohort is that which defines the trend of the change, while the
older generations remain relatively constant in the tasks which they perform
in their occupations.
In summary, during the last two decades, the workplace in Argentina
and Uruguay has experienced some changes in terms of the type of tasks
which workers perform in their jobs. In this sense, we can detect an increase
in the relative importance of non-routine cognitive tasks and a reduction
in the intensity of manual tasks. In contrast with that seen in developed
countries, work intensive in routine cognitive tasks has shown signs of growth.
These variations correspond to various explanatory factors. On one hand,
the process of technological change which incentives the modification of the
optimum combination of tasks within an occupation. At the same time, and
for the case of Uruguay, there is also still an effect of sectoral change, that
is, the movement of work between branches of activity, moving from those
which are more intensive in manual tasks to sectors with a greater emphasis
of occupations intensive in cognitive tasks.
All changes are enhanced by the educational expansion that took place
in the labour force, since as the workers increase their levels of qualification,
they increase their chances of dedicating a larger proportion of their time to
the performance of cognitive tasks. In any case, it is the young generations
who dominate these trends, which suggests that they have a greater capacity
for adaptation than the older generations.
1.8.5 Appendix V. Polarization of the labour market
(The cases of Argentina and Uruguay)
The process of adopting new production technologies based on automation,
robotics and digital communication would permit an increase in global pro-
ductivity and therefore economic efficiency. However, that also implies a risk
from the point of view of distribution. That being through the generation of
a possible polarization of the labour market, since the transition from occu-
pations which are intensive in manual tasks towards those more intensive in
cognitive tasks demands a greater level of qualification from the labour force.
In this sense, this distribution risk is that the labour market remains rep-
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resented by two large groups of workers. On one side, those who are highly-
qualified, who perform tasks requiring an intensive use of non-routine cogni-
tive tasks, of high productivity and high incomes. On the other side, a group
of poorly-qualified workers, relegated to occupy those positions requiring in-
tensive use of non-routine manual tasks, and therefore of low-productivity
and low incomes. This will occur while workers with medium-level qualifica-
tions and incomes, face the risk of a reduced labour demand in the perfor-
mance of routine tasks. This polarization may manifest itself through two
complementary paths: employability (with increases in the extremities of the
productivity distribution and falls in the center) and salary levels.
In order to provide an approximation of the effect that the changes in
intensity of the tasks performed by the labour force have on the well-being
of the workers, we have estimated here the significance of the relative im-
portance of each task on the explanation of two key variables of workers‘
well-being: probability of becoming unemployed and level of income. The
identification of the determinants of the probability of becoming unemployed
is done by the estimation of the following probit model:
Pr(di) = f(tij; Θj;ui)
Where di takes the value of one if the individual finds themselves un-
employed and zero if they are employed, tij represents the intensity of the
task j which the individual i performs and Θi is a vector of individual con-
trol variables such as age, a dummy variable which takes the value of one
if the person is a man and the number of years of study. The hypothesis
states that those workers who perform routine tasks more intensively have
a greater probability of finding themselves unemployed as a result of facing
a greater risk of substitution, while those who perform more cognitive tasks
have a lesser risk of finding themselves in that situation.The results of the
estimation are presented in Table 1.2.
The results found confirm the trends observed and partially confirm the
hypothesis suggested for developed countries. In this sense, the variable
”Routine manual” has the positive sign expected and is significant to 1%.
That suggests that the possibility of becoming unemployed increases as the
relative importance of the routine manual tasks performed in that occupation
grows. In other words, those workers in occupations that require a higher
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intensity of routine manual tasks face a greater risk of finding themselves
unemployed, with this effect being greater in Argentina than in Uruguay.
These results allow us to suggest that technological change, and therefore,
the possibility of replacing tasks with automation, increment the probability
of unemployment for those workers who spend the majority of their working
hours performing routine manual tasks.
However, and in line with that discussed previously, no positive relation-
ship is found between the probability of being unemployed and the inten-
sity of routine cognitive tasks in the previous occupation. In effect, and in
contrast to what has taken place in developed countries, in Argentina and
Uruguay we have seen an increase in the relative importance of this type of
task in the average workplace over the last 20 years.
With respect to the level of labour income, we propose the estimation of
the Mincer equation (1974) in order to better understand the relationship
between the relative importance of the tasks which workers perform in their
jobs and their level of income per hour.
For this, the following equation is estimated:
log(wi) = β0 + β1ti,nrc + β2ti,rc + β3ti,rm + β4ti,nrm + βjΘj + ui
where wi is the salary per hour, ti,j is the index of intensity of each task
j Thetai is a vector of individual control variables: work experience, work
experience squared, a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the
individual is a man, the years of education, and a dummy variable which
takes the value of one if the worker has formal employment.
The results of the estimation through the Ordinary Minimal Squares (Ta-
ble 1.3) are as expected. Workers in occupations which require a greater
relative importance of cognitive tasks have an output, in terms of hourly
salary, greater than those who perform a greater intensity of manual tasks.
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Table 1.2: Estimation of the probability of being unemployed. Year 2015
- 36 - 
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗 ,Θ𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� 
Where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 takes the value of one if the individual finds themselves unemployed and zero if they 
are employed,6
Variables 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑗𝑗  represents the intensity of the task j which the individual i performs and Θ𝑖𝑖  is 
a vector of individual control variables such as age, a dummy variable which takes the value of 
one if the person is a man and the number of years of study.  
The hypothesis states that those workers who perform routine tasks more intensively have a 
greater probability of finding themselves unemployed as a result of facing a greater risk of 
substitution, while those who perform more cognitive tasks have a lesser risk of finding 
themselves in that situation. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 2. 
able 2. Estimation of the pr a ility f i g ployed. Year 2015 
Argentina Uruguay 
  
  Non-routine cognitive -0.0514244* -0.0172726* 
 
´(0.029028) (0.0010277) 
Routine cognitive -0.1406224*** -0.0769139*** 
 
(0.018459) (0.009799) 
Routine manual 0.3346739*** 0.0505115*** 
 
(0.041706) (0.013147) 
Non-routine manual -0.1563471*** -0.0074673 
 
(0.038226) (0.015701) 
Man -0.1227095*** -0.2669335*** 
 
(0.034698) (0.020472) 
Yearsof education -0.0014153 -0.045073*** 
 
(0.005044) (0.003176) 
Age -0.0233769*** -0.0244753*** 
 
(0.001292) (0.000695) 
Constant -0.791312*** -0.0257861 
  (0.104482) (0.044926) 
   Nº of observations 24299 53740 
LR Chi2    902.52 1989.95 
Prob> Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1024 0.0787 
Log likelihood -3954.6 -11648.1 
Source: Our own estimation based on household surveys and O*NET 
Note: Standard error is shown in parenthesis. *** significant to 1%, ** to 5% and * to 10%. 
 
                                                          
6The household surveys conducted both in Argentina and in Uruguay include a question relating to the 
characteristics of the previous employment of the individual in the case that he is currently unemployed. 
Source: Our own estimation based on household surveys and O*NET
Note: Standard error is shown in parenthesis. *** significant to 1%, ** to 5% and
* to 10%.
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In both countries, non-routine cognitive tasks have a greater remuneration
than routine ones.
The results found allow us to suggest that the changes observed in the
workplace, in terms of the types of tasks that the labour force performs,
and the changes to be expected in the future while the access costs to new
technologies decrease and the capacity to adapt to them increase, could imply
a greater risk of polarization of the labour market.
A greater insertion of new technologies of automated production has two
direct effects on the market. On one hand, the increase in probability of
unemployment (technological unemployment) among those workers in occu-
pations intensive in routine manual tasks. On the other hand, a reduction
in the level of income for those who work in occupations which are intensive
in manual tasks, and an increase in income for those workers in occupations
intensive in cognitive tasks, especially non-routine.
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Table 1.3: Ordinary Least-Square Mincer’s Equation. (Year 2015)
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Table 3. Ordinary least squares–Mincer’s Equation. Year 2015 
Variables Argentina Uruguay 
  
  Non-routine cognitive 0.138261*** 0.0571613*** 
 
(0.006626) (0.003453) 
Routine cognitive 0.0579983*** 0.0297189*** 
 
(0.004752) (0.003486) 
Routine manual  0.0430737*** -0.0182148*** 
 
(0.012302) (0.004679) 
Non-routine manual  -0.0248547** -0.0263061*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.005292) 
Experience 0.012084*** 0.0247491*** 
 
(0.000921) (0.000736) 
Experiencia2 -0.000134*** -0.0002611*** 
 
(0.000002) (0.000001) 
Man 0.0722601*** 0.2277636*** 
 
(0.009096) (0.006925) 
Years of education 0.0371603*** 0.0808401*** 
 
(0.001416) (0.001138) 
Formal 0.4958803*** 0.3572354*** 
 
(0.00881) (0.008088) 
Constant 2.571179*** 3.188941*** 
  (0.02658) (0.01651) 
  
  Nº of observations 21707 49256 
Statistic F 1053.0 2143.1 
Prob > F     0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.30 0.28 
R2 adjusted 0.30 0.28 
Source: Our own estimation based on household surveys and O*NET 
Note: Standard error shown in parenthesis. *** significant to 1%, ** to 5% and * to 10%. 
 
Source: Our own estimation based on household surveys and O*NET
Note: Standard error is shown in parenthesis. *** significant to 1%, ** to 5% and
* to 10%.
Chapter 2
Teacher Quality and Cross
Country Differences in Student
Achievements
2.1 Introduction
Student outcomes show high variance across countries even among OECD
developed countries. Why do some countries obtain better educational results
than others? This chapter analyses this relevant question, focusing on the
role of teacher quality.
From the previous educational literature an extensive consensus has been
generated, both on the part of policy makers and researchers, that teacher
quality is a key input the process of student learning (Hanushek, 2003;
Hanushek and Rivkin 2007; Hanushek, 2010; Hanushek and Rivkin 2010).
Indeed, several works suggest that having an effective teacher is probably
the most important school factor for student achievements (Hanushek, 2003,
Klein et al., 2010; Gates, 2011; and Hiatt, 2009). On the other hand, Chetty
et al. (2011) state that having good teachers improves not only the stan-
dardized test scores but also generates long-term effects, both economic and
social.
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But the importance of teacher quality as an educational input is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for it to be a relevant factor in explaining
the gap across countries in educational outcomes. Indeed, to be a relevant
factor in explaining the cross-country gap, significant differences in teacher
quality between countries are needed. However, finding evidence regard-
ing differences in teaching quality between countries is extremely difficult,
since there are no international comparable measurements of teacher quality.
Additionally, most of the empirical works state that teacher quality is not
strongly correlated with observable characteristics of teachers (Rockoff, 2004;
Jepsen, 2005; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2007; Hanushek; 2010 among others).
Therefore, teacher quality cannot be approximated by observable variables
for which there are international statistics.
Attending to the previous points, two relevant questions arise: What is
the role of teacher quality to explain cross-country differences in student
outcomes? and; Why is TQ different across-countries? This chapter tries to
shed some light on these issues.
Specifically, in this chapter I construct a proxy for teacher quality (TQ
for short). I also analyse the key variables determining teacher quality and
discuss its importance as a source of cross-country differences in student
achievements. To this end, I propose and calibrate a theoretical model of
teacher selection for a set of 22 OECD countries.
From the theoretical point of view, the model proposed here is an exten-
sion of previous theoretical models. Previous literature basically focuses on
the self-selection of workers between the teaching profession and other oc-
cupations (See for instance, Nagler et al. 2015, Rothstein 2014 and Tincani
2011). The model proposed in this chapter includes two stages in a general
equilibrium framework instead. Like in the previous models, the first stage is
a self-selection stage that determines the supply of teachers in the economy.
Additionally, this model includes a second stage in which how the education
system selects their teachers is discussed. This second stage analyses the
demand for teachers.1 The micro-founded model developed in this paper is
a useful tool in several dimensions.
1My model simplifies the self-selection analyses compared to the models in previous
papers because I do not work in a dynamic framework. However, I include the analysis of
school decisions that is omitted in other models.
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Firstly, it is useful to proxy TQ at the country level. Based on the cali-
bration of nine parameters, I build a proxy of teacher quality for a large set
of countries in different years. To my knowledge, the only comparable proxy
is the one developed by Hanushek et al. (2014) who discuss the link be-
tween teaching skills and student outcomes across countries. They measure
TQ with teaching skills in literacy and numeracy using the PIAAC survey
of adult skills.2 Although the work of Hanushek et al. (2014) is the first
one in measuring TQ using the PIAAC survey, their proxy presents several
limitations: i) it includes only the cognitive skill dimension, ii) it is built
for only one year since PIAAC is a cross-section data set. My proxy mea-
sured in different years helps me to analyse whether teacher quality trends
can explain the evolution of student achievements at a country level. To my
knowledge, no previous studies include this analysis because time series of
country measures of teacher quality were not available. Having time series of
teacher quality for a set of countries is important because reasons behind the
cross-country dispersion in student outcomes could potential be learning cul-
ture or educational institutions. With my time series of TQ, I am controlling
for for these unobservable country fixed effects.
Secondly, the model is also useful to understand the ambiguous findings in
the empirical literature regarding the relationship between teacher salaries
and student achievements. The evidence suggests that salaries are not a
reliable proxy of teacher quality, since most of the studies do not find a
statistically significant effect between salaries and student outcomes.3 On
the contrary, the works of Loeb and Page (2000) and Dolton and Marcenaro
Gutierrez (2011) find a positive relationship between teacher salaries and
student achievements. In my model, the equilibrium relationship between
teacher salaries and teacher quality is non-linear and may be non-monotonic.
Therefore, different countries could be in different parts of the curve. This
is so because on the one hand, previous empirical analysis based on cross-
section data within a given country probably captures a small segment of the
equilibrium curve since teacher wage dispersion is usually small within the
country. On the other hand, the parameters controlling the teacher selection
process differ across countries, and, as I explain later on, the equilibrium
curve is quite sensitive to these parameters.
2They approximate the mean teacher skill in math (reading) with the mean cognitive
skill in numeracy (literacy) of teachers measured in PIAAC.
3Hanushek (2003) provides an extensive review on this issue.
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Thirdly, the model helps to understand the main variables affecting the
quality of teachers. Previous literature teaches us that teacher quality mat-
ters, but little is known regarding its main determinants. Counter-factual
exercises based on the model allow me not only to identify, but also to quan-
tify the main drivers of cross-country differences in TQ. Notice that, since
the theoretical model includes supply and demand of teachers, the analysis
is a general equilibrium framework that takes into account how supply and
demand interacts. To my knowledge, no previous papers study this issue.
Clearly, this is a first important step if we want to design economic policies
oriented to improve TQ, and thus student outcomes.
In this chapter, through the lens of my model, I build time series of teacher
quality at the country level. Additionally, with the objective of assessing if
my proposed measure is a good proxy of TQ, I include the TQ measure as
well as student and school characteristics, family background and educational
spending as inputs in the estimation of an empirical educational production
function (EPF) using the micro-data of PISA over a panel of 22 OECD
countries for the period 2000-2015. The model highlights the importance
of teacher quality as an educational input because I find that my proxy of
TQ is strongly correlated positively with cross-country dispersion in student
outcomes, even while controlling for student and school characteristics, family
background, macroeconomic variables and unobservable country fixed effects.
Then, based on the theoretical model and on the proposed EPF, I carry out
several counter-factual exercises with the dual objective of firstly determining
the importance of teacher quality as a source of cross-country differences in
student achievements, and secondly, discussing why teacher quality differs
across countries.
I find that cross-country differences in TQ explains approximately 22%
of the observed cross-country variance in observed student outcomes. Its
importance is quite similar to the family background effect and clearly higher
than the importance of other school inputs. This finding is in line with
the previous literature that highlights the importance of teacher quality as
educational input (Hanushek, 2003; Metzler and Woessmann 2012, Hanushek
et al 2014 among others).
When I study the main determinants of cross-country dispersion in TQ,
I find that the initial distributions of skills within the population are crucial
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in determining current dispersion in TQ across countries, since a larger mean
in the skills of the population derives in a better teacher selection process.
Moreover, teacher salaries and labour market conditions play a less important
role in explaining dispersion in TQ. These results are relevant because suggest
a hysteresis in the cross-country differences in student outcomes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents
the theoretical model of teacher selection used to generate country measures
of teacher quality. Section 2.3 includes the calibration of the model for a
panel of 22 OECD countries. Section 2.4 presents different counter-factual
exercises to analyse the importance of teacher quality as a source of cross-
county differences in student achievements. Section 2.5 includes counter-
factual exercises to discuss the determinants of cross-country differences in
teacher quality. Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
This section presents the theoretical framework to study the process of teacher
selection with the aim of estimating the average teacher quality for a panel
of countries. My strategy relies on analysing the individuals’ decision to
become teachers as well as the schools’ decision about hiring. This analysis
enables to me to estimate the general equilibrium effects of different variables
affecting teacher quality.
The economy considered is inhabited by a measure one of individuals
characterized by the pair (θ̂, t̂), where θ̂ is an observable skill that deter-
mines individual productivity in the non-teaching sector and t̂ represents an
unobservable teacher skill.4
For each individual, the pair of skills
(
θ̂, t̂
)
is assumed to be distributed
log-normally.
4The assumption of the non-observability of the teacher skill is suggested in previous
studies. See for instance Hanushek (2010) and Rothstein et al.(2014).
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ln
(
θ̂
t̂
)
∼ N
([
µθ
µt
]
,
[
σ2θ σθt
σθt σ
2
t
])
. (2.1)
Let ρθt =
σθt
σtσθ
to state the correlation coefficient between both skills for
the total population of potential teachers. I assume that ρθt ≥ 0, which
seems consistent with recent empirical studies.5
I assume that the wage in the teaching sector, ŵ0, is the same for all
teachers.6 In contrast, the wage in the market sector, ŵθ, depends on the
non-teaching skill θ̂ (general skill in ahead) as follows:
ŵθ = θ̂
α, (2.2)
where α, which is the wage elasticity with respect to the general skill,
measures the market return to the general skill θ̂.
The model has two stages of selection. The first one is the self-selection
stage. This stage determines the supply of teachers in the economy. The
second one is the school board stage and concentrates on the demand for
teachers.
2.2.1 Self-selection stage
In the first stage every individual i makes his occupational choice to maximize
his utility, ui. This stage is based on a Roy model, which is the most used
framework in the field of work self-selection.7
5A positive correlation between teaching and non-teaching skills is implicit in the fol-
lowing works. Hanushek et al. (2015) study the private returns to cognitive skills using
the PIAAC survey, and find a positive effect of cognitive skills on salaries. On the other
hand, Hanushek et al. (2014) study the effects of teacher cognitive skills, also measured
based on the PIAAC survey, on student achievements. This work finds a positive effect of
teacher skills on student outcomes. Therefore, the same skills present positive effects in
both, the teaching and non-teaching sectors.
6This assumption captures the empirical fact that the variance between teacher salaries
is very low compared to the variance of salaries across the whole economy.
7Roy models have been successfully used to study the selection process in labour mar-
kets in many contexts, for instance: immigration (Borjas, 1987), government employment
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The individual utility function is given by:
ui =
{
ln(ŵ0) + ln(t̂
τ ) if be a teacher
ln(ŵθ) otherwise,
(2.3)
where ln(t̂τ ) captures the non-pecuniary utility of teaching. The parame-
ter τ measures the elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility with respect to the
individual teacher quality.
The utility obtained as a teacher depends not only on the wage but also
on the individual teacher’s ability. The idea behind this is that teaching
skills must be positively correlated with the vocation of becoming a teacher.
Thus, the more motivated the teacher, the larger the non-pecuniary utility
of teaching is.8 The Appendix I discusses the sensitivity of the model’s
equilibrium to changes in the parameter values. Particularly, the case where
utility depends only on monetary compensation (τ = 0) is analysed.9
Given the utility function of Equation (2.3), individuals choose to become
teachers if:
ln(ŵ0) + τ ln(t̂) > α ln(θ̂). (2.4)
Defining ln(x̂) = x, using equation (2.4) and regrouping, the condition
above can be written as:
αθ − τt < w0, (2.5)
(Borjas, 2002), manufacturing industries (Heckman, 1985) and entrepreneurs (Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989).
8This interpretation could be replaced by assuming some wage dispersion within the
teacher sector where the best teachers are better paid. That is, τ could be interpreted as
the elasticity of teacher wages respect to the individual teacher skill without modifying
any result of the model. If τ is lower than α the scenario is still compatible with the fact
of lower wage variance within the teacher sector with respect to the whole economy.
9In the utility function, I do not consider the probability of not being selected for a
teaching position because I assume that individuals who are not selected as teachers can
apply for a job in the market sector under the same conditions as the rest of the population.
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Additionally, define v = αθ − τ as the ”self-selection function”. Since
v is a sum of two normal random variables, it is also distributed normally.
Particularly, v ∼ N(µv, σ2v), with mean µv = αµθ − τµt and variance σ2v =
α2σ2θ + τ
2σ2t − 2ατσtθ. This self-selection function will help us to identify the
supply of teachers, the average quality of the teacher supply as well as the
correlation of this self-selection function with the general skills.
Let define the following indicator function:
I =
{
1 if the individual choose to be a teacher
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
The probability that an individual chooses to work in the teaching sector,
P (I = 1) which is the teacher supply size, is given by:
P (I = 1) = P (v < w0) = P
(
v − µv
σv
<
w0 − µv
σv
)
,
= Φ
(
w0 − µv
σv
)
= Φ (z) , (2.7)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution, and z = w0−µv
σv
. Since, the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal is an increasing function in z, and z is an increasing
function of the teacher salary (w0), the teacher supply is also an increasing
function of the teacher salary.
The average quality of the teacher supply, E(t|I = 1), is computed as
follows:10
E(t|I = 1) = E
(
t|v − µv
σv
<
w0 − µv
σv
)
10This expression corresponds to the mean of an incidentally truncated bivariate normal
distribution. Just to simplify, I present the expected mean of t instead of t̂. Note that,
since the logarithm is a strictly increasing function, any change in the mean of t implies a
change of the same sign in the mean quality of teachers (i.e. mean of t̂).
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= µt + ρvtσt
(−φ(z)
Φ(z)
)
, (2.8)
where µt is the mean teacher skill of the total population in the economy,
z = w0−µv
σv
, ρvt is the correlation coefficient between the self-selection function
and the teacher skill, and φ and Φ are the density function and cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution respectively. The
expression σt
(
−φ(z)
Φ(z)
)
in Equation (2.8) is always negative. Therefore, the
average quality among the supply of teachers, E(t|I = 1), is lower than the
population mean (µv) when ρvt is positive. And thus, a negative selection
bias in the teacher supply arises.11 On the other hand, when ρvt is negative,
the supply of teachers presents a positive selection bias.
The expression for ρvt is given by:
ρvt =
σvt
σtσv
(2.9)
Since, σt and σv are always positive terms, the selection bias of the teacher
supply will depend on the sign of σvt. Moreover, σvt = cov(αθ − τt; t) =
ασθt − τσ2t . Hence, a negative selection bias arises when σθt > τσ2t /α while
a positive selection bias arises in the opposite case. Therefore, even discard-
ing the less intuitive cases where σθt is negative, a positive selection bias is
possible. If the non-pecuniary utility of teaching is eliminated, τ = 0, and
ρθt ≥ 0 holds, the model always predicts a negative selection bias in the
teacher supply.
2.2.2 School selection stage
In the second stage of selection, I assume that the school board hires a fixed
number of teachers, γ. Let Θ be an indicator function that states whether
an individual from the teacher supply is selected for a teacher position.
11A negative selection bias implies that the average teacher skill within the teacher
supply is lower than in the total population. In contrast, a positive selection bias ap-
pears when the average teacher skill within the teacher supply is higher than in the total
population.
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Θ =
{
1 if the individual is selected
0 otherwise.
(2.10)
The probability of obtaining a teacher position is P (Θ = 1) = γ.
I assume an educational production function in which student outcomes
depend on family resources (F ), school resources (R), school organization12
(Sch) and student characteristics (St). Additionally, following the empiri-
cal literature of ”teacher value added”, I assume that student outcomes (y)
depend positively on teacher ability (TQ = E(t|Θ = 1)).
y = y(F,R, Sch, St, TQ), (2.11)
the school board selects teachers to optimize student achievements (y),
taking the teacher salary (ŵ0) as given.
13 Note that, the wage bill is ex-
ogenous in the model, since it depends on the teaching staff size (γ) and
the teacher salary (ŵ0), both exogenous variables. The next chapter of this
dissertation work with a version of the model where (ŵ0) and class-size are
endogenous. The main mechanisms of the model hold under this more gen-
eral framework.
Since the individual teaching skill is unobservable, and ρθt ≥ 0 holds,
the school selection strategy is simple. Indeed, the school board seeks to
screen the true teaching ability of candidates based on its observable general
skills θ and then select the fraction γ of individuals with a higher level of
θ. The school strategy is based on the fact that individuals with a higher
level of θ also have a higher expected teacher ability E(t). The conditional
expectation of interest is then the expected teaching skill of teachers, that is
TQ = E(t|Θ = 1). Indeed, maximising TQ is equivalent to maximize student
outputs, given the educational production function of equation (2.11).
Let us define θ∗ as the minimum level of the general skill required to obtain
a teacher position such that a fraction γ of individuals within the teacher
12The typical variables included in the educational production function related to school
organization are the student-teacher ratio, levels of school autonomy and school size.
13I assume that school budget is enough to hire γ teachers at the exogenous teacher
salary, ŵ0.
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supply has a level of general skill higher than θ∗, that is
∞∫
θ∗
f(θ/I = 1)∂θ = γ
holds. The value of θ∗ is endogenously determined by the teacher staff size
(γ) and by the distribution of θ within the teacher supply. A rise on θ∗
implies a rise on the expected general skill among teachers E(θ/Θ = 1), and
therefore, a rise in the expected ability of teachers, TQ.
Since the conditional expectation TQ = E(t|Θ = 1) does not have a
closed expression, I will obtain them by simulation. Before doing this, the
next section discusses under which circumstances the school strategy attracts
effective teachers.
2.2.3 The effectiveness of the school strategy
The effectiveness of the school strategy depends crucially on the correlation
between the teacher skill and the general skill within the teacher supply (ρ˜θt),
which is endogenously determined in the model. This is so because schools
use the general skill as a proxy for the unobservable teacher skill. Therefore,
the larger the correlation between the two within the teacher supply, the
more precise the proxy is, meaning a more effective school strategy. On the
contrary, when this correlation is weak, the signal will be much less precise.
I denote this correlation as ρ˜θt = E (ρθt|I = 1), which is given by the
following expression:
ρ˜θt =
σ˜θt
σ˜tσ˜θ
, (2.12)
where σ˜θt represents the covariance between the teacher skill and the
general skill restricted to the teacher supply, and σ˜t and σ˜θ are the restricted
standard deviations of the teacher and general skills respectively.14 In what
follows, I study its quantitative value and how teacher wages, ŵ0 affect its
magnitude.
14See Rao (1989) for details regarding the computation of the restricted variances and
covariance.
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The correlation between skills within the teacher supply could be higher
than, lower than or equal to the correlation in the total population. This is
so because firstly, the restricted standard deviations σ˜t, σ˜θ are always lower
than the population ones (σt and σθ). Secondly, the restricted covariance σ˜θt
could be higher or lower than the population value (σθt).
15
If ρθt is relatively low, ρ˜θt > ρθt holds for any teacher salary. On the other
hand, if ρθt is relatively high, the inequality ρθt > ρ˜θt holds for any teacher
salary. Additionally, when ρ˜θt 6= ρθt, the distance between the restricted and
unrestricted correlation coefficients decreases with the supply of teachers,
which in turn, depends positively on wages. Therefore, a rise in teacher
wages determines the convergence between the restricted and the unrestricted
correlation.16
Since the convergence between the restricted and the unrestricted correla-
tion could be from above or from below, the sign of the relationship between
teacher salary ŵ0 and the effectiveness of the proxy ρ˜θt is not theoretically
defined. Specifically, if ρ˜θt < ρθt holds for any level of ŵ0, a positive re-
lationship between the teacher salary and the quality of the proxy, (ρ˜θt) is
obtained. In this case, when schools set a higher salary, the proxy to identify
the best teachers becomes powerful. On the contrary, when ρ˜θt < ρθt holds
for any ŵ0, a negative relationship between ρ˜θt and ŵ0 is obtained. In this
case, when schools fix a higher salary, the proxy to identify the best teachers
becomes weaker.
2.2.4 The equilibrium in the market for teachers
The equilibrium of the model is defined as a minimum level of general skill
required to be selected for a teacher position and the associated distribution
of the teacher skill among teachers (θ∗, f(t/Θ = 1), such that:
• No individuals wishes to change occupation from the teacher sector to
the market sector, given the market wages.
15Particularly, σθt ≤ σ˜θt if an only if ρθt ≤ τ/α.
16In the extreme, when w0 tends to infinite and thus, the teacher supply tends to the
total population, i.e. ρ˜θt tends to ρθt.
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• The school board maximises student outcomes given the teacher salary.
• The school board hires the required number of teachers. That is, θ∗
holds that:
∞∫
θ∗
f(θ/Θ = 1)∂θ = γ
Note that some individuals that choose to apply for a teacher position in
the self selection stage could not be hired, so that, an excess of supply in the
teacher market could be observed in equilibrium.17 Nevertheless, no agents
have incentives to change their decisions.
2.2.5 Equilibrium representation
Even though the model generates the complete equilibrium distribution of
the teacher ability among teachers, in this section, I concentrate only on the
mean of the distribution of TQ.
For each level of teacher salary and each parameter, the model states
a TQ in equilibrium. Since TQ is a key input for student outcomes, it is
relevant to study its relationship with teacher wages.
The ”Teacher Wage-Teacher Quality” curve (in advance TW-TQ curve)
shows for each level of teacher salary, w0, and a given vector for the rest of
model parameters, the expected teacher ability of the teacher staff, TQ =
E(t/Θ = 1), that holds the equilibrium conditions of the model. Figure
2.1 represents the TW-TQ curve for a baseline economy. Parameters in this
baseline economy were chosen in order to: i) work with standard normal
marginal distributions in both skills, µt = 0, σt = 1, µθ = 0, σθ = 1; ii) fix
an elasticity of the individual utility respect to the general skill higher than
the elasticity respect to the teacher skill, α = 1, τ = 0.118; iii) Work with a
positive, but not very strong, correlation between skills, ρθt = 0.5. Appendix
I discuss in detail how the TW-TQ curve is modified when we change the
parameter values of the model.
17Recall that, individuals who are not selected for a teacher position can apply for a job
in the market sector like any other individual.
18This assumption states that wages are more relevant than motivation in the occupa-
tional choice.
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Figure 2.1 shows an increasing and concave TW-TQ equilibrium curve.
Teacher salaries increase TQ but at a decreasing rate. That is, when salaries
are relatively low, an increase in salaries has a strong impact on the quality
of the teaching staff. When salaries are relatively high instead (i.e. more
than two times the median wage on the non-teaching sector), the effect of
teacher wage on the TQ is smaller and becomes almost zero for higher levels
of teacher wage. The shape of the curve is the consequence of the interaction
of three different mechanisms of transmission which are discussed in detail
in the next section.
Notice that the non-linear shape of the curve could help us to understand
the inconclusive relationship of previous empirical works between teacher
salaries and student outcomes. Hanushek (2003) provides an extensive re-
view of several studies analysing the relationship between teacher salary and
student performance. He shows that most of the studies do not find a statis-
tically significant positive correlation. As exceptions, Loeb and Page (2000)
and Dolton and Marcenaro Gutierrez (2011) find a positive relationship be-
tween teacher salaries and student achievements and provide elements to
understand the previous failures in the finding of a statistically significant
relationship which are in line with the shape of my TW-TQ curve.
One possible explanation for these ambiguous findings is that different
countries could be in different parts of the curve. This is so because on the
one hand, empirical analysis based on cross-sectional data within a country
probably captures only a small segment of the equilibrium curve since teacher
wage dispersion is usually small within country. Note that a linear regression
over different segments of the TW-TQ curve of Figure 2.1 could generate very
different results. In fact, an estimation over a sample of low teacher wages
probably suggests a significant relationship between teacher salaries and stu-
dent outcomes. However, with a sample of high teacher salaries it would be
more difficult to find a significant relationship. On the other hand, the pa-
rameters controlling the teacher selection process differ across countries, and
as it is explained in the Appendix I, the equilibrium curve is very sensitive
to the value of these parameters.
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Figure 2.1: The TW-TQ equilibrium curve
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Note: Teacher wage is expressed in terms of the median wage in the non-teaching sector.
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2.2.6 Teacher salary and teacher quality: Three chan-
nels of transmission
Teacher salaries impact the quality of teachers through three different chan-
nels: the quantity channel, the quality channel and the signal channel. Fur-
thermore, the sign of the latter two channels depends on ρθt. I will also
discuss how each channel operates for different values of ρθt.
The quantity channel affects the teacher supply size (γ). A rise in the
teacher wages increases the incentive to become a teacher. Therefore, a higher
teacher salary determines a larger teacher supply and more possibilities of
selection for schools. Panel A of Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between
teacher salaries and the teacher supply size for different values of ρθt. This
channel is almost insensitive to different values of ρθt.
The quality channel affects the average teacher skill of individuals within
the teacher supply, E(t/I = 1). The sign of the quality channel effect depends
on ρθt. With a high correlation between general and teacher skills, a rise in
the teacher salary determines a rise in the average teacher ability within the
teacher supply. Note that a higher quality of teacher supply improves the
pool of selection for school. In contrast, the quality of the teacher supply
is almost independent of the teacher wage in the case of a small correlation
among skills in the population (see the case of ρθt = 0.1).
19
Finally, panel C of Figure 2.2 shows the signal channel (i.e. ρ˜θt) for
different values of ρθt. As was explained in Section 2.2.3, the larger the
correlation is between the teaching and the general skill within the teacher
supply (ρ˜θt) the more powerful is the signal, and thus, the more efficient is
the selection strategy of schools.
The relationship between the teacher salary ŵ0 and ρ˜θt depends on the
correlation between both skills in the total population, ρθt. Indeed, as we
can see from the graph, ρ˜θt and ŵ0 are increasing (decreasing) in teacher
wages when the correlation between skills in the total population is strong
(weak). Therefore, when ρθt is high, paying higher wages makes the signal in
the selection process more accurate. On the contrary, when ρθt is low, paying
19Indeed, assuming ρθt < 0.1 the sign of this channel becomes negative. Since, empirical
evidence is in favour of ρθt > 0 we do not concentrate on this case.
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Figure 2.2: The Three Channels
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higher salaries determines a less accurate signal in the selection process.
In summary, in the case of a strong correlation between skills in the
population, a rise in teacher salaries leads to a more efficient method of
selecting teachers. This is so because higher wages imply that: i) the selection
pool of teachers is larger, ii) these agents are of better quality and iii) the
signal is powerful (the restricted correlation is larger). However, in the case
of a weak correlation between skills (see for instance, the case of ρθt = 0.1), a
rise in the teacher salary imply that i) the selection pool of teachers is larger
but ii) the average quality of the teachers could not increase and iii) the
proxy of the unobservable teaching skill is less accurate. As a consequence of
these opposing effects, the marginal effect of teacher salary on TQ is weaker
(or even negative) in this last case.20
Recall that the evidence suggests that observable characteristics of teach-
ers are not a good proxy for teacher ability (Rockoff, 2004; Jepsen, 2005;
Hanushek and Rivkin, 2007; Hanushek; 2010). Therefore, the parameter ρθt
20See Appendix II for a graphical analysis of the three channels for different values of
ρθt.
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of the model could be small which introduces uncertainty regarding the sign
of the last channels.
2.3 Calibration
The sensitivity of the equilibrium TW-TQ curve to some parameter values
(see Appendix I) introduces difficulties to use the model in order of computing
the expected quality of the teaching staff for a given country. Therefore, using
the model to generate measures of TQ at a country level requires an accurate
process of calibration. The model will only be useful if the correct TW-TQ
equilibrium curve is identified.
The model has nine parameters to determine. Five parameters are as-
sociated with the skill distribution among the population: the mean and
variance of the marginal distribution of the unobservable teacher skills, µt
and σt, mean and variance of the marginal distribution of the observable
general skill, µθ and σθ and the correlation between both skills ρθt. Three
parameters are related to the labour market conditions: ŵ0 measures the
teacher salary relative to the median wage in the market sector; α states the
elasticity of market wages to the observable general skill and γ indicates the
share of teachers among the total labour force. Finally, parameter τ rep-
resents the elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility to the individual teacher
skill.
I calibrate the model for a set of 22 OECD countries in the years 2000,
2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015.21 I assume that all the parameters of the
population distribution of skills and parameters τ and γ are time invariant
22 and parameters α and ŵ0 vary across years. Furthermore, I assume that
parameters µt, σt, µθ, σθ, ŵ0, α and γ vary across countries, while parameters
21Years and countries were selected for reasons of data availability. The database in-
cludes the years in which the PISA test was available. The set of countries was restricted
by the information required to the calibration of parameters.
22The assumption of a fixed distribution of skills in the adult population for a period of
12 years is not so strong. For instance, the PIAAC survey measures skills for populations
whose ages are between 16 and 66 years (50 cohorts). Therefore, in a period of 12 years
only a quarter of the cohorts changes. On the other hand, assuming a time invariant
utility function for a shorter period seems quite reasonable.
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ρθt and τ are constant across countries.
Observable parameters are approximated with country data. Unobserv-
able parameters are approximated indirectly. The following section describes
the strategy applied in each case.
2.3.1 Observable Parameters
The individual general skill and the labour market condition are assumed as
observable variables in the model. Thus, these variables are approximated
from country statistics. Tables 2.1 presents the sources of information used
to approximate the observable parameters.
Parameters corresponding to the moments of the country general skill
distribution (µθ and σθ) are approximated with the corresponding moments
of an average of skills included in the PIAAC survey for adult populations.
The PIAAC survey for adult populations is used to obtain a comparable
measure of skills across countries. This survey measures adults’ skills in
literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments -
and gathers information and data on how adults use their skills at home, at
work and in the wider community.23
Hanushek et al. (2015) studies the wage returns to the cognitive skills
measured in the PIAAC survey. In line with the assumption of equation
(2) regarding the general skill, the paper finds a positive effect on salaries
from all three cognitive skills measured in the survey. Based on these result,
the general skill of our model (θ) is approximated as an average of the test
scores in the three skills measured in the PIAAC survey.24 Test scores are
standardised with a mean µθ zero and a standard deviation of one across
countries σθ.
The wage return to the general skill (parameter α) is approximated by
23See more details about PIAAC survey in OECD(2013).
24The results Hanushek et al (2015) states that the wage returns to each skill included
in the PIAAC survey are different. Then our general skill (θ) which capture the relevant
skills for the market is constructed as a weighted average of the skills in PIAAC, where
the weight of each skill follows from the wage returns estimated in the work of Hanushek
et al (2015).
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Table 2.1: Approximation for observable parameters
Parameter Definition Source
µθ mean of the general skill distribution PIAAC
σ2θ variance of the general skill distribution PIAAC
γ share of teacher into the labour force EG
α elasticity of wages with respec to EG
the general skill
ŵ0 teacher salary relative to the median EG and IMF
wage in the market sector
the returns to tertiary education. Since the individual general skill θ was
calibrated based on the cognitive skills of the PIAAC survey, the best option
to approximate α would be the average returns to these skills. However,
this option is available only for a single year (2012). Therefore, in order
to consider the time dynamic of parameter α, it was approximated with
the wage returns to tertiary education, available on Education at a Glance-
OECD (EG, OECD) for all of the years included in the analysis.25 In line
with the model, the wage return to tertiary education captures a premium
associated with an observable approximation of individual skills.
Parameter ŵ0, indicates the relative teacher salary with respect to the
median wage in the market sector. It is approximated with the ratio of
the teacher salary in lower secondary education (available at Education at
Glance, OECD 2001) and the GDP per habitant (from IMF) both in PPP
dollars.
Finally, parameter γ is approximated with the share of teachers in the
total employment, measured by Education at a Glance, OECD, 2001.
25The wage returns to education present a high positive correlation of 0.78 across coun-
tries with the returns to the cognitive skills in the PIAAC estimated in Hanushek et al
(2015).
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2.3.2 Unobservable parameters
Teacher skills are unobservable, and thus parameters µt, σt, and ρθt can
not be approximated directly by country data. Similarly, since individual
preferences are unobservable, there is no information for parameter τ . All
these unobservable parameters are approximated indirectly.
I assume that the variance of the teacher skill distribution, σt, is equal to
the variance of the general skill, σθ. In practice, this decision implies working
with only eight, instead of nine parameters. The correlation between vari-
ances in observable skills is strong across countries.26 In addition, I assume
that countries with a high variance in some observable skill usually exhibit
a large variance in unobservable skills too.
Meanwhile, parameters µt, ρθt and τ are calibrated together through an
iterative process explained in Figure 2.4.
I start approximating the average teacher quality µt/Θ = 1 for each
country in 2015, based on the PISA results for that year.
According to equation (2.11) in the theoretical model, the following edu-
cational production function is assumed:
yis = β0TQcts + β1Si + β2Fi + β3SCHi + β4Mct + Tt + Cc + uis, (2.13)
where yis states the average student outcome for individual i in subject
s; TQcts is the simulated TQ for country c, in period t for subject s, Si
represents a set of individual characteristics; Fi states the family background
for individual i; SCHi states the school characteristics for individual i; Mct
represents a set of macroeconomic variables for country c in period t, , Tt is
time dummy for period t, Cc is a fixed effect associated with country c, and
uis is the residual of the equation.
Taking expectations on equation 2.13, assuming E(uis) = 0, and regroup-
ing, the expected teacher quality for each country, subject and period can be
26Cross-country standard deviations in numeracy and literacy skills of the PIAAC survey
show a correlation of 0.84. Moreover, cross-country correlation among the cognitive skills
measured in the PISA test are of the order of 0.97.
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computed.
E(TQis) = E(yis −B1Si +B2Fi +B3SCHi +B4Mct + Tt + Cc) (2.14)
The result of equation (2.14) is used to obtain the average teacher quality,
µt/Θ = 1, for each country and subject in 2015. Note that, this value is an
endogenous result of the model and it differs from parameter µt which states
the average teacher skill of the total population.
In order to operate with equation (2.14), first at all I need an approxima-
tion to each component of the right side of the equation. Student characteris-
tics include gender, age, migration status, and dummies regarding repetition
and difference between the language of the test and language at home. Family
background is approximated with the index of economic social and cultural
status of PISA (ESCS index). This index was created on the basis of the
highest levels of education and occupational status of the student’s parents;
the number of books at home; and an index of other home resources.27 School
characteristics include an index of autonomy developed by PISA, school size
and the student-teacher ratio.28 Finally, I control by the educational expen-
diture in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the GDP, the
GDP per capita in PPP dollars, and the growth rate.
Finally, the vectors of parameters Bi are estimated by running the OLS
regression with the objective to obtain an empirical estimation of the TW-
TQ curve. The empirical TW-TQ is estimated based on our sample of 22
OECD countries between 2000 and 2015. The estimation includes all of the
controls of equation (2.13) with the exception of TQ, which is replaced by the
relative teacher salaries. Concretely, the following regression is estimated:
27The index of other home resources was created on the basis of whether there is a quiet
study space, internet access, TV, and stories and novels at home. For more details on the
ESCS, see the Annex I of PISA (2015)- OECD.
28The index of school autonomy is calculated as the percentage of tasks included in the
questionnaire of school for which the principal, teachers or the school governing board
have considerable responsibility. See the Annex A1 of PISA (2015)- OECD Volume II for
details of the index of school autonomy. The school size is measured as the total student
enrolment. The student-teacher ratio is measured as at a school level as the ratio between
the total number of teachers in the school and the total enrolment.
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Table 2.2: Empirical TW-TQ curve
student score
b1 34.771**
b2 -8.934**
Average R-Squared 0.2282
Observations 577909
Sample 2000-2015
Note: Teacher salaries are expressed as a percentage of the GDP per capita. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Data source: PISA 2000-2015; OECD, IMF.
yis = b1ŵct + b2ŵ
2
ct +B1Si +B2Fi +B3SCHi +B4Mct +Tt +Cc +uis, (2.15)
where ŵct indicates the ratio among the teacher salary and the GDP per
capita (both in PPP dollars) for country i in period t. Consistent with our
theoretical equilibrium curve TW-TQ, the empirical specification in Equation
2.16 needs to include a quadratic term to capture non-linear effects of salaries.
Table 2.2 reports the values for parameters b1 and b2 from the empirical
estimation of the TW-TQ curve of equation (16).29 The quadratic term is
significant, so that the empirical TW-TQ curve is also concave.
Once I have an estimation of µt/Θ = 1 for each country in 2015, the
second step of the process involves recuperating parameter µt, that is, the
population mean of the teacher skill distribution. This step implies solving
the model inversely. Solving the model in this way requires first, using the
values for each exogenous parameter, including ρθt and τ still in the process
of calibration. Therefore, to run this step, I use initial values for those
parameters. I call these values ρ0θt and τ
0.
After this step, I obtain a preliminary calibration for µt conditional on
the initial values ρ0θt and τ
0. In the third step, parameters ρθt and τ are
calibrated in order to minimize the distance between the theoretical and
29For a complete estimation of the regression see the Appendix IV.
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empirical TW-TQ curve. The empirical curve is building based on previous
estimation. The theoretical TW-TQ is computed using the calibrated values
for observable parameters and the initial values for the unobservable ones.
Finally, the fourth step consists of checking the distance between the
initial values of ρθt and τ and the values obtained in the previous step. Let us
define  = 0.001 as a convergence criteria. Hence, this step implies checking
if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. |ρ0θt − ρθt| < 
2. |τ 0 − τ | < 
If the convergence conditions are satisfied, the process of calibration con-
cludes. If not, the iterative process reverts back to the second step taking
the new values of ρθt and τ as input instead of the initial values ρ
0
θt and τ
0.
Figure 2.3 shows the theoretical (blue line) and empirical (green line)
curves together after finish the calibration process. Figure 2.4 summarises
the process of calibration for parameters µt, ρθt and τ . The Appendix III
presents details of the iteration process.
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Figure 2.3: Theoretical vs Empirical TW-TQ curve
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expressed as a percentage of the GDP per capita.
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Figure 2.4: The iterative process of calibration
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2.3.3 Calibration Results
Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 summarise the parameters values for our set of 22
OECD countries. Table 2.3 presents the time-invariant parameters, while
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the time-variant parameters between 2000 and 2015.
By examining these tables three results of the calibration are particularly
remarkable.
First, the variance across countries of the unobservable teacher skill is
quite similar to the variance across countries of the observable general skill.
Hence, even though the calibration determines significant differences in the
mean of the distribution of teacher skills across-countries, those differences
are in line with cross-country differences in other measured skills. Particu-
larly, the variance across countries of the average teacher skill is similar to the
cross-country variance in the average skills measured in the PIAAC survey.
Second, the calibrated correlation between the teacher and general skill
(ρθ,t) is positive but not very high (0.57). This correlation is clearly weaker
than the individual-level correlation between the skills in the PIAAC sur-
vey (0.87 between numeracy and literacy and 0.73 between numeracy and
problem solving) and in PISA results (0.85 between maths and reading and
0.9 between maths and science). This result support the idea that observ-
able skills are not a very reliable proxy for teacher skills, as is shown by
previous works (Rockoff 2004, Jepsen 2005, Hanushek and Rivkin, 2007 and
Hanushek, 2010).
Finally, the elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility with respect to the in-
dividual teacher skill is relatively small (approximately a quarter) compared
to the elasticity of wages with respect to the general skills. This result high-
lights that, even though, effective teachers obtain an average higher utility
of teaching (so, the motivation factor matters), wages are the most relevant
factor in the individual occupational choice.
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Table 2.3: Time invariant parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Australia 0.4072 0.7666 2.30 0.2532 0.7661 0.57 0.24
Austria 0.1851 0.6919 2.60 0.6014 -0.1568 0.57 0.24
Belgium 0.6748 0.7033 3.60 1.3791 0.7642 0.57 0.24
Canada -0.0821 0.6070 1.70 1.6046 2.1071 0.57 0.24
Czech. R 0.3980 0.7972 2.10 0.1179 -0.2052 0.57 0.24
Denmark 0.3640 0.6223 2.80 1.4871 0.6785 0.57 0.24
Estonia 0.2412 0.6216 2.50 1.8271 1.6212 0.57 0.24
Finland 1.3688 0.6338 2.40 1.4981 2.2881 0.57 0.24
France -1.2216 0.5958 2.70 0.3782 0.7398 0.57 0.24
Germany 0.0266 0.7941 1.90 1.0954 1.1828 0.57 0.24
Ireland -0.9330 0.8007 2.80 0.9893 1.9286 0.57 0.24
Italy -2.1209 0.8795 2.90 -0.0108 -0.3119 0.57 0.24
Japan 2.0886 0.6747 1.50 2.7245 1.4741 0.57 0.24
Korea -0.2139 0.6121 1.40 2.2649 1.6541 0.57 0.24
Netherlands 1.0773 0.6414 2.80 1.6097 0.9129 0.57 0.24
Norway 0.7556 0.6299 3.70 1.0570 1.6702 0.57 0.24
Poland -0.7740 0.6926 2.50 1.0552 1.0372 0.57 0.24
Slovak, R. 0.1121 0.6451 2.50 -1.0269 -2.3060 0.57 0.24
Spain -1.7549 0.6280 2.70 -0.0235 0.5819 0.57 0.24
Sweden 0.6816 0.6554 2.80 0.5233 0.8699 0.57 0.24
UK -0.3772 0.8947 2.40 0.2708 0.6202 0.57 0.24
US -0.9032 0.9051 2.20 -1.2038 0.5548 0.57 0.24
ρ τμ θ σθ γ μ Math μ Read
Note: Columns (1)-(3) are observable parameters while columns (4)-(7) states the unob-
servable ones. Sources: PIAAC, OECD and own calibration.
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Table 2.4: Time-variant parameters
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia 0.9050 0.8928 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.92
Austria 1.06 1.05 1.16 1.02
Belgium 0.8640 0.8767 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.92
Canada 0.9146 0.9171 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.94
Czech. R 1.2105 1.24 1.27 1.19 1.30
Denmark 0.8378 0.8386 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85
Estonia 0.93 0.91 0.87
Finland 1.0332 1.0172 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.91
France 1.0122 1.0151 1.01 0.99 1.04 0.95
Germany 0.9678 1.0379 1.11 1.06 1.18 1.07
Ireland 0.9591 1.0080 1.14 1.11 1.19 1.10
Italy 0.8577 1.0320 1.11 1.01 0.99 0.96
Japan 1.00 1.03 1.03
Korea 0.9143 0.9509 0.95 0.89 1.00 0.94
Netherlands 0.9537 1.0033 1.00 1.08 1.06 1.00
Norway 0.8982 0.9273 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85
Poland 1.17 1.13 1.16 1.10
Slovak, R. 1.25 1.17 1.15
Spain 0.9747 0.8708 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.95
Sweden 0.8875 0.9127 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.83
UK 1.0739 1.0977 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.00
1.1654 1.2357 1.19 1.21 1.18 1.14
α
Source: OECD.
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Table 2.5: Time-variant parameters
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia 1.33 1.30 1.16 1.19 1.18 1.20
Austria 0.93 1.07 1.04 1.11 1.07 1.00
Belgium 1.17 1.21 1.11 1.20 1.18 1.10
Canada 1.38 1.43
Czech. R 0.61 1.02 1.04 0.96 0.72 0.57
Denmark 1.02 1.08 0.99 1.36 1.21 1.13
Estonia 0.46 0.77 0.50 0.47
Finland 1.05 1.19 1.04 1.19 1.06 1.04
France 1.03 1.09 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.89
Germany 1.43 1.60 1.46 1.70 1.58 1.47
Ireland 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.40 1.21 0.89
Italy 1.00 1.06 0.95 1.15 1.06 1.00
Japan 1.68 1.66 1.55 1.55 1.34 1.22
Korea 2.66 2.35 2.14 1.90 1.54 1.30
Netherlands 1.06 1.23 1.13 1.37 1.47 1.34
Norway 0.58 0.71 0.60 0.73 0.61 0.65
Poland 0.91 0.92 0.93
Slovak, R. 0.62 0.51 0.56
Spain 1.33 1.48 1.41 1.70 1.44 1.35
Sweden 0.92 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.85 0.79
UK 1.43 1.48 1.29 1.34 1.17 1.12
US 1.10 1.11 0.92 0.95 0.91 1.10
w0
Note Teacher salaries are expressed in terms of the GDP per capita (as proxy of the median
wage in the non-teaching sector). Sources: OECD and IMF.
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2.3.4 Model Results
This section discusses the model results. Our model is able to generate the
complete distribution of teacher quality among teachers for each country.
Nevertheless, in this work, I focus on the distribution’s mean as a summary
statistic.
Figure 2.5 shows the average teacher quality between 2000 and 2015 for
each country of our panel. The model results predict that Korea, Canada
and Japan have the highest teacher quality in the considered period in maths
while Estonia, Finland and Canada have the highest teacher quality in read-
ing. In the lower bound of the distribution the Slovakia and US shows the
lower teacher quality of our sample in maths. In reading, again Slovakia
presents the lower estimations of teacher quality followed by Italy and the
Czech Republic. Even though we observe changes in the relative positions of
countries among subjects, we have a strong cross-country correlation between
teacher quality in both subjects.
Once I obtain the TQ results, a natural question arises: Are the model
results a reliable proxy of a country’s teacher quality? It is difficult to answer
this question because there are no quantitative measures of teacher quality at
a country level. The only consensus in previous literature states that teacher
quality impacts student outcomes.30 I evaluate my proposed measure of TQ
based on its correlation with student outcomes.
A first approximation is a simple correlation between the model measure
of teacher quality and student outcomes. I use the PISA results as a compa-
rable measure of student outcomes across countries. The correlation between
TQ and student outcomes in maths and reading is 0.73 in our panel of 22
countries between 2000 and 2015. Figure 2.7 shows a scatter plot between
the average TQ by countries and the average student achievement on the
PISA test, both for the period 2000-2015 and for the two different subjects.
The correlation between the measure of country TQ and country results on
the PISA test is strong in both maths and reading.
A second more elaborate approximation is an estimation of an Educa-
30See for instance Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), Hanushek (2010) and Hanushek and
Rivkin (2010).
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Figure 2.5: Teacher quality by countries.
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Figure 2.6: Model estimates of TQ and PISA results
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tional Production Function (EPF) based on the PISA test scores that in-
cludes our model measure of TQ as an educational input together with other
controls. In concrete, I use the model measurement of teacher quality to
estimate the following specification of the educational production function,
based on equation (2.13).
yis = β0TQcts + β1Si + β2Fi + β3SCHi + β4Mct + Tt + Cc + uis,
where yis states the student score for individual i in subject s; TQcts
is the simulated TQ for country c, in period t for subject s, Si represents
a vector of individual characteristics; Fi states the family background for
individual i; SCHi states a vector of school characteristics for individual i;
Mct represents a set of country variables for country c in period t, Cc is a
fixed effect associated with country c, Tt is dummy for period t, and uis is
the residual of the equation.31
31Details regarding the estimation, including the set of individual, family and country
variables considered in the specification are presented in the Appendix IV.
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My econometric specification identifies the parameter of the model mea-
surement of TQ based on the dispersion within students and between sub-
jects32. Several concerns could arise from this estimation. First, the possi-
bility of having unobserved omitted variables, for example, the educational
attitude in a country. Societies that emphasize the importance of good edu-
cation may have both, high-quality teachers and parents who strongly sup-
port their child’s education. In this sense, teacher quality and student scores
could be significantly correlated but there is not a causal effect. Second, if
there is a subject-specific attitude in a country (a favourable attitude to-
wards language or mathematics). Third, self-selection or sorting of students
and teachers across schools (within countries) and within schools could also
biased our coefficient of interest. And finally, country specific measurement
of teacher quality are likely measured with error such that OLS estimates
are biased toward zero.
I deal with these concern by including a country fixed effect such that we
control for all the unobservable time-invariant omitted variables associated
to countries. That is, having time series of teacher quality for a set of coun-
tries is important for the baseline specification. This is so because potential
reasons behind the cross-country dispersion in student outcomes could be,
as explained above, learning culture or educational institutions, which are
set up at the country level. Using time series of TQ, we are controlling for
for these unobservable country fixed effects. Unfortunately, the problem of
subject attitude in a country could not be removed by the country fixed ef-
fect. The third concern is not an issue in my framework, because my object
of interest is teacher quality at the country level. And finally the last con-
cern does not seem to be a problem because, as explain in what follows the
estimated coefficient of TQ is positively significant and far away form zero.
Since, I can not deal with all concern explained above, I refuse to interpret
the OLS estimate of β0 as causal.
Table 2.6 summarises the estimations using the micro data of PISA. Col-
umn (1) presents the results of an OLS estimation without any control except
time dummies and country fixed effects. Column (2) shows a regression be-
tween PISA results and the model TQ measure including controls by individ-
ual characteristics, family background, school resources and macro variables.
32Within-student across-subject variation has already been used in Dee 2005, Metzler
and Woessmann 2012, and Hanushek et. al. 2014.
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Finally, column (3) makes the same estimation of column (2) using a different
sample.
The results show that the effect of the model measurement of TQ on
student outcomes is strongly robust to introducing controls and changing the
estimation sample. Moreover, in line with Hanushek (2003), I also find that
TQ is the single school input with the highest impact on student outcomes.
Indeed, the standardized effect of TQ on the student outcomes is greater than
the estimated standardized impact for the rest of the school inputs considered
in the EPF, including the student-teacher ratio, education spending and
variables of school organization.33
The estimated EPF indicates that moving up one standard deviation in
the average TQ of the country determines a rise of 0.121 standard deviations
(almost 11.307 PISA points) in the score of the students of this country. This
result is slightly higher than the teaching quality effect estimated in Rivkin
et al. 2001 (0.11 sd) from an estimate based on teacher fixed effects but lower
than the result of Hanushek et al. 2014 (0.2 sd) based on a similar strategy
to that of this work. Indeed, Hanushek et al. 2014 also estimate and EPF
based on micro data of the PISA test based on a within-student between
subject strategy of identification. The main of our estimations respect to the
work of Hanushek et al. 2014 are the measurement of teacher quality and
the sample of the estimation.34 Additionally, because I have time series of
TQ, I include country fixed effects in the empirical model.
Attending to the correlation of the model measurement of TQ and stu-
dent outcomes, in what follows, I assume that my model measurement is a
reliable proxy of the average teacher quality at the country level. Once I
have a comparable TQ measurement across countries, I can discuss the main
question of the paper, that is: What is the role of teacher quality to explain
cross-country differences in student outcomes?
Our educational production function states that cross-country disper-
sion in student outcomes could essentially arise from differences in: teacher
33Appendix IV reports the complete estimation.
34The work of Hanushek et al. 2014 approximates the average teacher quality in a
country based directly on the average score in PIAAC of teachers. Therefore they have
only one measurement of TQ by country without time variation. The last point limits
their sample of estimation which includes the dataset of PISA in 2009 and 2012.
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Table 2.6: Effect of TQ on student achievements
student score in PISA
(1) (2) (3)
TQ 9.4332*** 10.28*** 11.307***
Student characteristics no yes yes
Family background no yes yes
School characteristics no yes yes
Macroeconomic variables no yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.0344 0.2473 0.2509
Sample 2000-2015 2000-2015 2006-2015
Observations 1580069 1135585 953240
Note: Appendix IV reports the complete estimation. Significance levels: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Data source: PISA 2000-2015; OECD, IMF.
quality, student characteristics, family background, school organization (i.e.
school autonomy, school size and the student-teacher ratio), educational ex-
penditures, and unobservable country fixed effects.35 To my knowledge, this
is the first exercise that makes an integrated analysis of several inputs in
the production function of student achievement to evaluate the relevance
of each one as sources of cross-country dispersion in student outcomes. To
this end, using my theoretical model and the estimated EPF, I study several
counter-factual exercises.
Each exercise consists of removing the country differences in all sources
of dispersion except to one, the selected input. I repeat this exercise for each
one of the school inputs included in my educational production function. In
this way, I identify the individual contribution of each source to cross-country
differences in student outcomes. Then, I compute how much of the observed
variance on test scores in the data could be explained by the variance of the
35This fixed effect captures, for instance, differences in the characteristics of the educa-
tional systems or the importance attached to education by the society.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Educational Inputs on cross-country variance
in student achievements
% of the observed variance
explained by each component
Teacher Quality 22%
School organization 5%
Student Teacher ratio 1%
Expenditure on education (% of GDP) 8%
Family Background 20%
specific source. Table 2.7 summarise the results.36
In line with the results in Hanushek (2014), I find that differences in
teacher skills are a significant determinant of international differences in stu-
dent performance. Indeed, the results of the counter factual exercise state
that nearly a quarter of the cross-country variance in student achievements
observed in test scores is obtained by considering only differences in TQ. In
order to contextualise the importance of TQ to explain cross country dif-
ference in student achievements, note that the results indicate that the TQ
effect is quite similar to the family background effect. Differences in family
background have been identified in previous literature as one of the main
determinants of cross-country differences in student outcomes (See, for in-
stance, review of Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes 2011 and Woessmann, et al. 2009).
The other school inputs have a weaker impact. Indeed, a scenario in which
all country differences are removed except the variables related to school or-
ganization (school autonomy and school size) exhibits a cross-country vari-
ance in student achievements of approximately 5% of the observed variance
in our panel of countries. Taking into account only differences in the stu-
dent teacher ratio produces a variance on the PISA results of a 1% of the
observed variance in the panel. Finally, differences in educational spending
generate a cross-country dispersion of student outcomes equivalent to 8% of
the total variance of the panel. That is, with the exception of TQ, differences
in school inputs play a minor role in explaining cross-country differences in
36Individual contributions do not sum 100 because the sources covariate among them,
and I include only variables related to the education system in the table.
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student achievements.
2.4 Why is TQ different across-countries?
If TQ is so important in explaining cross-country differences in student out-
comes, we need to go further into the analysis and ask why TQ differs across
countries. The theoretical model of this paper helps us to shed light on the
answer of this question.
The model allows me to study the importance of different sources of TQ
dispersion across countries. In particular, I classify three different sources:
i) country differences in teacher salaries, ŵ0; ii) country differences in labour
market conditions (summarised with the parameters α and γ ); and; iii)
country differences in initial distributions of skills, (summarised with the
parameters µθ, σθ, µt and σt). Of course, these different sources of variance
covariate among them. Therefore, removing one source of TQ differences
does not necessarily reduce the cross-country variance of TQ.
I use counter-factual exercises to evaluate the importance of each deter-
minant. Each exercise consists of modifying one of the model parameters in
order to obtain new estimations of TQ for each country and year. Table 2.8
summarised the results.
In the first exercise, to evaluate the role of teacher salaries, I compute a
new vector of country measurements of TQ under the assumption that each
country pays the same relative teacher wage, which I assume to be equal to
the average wage ŵ0 across all countries of the panel and across years. In this
new set up, without differences in teacher wages, the variance of TQ in the
panel falls by 6.6%. The decrease in TQ dispersion is because the simulated
TQ after the removal of differences in teacher wages and the observed vector
of teacher salaries is positively correlated (i.e. 0.24). That is, between 2000
and 2015, countries with better estimations of TQ after removing differences
in wages, also paid, on average, better salaries. Consequently, during this
period teacher salaries amplify the TQ dispersion across countries. Never-
theless, the effect of removing differences in ŵ0 is relatively weak.
A second source of TQ differences across countries is the labour market
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conditions which are captured in the model by parameters α and γ. I simulate
alternative scenarios removing differences in labour market parameters by
imposing the mean of the panel on all countries.
In a second exercise, I remove differences in the wage returns to the
observable skill (α). In this scenario, the variance of TQ remains almost
constant (decreases by 0.2%). The almost null effect of α over TQ dispersion
is because the observed values of (α) across countries, on average, covariate
negatively with other sources of dispersion in our panel. Therefore, even
though the exercise removes the variance of one element that impacts on the
TQ variance, the overall variance of TQ remains almost constant. This result
implies that current differences in the labour market returns do not play a
key role in explaining differences in TQ across countries.
In the same line, I build a third scenario removing differences in the share
of teachers in the labour force (γ). In this case, the variance of TQ falls by
3.5%. Thus, the share of the teacher staff is a relevant amplifier of TQ
variance even though its effect is weak.
Finally, I evaluate the role of the general skills of the population. For
that, I simulate a fourth scenario without differences in the population dis-
tribution of skills. In this case, I impose the same values (panel means) for
parameters µθ, σθ, µt and σt on all countries. Under this assumption, cross-
country differences in TQ are due entirely to the fact that teacher salaries and
labour market conditions determine that the hired teachers belong to differ-
ent percentiles of the skills distribution. In this scenario, the cross-country
variance of TQ falls by 91%. This scenario highlights the importance of
initial distributions of population skills to determine the quality of teachers.
To understand the implication of this result, we can think of a scenario
in which teachers in all countries belongs to the same percentile of the popu-
lation skill distribution. In this case, all the cross-country differences in TQ
are explaining by the initial distribution of the population skills. Of course,
countries with an initial distribution located at the right (higher mean) will
hire teachers with higher skills. So, in order to converge in terms of TQ, coun-
tries where the initial distribution of skills is characterised by a smaller mean
would need to hire their teachers from a higher percentile of the population
distribution with respect to the average.
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Table 2.8: Sources of TQ differences across countries
Modified Imputed Variance in TQ
parameters value
Ex. 1 ŵ0 panel mean -6.6%
Ex. 2 α panel mean -0.2%
Ex. 3 γ panel mean -3.5%
Ex. 4 µt, µθ,σt, σθ panel mean -91%
In summary, previous counter-factual exercises suggest that the initial
distribution of skills determines most of the current TQ differences. The
teacher selection process leads to better results in countries with a high qual-
ity space of selection. In this sense, the history of educational results and
its implications on current population skills plays a key role in explaining
current dispersion in student achievements.
Additionally, observed differences in teacher salaries and labour market
conditions act as amplifiers of initial differences in populations skills. For in-
stance, countries with better initial conditions in terms of the teacher ability
distribution also pay, on average, higher teacher salaries. Therefore, a dif-
ferent configuration of labour market conditions, and particularly of teacher
salaries would be required to break down the hysteresis introduced by initial
differences in population skills.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper evaluates to what extent teacher quality explains cross-country
differences in student achievements. Additionally, using counter-factual exer-
cises, the paper analyses the main drivers of teacher quality variation across
countries.
To do this, I propose and calibrate a micro-founded model to study the
teacher selection process. Based on the calibrated model, I build time series
of teacher quality at a country level for 22 OECD countries and use them as
input in the estimation of an education production function (EPF). To my
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knowledge, no previous studies provide time series of teacher quality. These
time series allow me to analyse whether teacher quality trends can explain
the evolution of student achievements at a country level. Finally, using the
theoretical model and the estimated EPF, I carry out several counter-factual
exercises to evaluate the contribution of different variables for explaining
cross-country differences in student outcomes.
The chapter has three key results. First, the model measurement of
teacher quality shows a significant positive correlation with student outcomes
in PISA across countries, even when controlling for country fixed effects.
This result suggests that our measurement of teacher quality at the country
level seems a reasonable one. Second, TQ is the single educational input
with the largest impact on cross-country variance in student achievements,
explaining approximately 22% of it. Although, this result is in line with
previous literature that highlights the importance of teacher quality as an
educational input, I go further by comparing how important TQ is with
respect to other inputs of the educational production function. I found that
the impact of TQ is quite similar to the impact of family inputs and clearly
higher than the effect of other school inputs. Third, initial distributions
of population skills determine most of the current differences in TQ across
countries. The effect of initial distribution results is significantly larger than
the effects of teacher salaries and labour market conditions.
Changing labour market conditions, and particularly teacher salaries, are
a key factor to breaking down the hysteresis introduced by initial differences
in the skills of the population. This is a significant challenge for policy makers
in countries with poor educational outcomes.
Finally, the micro-founded model proposed in this chapter could be a
useful tool to analyse the effectiveness of different educational policies and
to evaluate reallocations within the educational budget. We advance in this
sense in the next chapter.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Appendix I. Equilibrium sensitivity
Figure 2.7 shows how sensitive the equilibrium TW-TQ curve is to changes
in the exogenous parameters of the population skills.
Panels A and B of Figure 2.7 show the sensitivity of the equilibrium curve
to changes on the mean (µt) and variance (σ
2
t ) of the teacher skill distribution.
A rise in the mean µt shifts the equilibrium curve up without significantly
changing its shape. This result is quite intuitive. A population characterized
by high levels of teaching skill results in better teachers. On the other hand,
a rise in the variance of teachers skills σ2t modifies the slope of the curve since
it becomes steeper, specially when salaries are relatively low.
Panels C and D of Figure 2.7 show the sensitivity of the equilibrium curve
to changes in the mean (µθ) and variance (σ
2
θ) of the general skill distribution.
A higher mean of the general skill distribution µθ determines a fall on the
average quality of teachers and a steeper curve.
Panel D shows that the larger the variance, the flatter the TW-TQ equi-
librium curve is. If σ2θ and salaries are low, the average TQ is low. However,
if the variance is low, and salaries are high, the average TQ is high.
Finally, panel E shows the effects on the equilibrium results derived from
changing the correlation between the two skills of the model (ρθt). Indeed, for
a high correlation between both skills the curve TW-TQ is strictly increasing
and nearly linear. In contrast, for smaller values of ρθt it becomes more
concave. In the extreme, i.e. ρθt = 0.1, the equilibrium relationship becomes
decreasing at the end, and therefore, we obtain a non-monotonic equilibrium
curve.
Figure 2.8 shows the sensitivity of the TW-TQ curve to changes in the
rest of model parameters (α, τ and γ). Panel A shows that with a rise on
the market return of the general skill (α) the TW-TQ curve becomes flatter.
Panel B shows the sensitivity of the TW-TQ curve to changes in the non-
pecuniary returns to the individual teacher skill (τ). Like other parameters,
changes on τ have two different effects. First, a rise on τ moves up the TW-
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Figure 2.7: Impact of changes in the skill distribution parameters
on the TW-TQ equilibrium curve
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TQ curve and simultaneously, makes the TW-TQ equilibrium curve more
concave. For the extreme case of zero non-pecuniary return (the blue line),
the TW-TQ curve is nearly linear.
On the other hand, higher values of τ imply an increase in the slope when
teacher salaries are low together with a marginal effect of almost zero when
teacher salaries are larger than one time the median wage in the market
sector (for instance, see the violet line corresponding with τ = 0.4).
Finally, panel C shows the sensitivity of the equilibrium curve to changes
in the share of teachers on the labour force (parameter γ). An increase in
the number of teachers, i.e. on γ, moves down the TW-TQ equilibrium curve
without significantly changing its shape.
Two key conclusions are derived from the previous analysis. First, the
equilibrium relationship between teacher salary and the average quality of
teachers could be non-linear and even non-monotonic. Therefore, the marginal
effect of the teacher salary on the TQ is non-constant and depends on the
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Figure 2.8: Impact of parameters α, τ and γ on the TW-TQ equi-
librium curve
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level of teacher salaries and the parameter values of the model.
Second, the model rationalises very different different shapes of the TW-
TQ curve, which are derived from the interactions of three different channels
operating in the model discussed in the previous section.
2.7.2 Appendix II. Transmission channels from teacher
salaries to teacher quality
In this section, I explore graphically the three channels through which teacher
salaries impact on the quality of teachers in two different scenarios. First
assuming that correlation between the two skills are strong –ρθt = 0.7, and
a second scenario under a weaker correlation of ρθt = 0.1.
Recall that three characteristics of the individuals that choose to apply
for a teacher position (that is the supply of teachers), are relevant to study
the school selection stage:
118 Teacher Quality and Student Achievements
Firstly, supply size matters (i.e. the quantity channel). A higher num-
ber of individuals in the teacher supply increases the selection possibilities
of schools. That is, schools are restricted to a larger subset when it solves
its optimization problem. Just as example, if teacher supply is equal to the
number of teacher required by the education system, the stage of selection
developed by schools is not relevant. In fact, schools just hire all the indi-
viduals into the teacher supply. Therefore, supply size is the variable that
determines the quantity channel.
Secondly, supply quality matters (i.e. the quality channel). Since schools
select teachers from the teacher supply, the average teacher skill of this sub-
group of the population is a key variable too. Independently of the selection
strategy, the selection process will be very inefficient if all the individuals in
the teacher supply are bad teachers. A higher average teacher skill within the
teacher supply is a signal of a better quality in the selection space of schools.
Therefore, the average teacher skill of the subset of individuals integrating
the teacher supply illustrates our quality channel.
Finally, the correlation between teacher skills and general skills restricted
to the teacher supply matters (the signal channel). Since schools use the gen-
eral skill as signal to hire teachers (teacher skill is unobservable in the model),
the correlation among both skills within the teacher supply determines the
power of the signal used by schools.
Figure 2.9 shows a simulated population of 1.000.000 individuals for which
skills follows a log-normal distribution (see equation 2.1). In the picture, each
individual - characterized by a pair of skills (t, θ) - is identified as a point in
the plane. The upper panel of the figure presents the total population while
the lower panel focuses on the individuals who apply for a teacher position
(i.e. the teacher supply).
The blue line of the upper panel is the indifference line for a different
teacher salary.37.) Individuals below the indifference line choose to apply
for a job in the education sector. On the other hand, individuals above the
indifference line choose to work in the market sector.
37Remember that each individual chooses the sector to work in order to maximize his
utility (see equation 2.4. Indifference line has the following expression: θ = w0+c+τtα . The
indifference curve is computed assuming that τ = 0.1; and c = 0; and w0 = 0 (or ŵ0 = 1)
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The scatter plot in Figure 2.9 shows a strong correlation among the skills.
As a consequence of this correlation, people with a high level of general skill,
usually have a high level of teacher skill.
Note that the sub-population below the indifference curve has a differ-
ent distribution of skills compared to the distribution of skill in the total
population. Therefore, even though I assume a fixed mean, variances and
correlation among skills for the total population, these moments are endoge-
nous within the teacher supply. The lower panel of the Figure focusses on
the individuals that choose to work in the teacher sector for the following
relative teacher salaries (0.3; 1; 2.7).
A rise in the relative teacher salary moves up the indifference line. More
individuals are located under the indifference line as a consequence of the
rise in the teacher salary. That is, more individuals apply for a job in the
teacher sector. A second effect of a rise in teacher salary is a higher quality
of the teacher supply. A higher teacher salary induces to individuals with
higher general skill (and therefore higher potential market wage) to choose
the teacher sector. But, given the strong correlation between skills, these
individuals, on average, also have a higher teacher skill. Finally, the figure
shows that correlation between skills within the teacher supply, measured by
the slope of the regression line -red line- in the lower panel, is stronger as
higher is the teacher salary. Therefore, in this context a rise in the teacher
salary increase the power of the signal used by schools in the second stage of
selection.
In the second example, I simulate a population of 1.000.000 individuals for
which the correlation between the two skills is very weak (ρθt = 0.1). Figure
2.10 presents the total population of individuals together with indifference
curves for different levels of teacher salaries. Again, the upper panel of the
figure presents the total population while the lower panel focuses on the
individuals who apply for a teacher position (teacher supply).
In this case, the points in the plane do not follow a clear pattern. There-
fore, individuals with a high level of ln(θ) show a high dispersion in terms
of ln(t). As before, a higher teacher salary moves up the indifference line.
Like in the strong correlation population, a higher teacher salary increase the
number of individuals in the teacher supply. That is, a higher teacher salary
enlarge the space of selection of schools (quantity channel). However, in
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Figure 2.9: Teacher salary and teacher quality under a strong cor-
relation between skills
this case the average quality of teacher supply does not change when teacher
wage is higher. As before, a rise in the teacher supply induces to workers
with higher general skill to choose the teacher sector, but in this case individ-
uals with higher ln(θ) do not necessarily has a higher ln(t). Therefore in this
scenario, the quality channel does not operates or is very weak compared to
the previous case. Finally, the picture show that in this case, as the small is
the teacher supply and the higher is the correlation between skills, the higher
is the power of the signal used by schools.
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Figure 2.10: Teacher salary and teacher quality under a weak cor-
relation between skills
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2.7.3 Appendix III. The Iteration process of calibra-
tion
The process starts with the approximation of the average teacher quality
(µt/Θ = 1) for each country in 2015, using PISA test scores for this year. The
normalized values obtained operating with equation (2.15) are the following:
Table 2.9: Teacher quality by country 2015
μt/Θ=1 μt /Θ=1
 (math)  (reading)
Austria 0.1336 -0.687
Belgium -1.4918 -1.707
Canada 0.3178 0.567
Czech. R 0.0203 -0.357
Denmark -0.6905 -0.974
Estonia 0.9355 0.744
Finland 0.5268 0.782
France -0.1939 0.417
Germany 0.5053 0.249
Ireland -0.3211 0.544
Italy -0.4066 -0.200
Japan 1.6963 1.829
Korea 2.2187 1.417
Netherlands 0.8025 0.404
Norway -0.6062 0.104
Poland 1.1893 1.241
Slovak, R. -1.0586 -2.118
Spain -0.9770 -0.796
Sweden -1.2453 -1.107
UK -0.5750 -0.272
US -0.7802 -0.081
Table 6. Teacher ality by country 2012
The second step of the process involves to recuperate parameter µt. For
that, I need to solve the model in an inverse sense.
Parameters to solve the model in the first iteration are included in table
2.10.
The third step implies to estimate parameters ρθt and τ in order to mini-
mize the distance between the theoretical and empirical TW-TQ. The process
converge to ρθt = 0.57 and τ = 0.24 starting from different initial values of
ρθt and τ .
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Table 2.10: Parameter values.
Parameter values
µθ 0
σt 1
σθ 1
α 1
γ 0.025
ρ0θt 0.5
τ 0 0.1
2.7.4 Apendix IV. Estimations
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Table 2.11: Determinants of the student’s score in PISA.
TW-TQ curve (1) (2) (3)
TQ 9.4332*** 10.28*** 11.307***
Teacher wage 34.771***
Teacher wage (quadratic) -8.934**
female 7.313*** 7.5879*** 5.499***
F. Gen. Migrant -13.6568*** -13.7194*** -12.689***
Diff. Language -1.945 -1.4595*** -1.034
Age 15.504*** 15.2119*** 15.835***
Repetition -50.122*** -50.7183*** -70.4472***
ESCS 32.674*** 32.1402*** 31.149***
Sch. Size 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0078***
Sch Autonomy 0.5655 1.352 0.415
Student-teacher ratio 2.7597*** 2.4607*** 3.0096***
Student-teacher ratio (quadratic) -0.0766*** -0.0698*** -0.0798***
% of private 8.248*** 12.8591*** 11.2779***
GDP growth 1.888*** 1.0975*** 1.2282***
GDP per capita -0.0014*** -0.001*** -0.0016***
Expenditure on Educ (% of GDP) -1.049* 0.0002 0.001
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.1976 0.0344 0.2473 0.2509
Sample 2000-2015 2000-2015 2000-2015 2006-2015
Observations 1183493 1580069 1135585 953240
Note: In the estimation of the TW-TQ curve, teacher salaries are expressed as a percentage
of the GDP per capita. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Data source:
PISA 2000-2015; OECD, IMF.
Chapter 3
Teacher Quality or Quantity?
An approach to the efficient
allocation of the educational
wage bill
3.1 Introduction
Educational literature has usually been oriented towards studying the effec-
tiveness of different educational policies considered individually. This kind
of analysis has been stimulated in turn by the increasing use of Random
Control Experiments for the evaluation of policies.1
However, papers which compare various alternatives for the use of a sin-
gle resource and discuss the efficient allocation of it are much less frequent.
This chapter analyses the trade-off between teacher quality and teacher quan-
tity by studying the efficient allocation of the educational wage bill between
teachers’ salaries and the number of teachers. This analysis is of special rel-
evance given that, due to the scarcity of resources, it is necessary to improve
0This is a joint work with Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana (UAM).
1See, Muralidharan (2016) for an extensive review of the random experiment literature
in the field of education.
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the efficiency of the public sector by directing efforts towards those factors
that have a greater impact on school performance.
Focusing the attention on wage bill is important at least for two reasons.
First, wage bill represents, on average, approximately 65% of total educa-
tional spending in OECD countries (see OECD, 2017). Second, the results
of chapter 2 of this thesis and several previous studies show that teachers
represent the educational input with the greatest impact on the academic
results of the students (Hanushek, 2003, Klein et al., 2010; Gates, 2011; Hi-
att, 2009). Therefore, the efficiency of the education sector could be closely
related to decisions on salary compensation.
The discussion regarding the allocation of the educational wage bill is
characterized by a clear trade-off between teacher quality and teacher quan-
tity. On one hand, higher salaries could act as an incentive to attract and re-
tain the best teachers to the education sector (Dolton and Marcenaro Gutier-
rez, 2011; Loeb and Page, 2000).2 On the other hand, a rise in the number
of teachers allows a reduction in class size which is usually linked to a bet-
ter study environment, and therefore, to better student outcomes (Card and
Krueger, 1992; Hoxby, 2000; Woessman, 2005).
As far as we know, the only work with a similarly aim to analyse the
efficient allocation of the wage bill is the one carried out by Dolton and
Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014). The estimation of efficiency developed by the
authors is based on a stochastic frontier production function analysis.3 This
approach does not consider the indirect effects (general equilibrium effects)
linked to changes in the number of teachers hired. That is, their analysis im-
plicitly assumes that the educational system faces an infinitely elastic supply
of homogeneous teachers. Then, hiring additional teachers impact only on
the class size but not on the average quality of the teaching staff. Their
assumption may be reasonable for analysing decisions in the margin, but it
becomes unsatisfactory when we allow for significant variations in the num-
ber of teachers hired, which in turn are heterogeneous in quality. Indeed, the
work of Rothstein (2014) shows how the evaluation of several education poli-
cies is substantially modified when considering restrictions or heterogeneities
2The results of chapter 2 support this idea.
3This econometric specification treats the educational system as if it were a company
which attempts to obtain an output (student scores) by the transformation of a set of
inputs (teacher wages and class size).
3.1. INTRODUCTION 127
on the teacher supply.
Compared to Dolton and Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014), we not only de-
veloped an empirical approach but also propose a theoretical model which
allows us to consider both direct and general equilibrium effects. Addition-
ally, the theoretical model allows us to discuss the main factors affecting the
optimal allocation of the wage bill. In this sense, a relevant contribution to
this work with respect to the one in Dolton and Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014),
is to introduce in the analysis a theoretical framework which allows us to
consider general equilibrium effects and work with heterogeneous agents.
The proposed micro-founded model allows us to understand the process
of teacher selection, and the determination of the average teacher quality of
the education system in the case of an economy with two sectors and hetero-
geneous agents characterised by different skills. We use a modified version
of the theoretical model proposed in chapter 2. Specifically, in this chapter,
we work with a more general framework where teacher wages and class size
(that implicitly measure the quantity of teachers) are both endogenous vari-
ables for the school board. Therefore, we can compute not only the expected
TQ under the observed teacher wages and class size but also compute the
average TQ under the optimal decision regarding both variables that results
from the theoretical model. This comparison will be useful to compute the
inefficiency of the wage bill.
Moreover, based on the model, we can capture the two different effects
associated with changes in the number of teachers, that is, the direct ef-
fect on class size and the indirect effect on the average quality of teachers.
That is, since the theoretical model includes supply and demand of teach-
ers, the analysis is a general equilibrium framework that takes into account
how supply and demand interacts. Specifically, our theoretical model shows
us that if we increase the number of teachers hired, in order to reduce the
class size, while maintaining constant teachers’ wages, the average quality of
the teaching staff will deteriorate. Therefore, an efficient distribution of the
salary budget in the education system must necessarily consider the direct
effects of teacher quality and quantity on student outcomes, as well as their
interaction.
We then estimate an educational production function (EPF) using micro-
data of PISA to quantify how changes in our theoretical measure of teacher
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quality and class size both impact student achievements. This empirical
production function in conjunction with the equilibrium TQ measurement
and class size that emerges from our model allow us to compute the optimal
allocation of the wage bill.
Then, comparing the optimal allocation for the wage bill with the ob-
served data we build an index that measures the inefficiency in the alloca-
tion of quantity and qualities of teachers for 22 countries of the OECD. The
results state that the average inefficiency in the allocation of the wage bill
for the group of countries considered is 16%. That is, resources currently al-
located to the educational wage bill could have a significantly greater impact
on educational outcomes by improving their allocation between wages and
teaching hours. Moreover, in most countries, the inefficiency gap is generated
by a bias to prioritize the quantity more than the quality of teachers.
Finally, in order to evaluate the results of our model, we analyse the
correlation between the proposed index of inefficient allocation with an em-
pirical estimate of the overall inefficiency of the education system which is
built independently of the model. Like the Solow residual in the literature
of growth, our empirical estimate of the overall inefficiency of the education
systems is constructed as the ratio between the educational score predicted
by an estimated educational production function and the observed educa-
tional score. Notice that, given the importance i) of the wage bill within the
educational costs and ii) of teaching quality within the overall school inputs,
we will expect that inefficiency in the allocation of the salary budget explains
a significant part of the overall inefficiency of the school system. This is al-
ready the case: our results show that including several control variables and
using different econometric specifications, our estimations confirm a positive
and significant correlation between the indicator of the allocative inefficiency
of the salary budget obtained from our theoretical model and the empirical
estimate of overall inefficiency of the educational system.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents
the theoretical model used in the analysis. The third section discusses the
way in which the model is calibrated for a set of 22 OECD countries and
the estimation of the efficient allocation for the education salary budget in
each of them, based on the calibrated model. The fourth section presents
an empirical approach to estimate the overall inefficiency of educational sys-
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tems in the set of considered countries and discuss its correlation with our
measure of inefficiency in the allocation of the salary budget derived from
the theoretical model. Finally, the fifth section concludes.
3.2 The model of teacher selection
The theoretical model of teacher selection developed in this chapter is a
modified version of the one carried out in chapter 2. As in chapter 2, the
model comprises two stages. The first one is a self-selection stage in which
agents decide if they apply for a teaching position or for a job in the non-
teacher sector (market). In this first stage, the teacher supply of the economy
is determined. This stage does not have changes respect to the model in
chapter 2. In any case, with the aim that each chapter can be read as an
independent research, we present again the self selection stage in this chapter.
In the second stage, the school board will decide how many teachers to
hire and the level of the teacher wages according to their budget constraint.
This stage represents an extension to previous models of teacher selection in
the literature which focus on the self selection stage (see Nagler et al., 2015;
Rothstein, 2014; and Tincani, 2011). Moreover, the school selection stage
is substantially modified with respect to the model in chapter 2 in order to
analyse issues related to efficiency. Indeed, in this model we consider both,
teacher wages and the number of teachers hired as endogenous variables
for the school board. Both variables are going to become crucial to study
efficiency issues analysed in section 3.3.
The following sections analyse in detail both stages and the resulting
equilibrium of the model.
3.2.1 Self selection stage
The economy considered is inhabited by a measure one of individuals char-
acterized by the pair (θ̂, t̂), where θ̂ is an observable skill which determines
individual productivity in the non-teaching sector (market sector) and t̂ rep-
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resents the unobservable teacher skill.4
For each individual, the pair of skills
(
θ̂, t̂
)
is assumed to be distributed
log-normally.
ln
(
θ̂
t̂
)
∼ N
([
µθ
µt
]
,
[
σ2θ σθt
σθt σ
2
t
])
. (3.1)
Let ρθt =
σθt
σtσθ
to state the correlation coefficient between both skills for
the total population of potential teachers. I assume that ρθt ≥ 0, which
seems consistent with recent empirical studies.5
I assume, that the salaries in the teaching sector, ŵ0, are the same for
all teachers.6 In contrast, wages in the market sector, ŵθ, depend on the
non-teaching skill θ̂ (general skill in ahead) as follows:
ŵθ = θ̂
α, (3.2)
where α which is the wage elasticity with respect to the general skill,
measures the market return to the general skill θ̂.
In the first stage every individual i makes his occupational choice to
maximize his utility, ui. This stage is based on a Roy model which is the
most extended framework in the field of work self-selection.7
4The assumption of the non-observability of the teacher skill is suggested in previous
studies. See for instance Hanushek (2010) and Rothstein, et al.(2014).
5A positive correlation between teaching and non-teaching skills is expected from the
following works. On one hand, Hanushek et al. (2015) study the private returns to
cognitive skills using the PIAAC survey and find a positive effect of cognitive skills on
salaries. On the other hand, Hanushek et al. (2014) study the effects of teacher cognitive
skills, also measured based on the PIAAC survey, on student achievements. This work
finds a positive effect of teacher skills on student outcomes. Therefore, the same skills
present positive effects in both teaching and non-teaching sectors, so they are implicitly
positively correlated.
6This assumption captures the empirical fact that the variance between teacher salaries
is very low compared to the variance of salaries in the whole economy.
7Roy models have been successfully used to study the selection process in labour mar-
kets in many contexts, for instance: immigration (Borjas, 1987), government employment
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The individual utility function is given by:
ui =
{
ln(ŵ0) + ln(t̂
τ ) if teacher
ln(ŵθ) otherwise,
(3.3)
where ln(t̂τ ) captures the non-pecuniary utility of teaching. The parame-
ter τ measures the elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility with respect to the
individual teacher quality.
The utility obtained as a teacher depends not only on wages, but also on
teacher’s ability. The idea behind is that teacher skills must be positively cor-
related with the vocation of becoming a teacher. Thus, the more motivated
is the teacher, the larger the non-pecuniary utility of teaching. Section 2.6
discuss the equilibrium of the model if the utility depends only on monetary
compensation, τ = 0. 8
Given the utility function of Equation (3.3), individuals choose to become
teachers if:
ln(ŵ0) + τ ln(t̂) > α ln(θ̂). (3.4)
Defining ln(x̂) = x and regrouping, the condition above can be written
as:
αθ − τt < w0, (3.5)
Additionally, define v = αθ − τ as the ”self-selection function”. Since
v is a sum of two normal random variables, it is also distributed normally.
Particularly, v ∼ N(µv, σ2v), with mean µv = αµθ − τµt and variance σ2v =
α2σ2θ + τ
2σ2t − 2ατσtθ.
Let us define the following indicator function:
(Borjas, 2002), manufacturing industries (Heckman, 1985) and entrepreneurs (Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989).
8In the utility function, I do not consider the probability of not being selected for a
teaching position, because I assume that individuals who are not selected as teachers can
apply for a job in the market sector under the same conditions as the rest of the population.
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I =
{
1 if the individual choose to be a teacher
0 otherwise.
(3.6)
The probability that an individual chooses to work in the teaching sector
is given by:
P (I = 1) = P (v < w0) = P
(
v − µv
σv
<
w0 − µv
σv
)
,
= Φ
(
w0 − µv
σv
)
= Φ (z) , (3.7)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution, and z = w0−µv
σv
. P (I = 1) is the teacher supply size. Since,
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal is an increasing
function in z, the supply of teachers will rise as z rise. Particularly, since z is
an increasing function of the teacher salary (w0), the teacher supply is also
an increasing function of the teacher salary.
The average quality of the teacher supply, E(t|I = 1), is computed as
follows:9
E(t|I = 1) = E
(
t|v − µv
σv
<
w0 − µv
σv
)
= µt + ρvtσt
(−φ(z)
Φ(z)
)
, (3.8)
where µt is the mean teacher skill of the total population in the economy,
z = w0−µv
σv
, ρvt is the correlation coefficient between the self-selection function
and the teacher skill, and φ and Φ are the density function and cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution respectively.
9This expression corresponds to the mean of an incidentally truncated bivariate normal
distribution. Just to simplify, I present the expected mean of t instead of t̂. Note that,
since the logarithm is a strictly increasing function, any change in the mean of t implies a
change of the same sign in the mean quality of teachers (i.e. mean of t̂).
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3.2.2 School selection stage
The stage of school selection is substantially modified in this model compared
with the framework presented in chapter 2. The modifications introduced
to the model allow us to discuss the optimal allocation of the educational
salary budget. Indeed, in chapter 2 we focused only on the strategy of teacher
selection, taking as exogenous the teacher salaries and the number of teachers
hired. Therefore, the theoretical framework of chapter 2 allows us to compute
the expected quality of the teaching staff under the observed allocation of
the educational salary budget, but not identify the optimal allocation.
In contrast, in this chapter, we propose a more general framework in
which teacher salaries and the number of teachers are decisions made by the
school board. Indeed, in this stage the school board will decide, acting as
the only contracting party in the market, the number of teachers to hire and
the level of wages to offer. Of course, the decision regarding the number
of teachers to hire restricts the possibilities of salaries to offer because the
budget is limited.
The school board will make their demand decision seeking to optimise
the results obtained by their students, taking into account their budget con-
straints. We will assume that the school board knows how individuals make
their occupational choice on the self-selection stage. Therefore, it knows the
impact of changes in teacher wages on the quantity and quality of the teacher
supply.
Additionally, we will assume that the student outcomes respond to the
following educational production function:
y = y(I, F, TQ, STR, SCH), (3.9)
where I represents a set of variables associated to the individual, F is a
set de familiar inputs, TQ represents the average quality of teachers, STR
represents the student teacher ratio, and SCH represents a set of charac-
teristics linked to the school organization, like school autonomy, the school
size and school ownership. In line with the previous literature, we assume
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that teacher quality positively affects student outcomes10 while the student-
teacher ratio has a negative impact, at least, after a certain threshold.11
Note that both individual characteristics and family inputs are exogenous
variables for the school board (I = I0 and F = F0). Additionally, we will
also consider the variables related to the school organization as exogenous
because we will focus on the allocation of the wage bill. Therefore, we could
express the educational production function as a function only on TQ and
STR. Particularly, we will assume a baseline production function which
contemplates the possibility of a non-linear impact of STR as follows:12
y = β1TQ+ β2STR + β3STR
2 (3.10)
where β1, β2 y β3 represent the partial effects of changes in teacher quality
and the student-teacher ratio on student outcomes.
Note that the teacher quality is an endogenous result of the model and
therefore, it depends on all the parameters of the model. On the other hand,
the student-teacher ratio depends on the number of students in the education
system, which is exogenous, and the number of teachers hired, which is an
endogenous result of the optimisation problem carried out by the school
board.
The educational production function of equation (3.10) proposes that ed-
ucational authorities could improve the student achievement either through a
decrease in the student-teacher ratio or an improvement in the teacher qual-
ity. However, hiring a higher number of teachers or increasing the teacher
wages in order to attract higher ability workers requires a higher budget for
salary compensations (higher salary budget). Therefore, it becomes neces-
sary to include in the analysis the budget constraint faced by the education
system.
The budget constraint states that the educational salary budget must be
less than or equal to an exogenously determined amount.
10Hanushek, 2003, Klein et al., 2010; Gates, 2011; Hiatt, 2009; Chapter 2.
11Card and Krueger, 1992; Hoxby, 2000; Woessman, 2005.
12We make robustness exercises using alternative specifications in the production func-
tion.
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ŵ0D ≤ G0. (3.11)
where ŵ0 represents the teacher wage, D is the number of teachers hired,
and G0 is the exogenous maximum amount of money to spend in salary
compensations.
Then, all the combinations of teacher wages (ŵ0) and number of teachers
hired (D) which satisfy the budget constraint of equation (3.11) are consid-
ered available for the school board. As mentioned above, this work focuses
on the efficient allocation of the wage bill and not on its absolute magnitude.
Therefore, the importance of considering the budget constraint is because
some education systems could achieve high student scores due to a high ex-
penditure while still being inefficient.
Defining the parameter γ as the share of teachers in total employment,
we can rewrite our modified version of the model in Chapter 2 using their
parameters. Then, we can use the calibration carried out in the previous
chapter for 22 OECD countries.
That is:
γ =
D
N
, (3.12)
where N is the total employment which is assumed exogenous.
Dividing both sides of equation (3.10) betweenN , we can write the budget
constraint of the education system in term of the parameters γ and ŵ0.
ŵ0γ < g0, (3.13)
where g0 is the educational wage bill per worker (G0/N).
A final issue to take into account is the selection strategy used by the
school board to hire teachers. As is discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the
strategy of the school board to select their teachers basically consist of two
steps: i) ranking the teacher supply based on the individual’s observable
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ability (θ), and ii) hiring the fraction γ of individuals which displays great-
est ability. Since we assume a positive correlation between the teacher and
general skills, this strategy leads to maximising the expected quality of the
teaching staff.
This strategy determines that the correlation between the general skill θ
and the teacher skill t within the teacher supply (ρ˜θt) becomes a key parame-
ter to estimating the expected quality of the teaching staff. Indeed, a higher
correlation implies better results of the selection strategy because the proxy
used to predict the quality of teachers will be more powerful. On the con-
trary, a lower correlation implies less capacity for selection because schools
cannot identify the best teachers. In the extreme case in which the correla-
tion among skills within the teaching supply is zero, the school board does
not have any information regarding the teaching ability of the individuals
and therefore, the expected quality of the teaching staff will coincide with
the average ability of the teacher supply. This case would be equivalent to a
random selection strategy among those individuals who apply for a teaching
position.
It is important to note that the correlation of skills within the teacher
supply is an endogenous result of the model and does not coincide with the
correlation of skills in the total population, which is an exogenous parameter.
The correlation of skills within the teaching supply is computed as follows:
ρ˜θt =
σ˜θt
σ˜tσ˜θ
, (3.14)
where σ˜θt represents the covariance between the teacher and general skill
within the teacher supply and σ˜t and σ˜θ are the standard deviations of the
teacher and general skill respectively within the teacher supply.13
As an endogenous result of the model, ρ˜θt is affected by the decisions
taken by the school board regarding the teacher wages ŵ0. That is, the
power of the signal used in the process of selection is a function of teacher
wages (ρ˜θt = g(ŵ0)).
13See Rao (1989) for details regarding the computation of the restricted variances and
covariance.
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Particularly, if ρθt is relatively low, ρ˜θt > ρθt holds for any teacher salary.
On the other hand, if ρθt is relatively high, the inequality ρθt > ρ˜θt holds for
any teacher salary. Additionally, when ρ˜θt 6= ρθt, the distance between the
restricted and unrestricted correlation coefficients decreases with the supply
of teachers, which in turn, depends positively on wages. Therefore, a rise
in teacher wages determines the convergence between the restricted and the
unrestricted correlation.14
Since the convergence between the restricted and the unrestricted correla-
tion could be from above or from below, the sign of the relationship between
teacher salary ŵ0 and the effectiveness of the proxy ρ˜θt is not theoretically
defined. Specifically, if ρ˜θt < ρθt holds for any level of ŵ0, a positive re-
lationship between the teacher salary and the quality of the proxy, (ρ˜θt) is
obtained. In this case, when schools set a higher salary, the proxy to identify
the best teachers becomes powerful. On the contrary, when ρ˜θt < ρθt holds
for any ŵ0, a negative relationship between ρ˜θt and ŵ0 is obtained. In this
case, when schools set a higher salary, the proxy to identify the best teachers
becomes weaker.
Considering all the previous issues, the maximization problem faced by
the school board is summarized as follows:

max
ŵ0,γ
y = f(TQ, STR)
st
ŵ0γ < g0
P (I = 1) = Φ(w0−µv
σv
)
E(t|I = 1) = E
(
t|v−µv
σv
< w0−µv
σv
)
ρ˜θt = g(ŵ0)
STR = 1
γ
∗ stud
N
TQ = TQ[P (I = 1), E(t|I = 1), ρ˜θt, γ]
The optimization problem implies that the school board will choose the
teacher wage (ŵ0) and the number of contracted teachers (γ) according to
their budget constraint, and taking into account that: i) the size of the
14In the extreme, when w0 tends to infinite and thus, the teacher supply tends to the
total population, i.e. ρ˜θt tends to ρθt.
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teacher supply (and therefore the possibilities of selection) is affected by
decisions regarding teacher salaries. ii) the average quality of the teacher
supply is affected by decisions regarding teacher salaries. iii) the powerful of
the signal used to select teachers is also affected by decisions regarding teacher
salaries. iv) The student-teacher ratio depends negatively on the number of
teachers hired and, v) The final quality of the teacher staff depends on the
quantity and quality of the teacher supply, the power of the signal used in
the process of selection and the number of teachers to hire.
3.2.3 Equilibrium of the model
The equilibrium of the model consists of an optimal teacher wage (w∗), an op-
timal share of teachers in the total employment (γ∗) and an optimal expected
teacher quality TQ∗ such that:
• No individuals wish to change occupation from the teaching sector to
the market sector, given the market wages.
• The school board maximises the student outcomes given its budget
constraint.
Note that some individuals that choose to apply for a teacher position in
the self-selection stage could not be hired, so that, an excess of supply in the
teacher market could be observed in equilibrium.15 Nevertheless, no agents
have incentives to change their decisions.
3.2.4 Estimation of the Equilibrium
The proposed model does not have a closed numerical solution, so it is ob-
tained from simulations. In what follows we present the solution of the
model obtained from the simulation of a population of 1,000,000 individu-
als for which the distribution of skills follows the log-normal distribution of
equation (3.1).
15Recall that individuals who are not selected for a teacher position can apply for a job
in the market sector like any other individual.
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Our strategy to solve the model is based on four steps. First, we consider
a grid of teacher wages and share of teachers in the total employment large
enough to include most of the available combinations.16 Second, we compute
the expected teacher quality for each combination of γ and ŵ0 in the grid
based on our theoretical model.17 Third, we compute the expected student
outcomes for each available combination of γ and ŵ0 based on the educational
production function of equation (3.10) and the computed values for teacher
quality. Finally, considering only the combinations available to the budget
constraint, we search for the allocation which leads to the highest student
achievement.
As an example, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the results obtained for a
baseline economy based on the parameters of Table 3.1. The parametric
values assumed for the purposes of computing the equilibrium of the model
were chosen in order to work with a simple economy where: i) the marginal
distributions of both skills are standardized normal (in their logarithm); ii)
the individual utility derived from the occupational choice is more affected
by wages than motivational factors (α > τ); iii) there is a positive but
not extremely strong correlation between both utilities, which determines
an imperfect proxy for the teacher skill in the process of selection; iv) it is
assumed that an increase of one standard deviation in the teacher quality has
an identical effect on the educational results that a reduction of one standard
deviation in student-teacher ratio, and; v) the effect of the student-teacher
ratio on educational outcomes does not have non-linear effects.
Figure 3.1 assumes that the budget constraint is not binding and then,
all points in the grid are available to the school board. The figure shows
that student outcomes rise with teacher wages. This quite intuitive result
follows from the fact that in the considered economy a higher level of teacher
wages allows attracting to the profession individuals with higher abilities
and therefore the average quality of the teaching staff increases. In turn, the
higher teacher quality translates into better student achievements. However,
it is important to note that the effect of teacher salaries on student outcomes
16The initial grid includes all the values of relative teacher salary and teacher partici-
pation in the labour force observed in the set of 22 countries considered in this work. In
case of obtaining a corner solution, we enlarge the grid.
17Each point of the grid implies a exogenous combination of teacher wages and number
of teachers. Therefore, for each point of the grid, we solve the model like in chapter 2 to
obtain the expected quality of the teaching staff.
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Table 3.1: Parameters of a baseline Economy
Parameter Definition Value
µt mean of the teacher skill distribution 0
σ2t variance of the teacher skill distribution 1
µθ mean of the general skill distribution 0
σ2θ variance of the general skill distribution 1
ρθt correlation between the teacher and general skill 0.5
α elasticity of wages with respect to 1
the general skill
τ elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility with 0.1
respect to the teacher skill
β1 partial effect of teacher quality on 1
student outcomes
β2 partial effect of student teacher ratio on -1
student outcomes
β3 partial effect of student teacher ratio on 0
student outcomes (quadratic)
is non-linear, with a decreasing marginal effect.
Less intuitive is the observed effect in terms of the share of teachers in
the total of employment (γ). Given that the total employment is assumed
exogenous, a rise of γ implies a greater number of teachers hired and therefore
a smaller student-teacher ratio. Considering that we assume a negative direct
effect from the student-teacher ratio to the student outcomes (β2 = −1),
intuitively, a rise in the number of teachers hired (a rise on γ) should be
associated with improvements in the student achievements.
However, in our model, a greater number of teachers hired, ceteris paribus,
generates an adverse effect on the average quality of the teaching staff. In-
deed, given the strategy of selection used by the school board, if there is
no additional change, hiring a greater number of teachers will involve hiring
individuals with a lower level of the observable ability (θ) and therefore, with
a lower expected level of teacher skill (t). It is precisely this decrease of the
average quality of the teaching staff what explain the negative indirect effect
on student outcomes linked to the decision of hiring additional teachers.
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Figure 3.1: Expected student outcomes for different combinations
of teacher wages and share of teachers into total employment
In our baseline economy, the indirect effect of a rising in γ on the average
quality of teachers is greater than the direct effect derived from the reduction
of the student-teacher ratio, determining that the expected student outcomes
decrease in γ. In this sense, our baseline economy emphasizes the importance
of considering not only the partial effects but also the general equilibrium
effects when evaluating the optimal allocation of the wage bill.
Figure 3.2 shows how the grid of values is restricted when we assume
more limited budgets to hire teachers. Specifically, there are four alterna-
tive scenarios where the exogenous budget constraint expressed in terms of
wage compensations per worker (g0) is getting smaller. In the figures, we ob-
serve that once the budget constraint becomes active, combinations of higher
salaries (ŵ0) and a larger number of teachers (γ) becomes not available.
The optimal allocation for the wage bill in each scenario is the one that
maximize student outcomes among the available points of the grid. As is
expected, the optimal allocation associated to higher budgets leads to better
student outcomes. Therefore, higher student achievements not necessarily
implies a higher efficiency in the allocation of the wage bill.
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Figure 3.2: Available combinations of teacher wages and share of
teachers under different levels of salary expenditures
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3.3 Inefficiency in the allocation of the edu-
cational wage bill in OECD countries
Based on the theoretical model of the previous section, we computed for a
set of 22 OECD countries the efficient allocation for the educational salary
budget, that is, the combination of teacher salaries and number of teachers
that maximises student outcomes given the budget constraint.
The computation of the optimal combination of γ and ŵ0 for each country
is mostly based on the calibration of the model for our set of countries carried
out in Chapter 2. Additionally, in order to quantify the impact of TQ and
STR on student outcomes, the following educational production function
based on PISA micro data in mathematics was estimated using the same
sample of 22 OECD countries between 2006 and 2015:
yi = B1Ii+B2Fi+B3SCHi+β1TQct+β2STRi+β3STR
2
i +Cc+Tt+ui, (3.15)
where yi represents the score in PISA for individual i, I represents a set of
individual characteristics like age, gender, migration status, language18 and
if the individual repeat a grade; F is a set of family inputs summarized in
the index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS index) of PISA19;
SCH includes characteristics of the school to which the individual i attends,
like the academic and budget autonomy, the school size, ownership (public or
private) and the size of the population in which is located; TQc,t represents
the average teacher quality for country c in period t which is estimated based
on the theoretical model and STR represents the student-teacher ratio in the
school to which individual i attends. Note that the specification allow for
non-linearities in the effect of STR on student outcomes. Finally, Cc and Tt
are fixed effects corresponding to counties and years respectively.
18We consider the correspondence between the native language and the language of the
test.
19This index was created on the basis of the highest levels of education and occupational
status of the student’s parents; the number of books at home; and an index of other home
resources. The index of other home resources was created on the basis of whether there is
a quiet study space, internet access, TV, and stories and novels at home. For more details
on the ESCS, see the Annex I of PISA (2015)- OECD.
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The objective of the estimation is to identify the parameters associated
with the impact of teacher quality (β1), and the student-teacher ratio (β2 and
β3) on student outcomes. Those values are presented in table 3.3 together
with the rest of parameters which are assumed fixed across countries in the
calibration of Chapter 2.20 Based on these estimated coefficients, and the
rest of the parameters of the model calibrated in Chapter 2 presented in
table 3.2, we are able to estimate the efficient allocation for each one of the
22 countries considered in our sample. All the parameters values used for
each country in the simulation exercises are specified in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
In turn, comparing the expected student outcomes when adopting the
optimal combination suggested by our model with the expected results by
adopting the observed values of teacher salaries and the number of teachers,
we computed an index of Inefficient Allocation (IA index) for this group of
countries. Table 3.4 presents for 2015 the observed values of teacher salaries
(ŵ0) and the share of teachers in the total employment (γ) together with the
optimal values.21
Table 3.4 shows that, in most countries, the efficiency gap is generated by
a bias towards prioritising quantity over the quality of teachers. Indeed, in
most of the countries the number of teachers hired is larger than its optimal
value, and, conversely, teacher salaries are lower than the optimal ones. The
only exceptions are Korea and Japan which show an allocation very close to
the optimal point, but, with a slight bias towards quality instead of quantity.
Once the optimal allocation has been computed, we are able to estimate
our measure of the Inefficient Allocation of the wage bill (IA index). We will
use as an indicator of efficiency in the allocation of the salary budget the
ratio between the educational score predicted by the EPF of equation (3.10)
in the observed scenario for ŵ0 and STR and the predicted score under the
efficient allocation. This efficiency indicator varies between zero and one.
The value one indicates efficiency.
At the same time, we will adopt the complement of the Efficiency measure,
that is, IA = 1-Efficiency as an indicator of Inefficient Allocation of the salary
20Details on the estimate, including the coefficients and significance of all the variables
considered, is included in the Appendix II of this Chapter. The results for β2 and β3 are
robust to changes in the sample of the estimation.
21The same tables for 2006, 2009 and 2012 are included in the Appendix I of the chapter.
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Table 3.2: Specific parameters by countries
2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia 0.2532 0.7666 0.4072 0.7666 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.92
Austria 0.6014 0.6919 0.1851 0.6919 1.06 1.05 1.16 1.02
Belgium 1.3791 0.7033 0.6748 0.7033 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.92
Canada 1.6046 0.6070 -0.0821 0.6070 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.94
Czech. R 0.1179 0.7972 0.3980 0.7972 1.24 1.27 1.19 1.30
Denmark 1.4871 0.6223 0.3640 0.6223 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85
Estonia 1.8271 0.6216 0.2412 0.6216 0.93 0.91 0.87
Finland 1.4981 0.6338 1.3688 0.6338 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.91
France 0.3782 0.5958 -1.2216 0.5958 1.01 0.99 1.04 0.95
Germany 1.0954 0.7941 0.0266 0.7941 1.11 1.06 1.18 1.07
Ireland 0.9893 0.8007 -0.9330 0.8007 1.14 1.11 1.19 1.10
Italy -0.0108 0.8795 -2.1209 0.8795 1.11 1.01 0.99 0.96
Japan 2.7245 0.6747 2.0886 0.6747 1.00 1.03 1.03
Korea 2.2649 0.6121 -0.2139 0.6121 0.95 0.89 1.00 0.94
Netherlands 1.6097 0.6414 1.0773 0.6414 1.00 1.08 1.06 1.00
Norway 1.0570 0.6299 0.7556 0.6299 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.85
Poland 1.0552 0.6926 -0.7740 0.6926 1.17 1.13 1.16 1.10
Slovak, R. -1.0269 0.6451 0.1121 0.6451 1.25 1.17 1.15
Spain -0.0235 0.6280 -1.7549 0.6280 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.95
Sweden 0.5233 0.6554 0.6816 0.6554 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.83
UK 0.2708 0.8947 -0.3772 0.8947 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.00
US -1.2038 0.9051 -0.9032 0.9051 1.19 1.21 1.18 1.14
α
μ t σt μ θ σθ 
Note: Parameter values are based on the calibration carried out in Chapter 2. Parameters
µθ, σθ (mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the general skill among the
total population) and α (wage returns to the general skill in the non-teaching sector) are
observables. The sources for those parameters are the PIAAC survey and OECD. The
calibration of the unobservable parameters µt and σt is explained in section 2.3.2 of the
previous chapter.
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Table 3.3: General Parameters
Parameter Definition Value
ρθt correlation between teacher 0.57
and general skill
τ elasticity of non-pecuniary utility with 0.24
respec to the teacher skill
β1 partial effect of teacher quality on 9.2
student outcomes
β2 partial effect of student teacher ratio 2.46
on student outcomes
β3 partial effect of student teacher ratio -0.79
(cuadratic) on student outcomes
Note: Parameters ρθt and τ (correlation of teaching and general skills among the total
population and the elasticity of the non-pecuniary utility with respect to the individual
teaching skill respectively) are based on the calibration carried out in Chapter 2. Param-
eters β1, β2 and β3 are based on the estimation of the Educational production function of
equation (3.15). Details of the estimation are presented in the Appendix II.
budget. Therefore, the IA index also varies between zero and one, where zero
indicates efficiency.
The computation of the score in the observed scenario is based on the
observed value of the student-teacher ratio and the estimated teacher quality
from our theoretical model with the parameters calibrated for each country.
In turn, the computation of the score in the optimal scenario considers the
student-teacher ratio compatible with the optimal value of γ (γ∗) and the
predicted teacher quality from the model using all the observed parameters
except in the cases of ŵ0 and γ which are replaced by their optimal values
(w∗; γ∗).
In this way, the proposed index of Inefficient Allocation of the wage bill
is expressed as follows:
IAct = 1− y(wct; γct)
y(w∗ct; γ∗ct)
(3.16)
where IAct represents the index of inefficient allocation for country c in
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Table 3.4: Wages and share of teachers in total employment (ob-
served and optimal(*) values for 2015)
w w* γ γ*
Australia 1.11 1.470 2.30% 1.71%
Austria 1.06 1.530 2.60% 1.78%
Belgium 1.11 1.803 3.60% 1.96%
Canada 1.26 1.364 1.70% 1.57%
Czech. R 0.62 0.833 2.10% 1.54%
Denmark 1.13 1.500 2.80% 2.10%
Estonia 0.50 0.727 2.50% 1.71%
Finland 1.00 1.606 2.40% 1.50%
France 0.99 1.379 2.70% 1.92%
Germany 1.45 1.712 1.90% 1.61%
Ireland 0.99 1.273 2.80% 2.17%
Italy 1.04 1.758 2.90% 1.71%
Japan 1.24 1.227 1.50% 1.50%
Korea 1.40 1.303 1.40% 1.50%
Netherlands 1.18 1.188 2.80% 2.70%
Norway 0.66 1.121 3.70% 2.17%
Poland 0.87 1.439 2.50% 1.50%
Slovak, R. 0.54 0.788 2.50% 1.71%
Spain 1.45 1.924 2.70% 2.03%
Sweden 0.82 1.197 2.80% 1.92%
UK 0.99 1.167 2.40% 2.03%
US 1.06 1.17 2.20% 1.99%
2015
Note: Teacher wages are expressed in terms of the GDP per capita.
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period t; y(wct; γct) indicates the predicted educational score for country c in
period t using the observed values for teacher wages and number of teachers,
and y(w∗ct; γ
∗
ct) states the score predicted for country c in period t assuming
an optimal allocation of the educational wage bill (w∗; γ∗). We estimate
the index of inefficient allocation for a group of 22 OECD countries for the
years 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015. These years were chosen because of the
availability of PISA data.22 The results are presented in table 3.5.
Table 3.5 shows that on average our set of countries evidence an ineffi-
ciency in the allocation of the wage bill of the order of 16% between 2006 and
2015.23 That is, the contribution of the wage bill to the student outcomes
could be, on average, 16% higher than its observed contribution. Japan, Ko-
rea, and Canada are the countries with the most efficient allocation of the
wage bill while the Slovak Republic, US, and Norway have the less efficient
allocations. In all cases, countries which evidence the less efficient allocation
are characterized by a clear bias toward quantity in the allocation of the wage
bill.
The ranking of countries in terms of their IA index remains fairly stable
between 2006 and 2015. Indeed, most of the countries do not show significant
changes in the IA index in the considered period. The main exceptions are
Italy, which shows a reduction in the inefficiency index associated to a rise in
the teacher salaries and a small rise in the student-teacher ratio, and Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, and Poland which present a rise in the IA index
due to a rise in the quantity bias.
Although there are several similarities between our ranking in terms of
the IA index with respect to the ranking developed by Dolton and Marcenaro
Gutierrez (2014), there are also important differences. The differences are not
only manifested with respect to the ranking of results but fundamentally to
22As described in the next section, PISA data base will allows us to make an empirical
estimation of the inefficiency of the education systems in order to evaluate the results of
our model.
23Note that this paper focuses solely on the inefficiency related to the process of hiring
teachers, and does not consider the inefficiencies that could occur in the performance
of the teaching function like teacher absence. That is, we work under the assumption
that decisions regarding the allocation of the wage bill are not correlated with this kind
of inefficiencies. Muralidharan et al. (2015) highlights the importance of this kind of
inefficiencies and its relationship with the governance of schools.
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Table 3.5: Index of Inefficient Allocation of the wage bill (IA)
2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia 13.5% 13.7% 14.1% 13.0%
Austria 16.3% 15.4% 17.3% 15.8%
Belgium 17.7% 18.1% 16.7% 17.1%
Canada na na 5.3% 5.5%
Czech. R 12.1% 13.7% 15.0% 18.4%
Denmark 11.3% 9.4% 9.2% 9.0%
Estonia na 8.8% 12.6% 12.7%
Finland 11.9% 11.7% 13.4% 13.4%
France 17.4% 16.9% 17.7% 18.2%
Germany 8.8% 7.9% 8.6% 8.3%
Ireland 10.3% 9.0% 9.4% 12.0%
Italy 35.1% 30.0% 27.5% 26.4%
Japan na 3.2% 2.9% 2.7%
Korea 6.3% 7.5% 5.5% 4.9%
Netherlands 7.3% 7.1% 7.2% 7.4%
Norway 19.7% 17.5% 19.7% 20.0%
Poland na 16.5% 19.9% 20.2%
Slovak, R. na 40.2% 50.7% 53.0%
Spain 17.5% 16.6% 18.3% 17.0%
Sweden 15.6% 14.6% 15.8% 17.4%
UK 11.0% 11.2% 11.2% 9.6%
US 33.1% 33.3% 33.7% 31.2%
Ineficiencia Asignativa (IA)
Note: na indicates that it was not possible to calculate the efficiency due to lack of
information regarding some parameter of the model. The IA index also varies between
zero and one, where zero indicates efficiency.
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the policy recommendations that are derived from them. While Dolton and
Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014) find that slightly more than half of the countries
analysed should reduce their teaching salaries in order to be more efficient,
in this work, as mentioned above, a clear bias to prioritize the quantity more
than the quality of teachers is identified, and then it would be better to
reallocate resources through quality of teachers instead. As an example, the
work of Dolton and Marcenaro Gutierrez suggests that countries like the US,
UK, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, Germany and Spain should reduce
their teaching salaries in order to obtain greater efficiency, while our results
suggest otherwise.
We identify two main reasons for the differences between our results and
those of Dolton and Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014). The first one appears as a
consequence of measuring differently the impact of teacher salaries on student
outcomes. Specifically, in our work, we calibrate the theoretical model for
each one of the 22 OECD countries which allow us to measure the specific
impact of changes in teacher wages and the number of teachers on students
test scores (as seen in figure 3.1). Indeed, we have a total of 22 figures for
each country of the data base, all of them with a similar shape to the one
presented in figure 3.1. Recall that in our work, the impact of teacher salaries
and class size on the expected teacher quality is specific in each country
because it depends on: i) the average and variance of the population skills
(parameters µt, µθ, σt, and σt); ii) the wage returns in the non-teaching sector
(parameter α) and; iii) the observed level of teacher wages because the curve
that relates salaries (parameter ŵ0)to teacher quality is non-linear in all the
countries considered according to our calibration of the model. In contrast,
the work of Dolton and Marcerano (2014) measure the effect of wages on
student scores based on an elasticity obtained from a panel estimation. Their
approximation determines that: first, the impact of wages on student test
scores is the same for all countries and second, the effect of wages on student
scores is independent of the level of teacher wages (that is, different from our
theoretical results, it is a linear effect).
The second source of differences with respect to the results in Dolton and
Marcenaro Gutierrez (2014) stems from the fact that our work takes into
account the indirect effect that operates on teacher quality when the number
of teachers hired is modified. Omitting this general equilibrium effect clearly
generates a favourable bias towards recommending a distribution of the salary
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budget more oriented to quantity than to wages.
3.4 Empirical approximation to the inefficiency
in education systems
Once we build the inefficient allocation index (IA) based on our model, the
main question is: Are our theoretical results reasonable? To answer this
question, we study the correlation between the IA index with an empirical
estimation of the overall inefficiency of the education system which is totally
independent of our theoretical approach.
The empirical inefficiency is based on an alternative estimation of the
educational production function proposed in equation (3.16). Particularly,
we replaced the theoretical measure of TQ by the observed data of the relative
teacher wage in order to ensure that our estimate of inefficiency was not
affected by inputs derived from our theoretical model. Additionally, country
fixed effects were removed from the specification because they capture not
only omitted inputs but also differences in the average efficiency among the
countries. In this way, the empirical efficiency was based on the following
specification:
yi = B1Ii+B2Fi+B3SCHi+b1wct+b2w
2
ct+b3STR+b4STR
2+Tt+ui, (3.17)
where wct represents the teacher wage relative to the median wage in the
market sector and all the other inputs are the same than in equation (3.16).
Like the Solow residual in the literature of growth, we define the empiri-
cal inefficiency of an educational system as the ratio between the educational
score estimated from equation (3.17) and the observed educational score.24
In consequence, a higher value of the ratio indicates that the observed perfor-
24As a robustness exercise, we make alternative estimations of inefficiency based on the
frontier model proposed in Battese and Coelli (1995). The results are qualitative similar
to those obtained by the strategy used here.
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mance is lower than its expectation using the observed determinants. That
is, a higher value of the ratio states a less efficient use of resources.25
The indicator of empirical inefficiency is computed as follows:
EIct =
yˆct
yct
(3.18)
where yˆct indicates the estimated education score for country c in period
t using the fitted value from equation (3.17) and yct indicates the observed
score in PISA for country c in period t.
It should be noted that the index of empirical inefficiency (EI) measures
the overall inefficiency of the education system and not only the inefficiency
derived from the allocation of the wage bill. In this sense, even in the case
of a perfect performance of our theoretical model to capture the inefficiency
in the allocation of the wage bill, there should not be a total coincidence
between the IA and EI indicators since the IA index captures only a part of
the complete inefficiency of the system.
However, taking into account the importance of the wage bill within the
educational budget and the importance of teacher quality as school input, it
is expected that inefficiencies in the allocation of the wage bill determines a
significant share of overall inefficiency. In this sense, if our theoretical model
is able to adequately capture the inefficiencies in the allocation of the wage
bill, the index of inefficient allocation of the wage bill (IA) should show a
significant correlation with our empirical estimate of overall inefficiency of
the education system (EI).
Table 3.6 presents the results of the EI index for the same set of 22
countries and the same period for which the index of inefficient allocation of
the wage bill was computed. Figure 3.3 shows the correlation between both
indicators, IA and EI, which is 0.47 for our set countries and the considered
period.
Looking for a more rigorous approximation to the relationship between
the EI and IA measures, we regress the EI index as the dependent variable of
25Note that, the value 1 represents the average level of efficiency for the set of considered
countries between 2006 and 2015.
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Table 3.6: Empirical Inefficiency of Education Systems (EI)
2006 2009 2012 2015
Australia 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.05
Austria 1.00 1.05 1.04
Belgium 0.93 0.99 0.96 1.00
Canada 1.00 1.01
Czech. R 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.94
Denmark 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.06
Estonia 0.87 0.96 0.89
Finland 0.93 0.98 1.01 1.01
France 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.03
Germany 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03
Ireland 1.02 1.05 1.04 1.03
Italy 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05
Japan 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.91
Korea 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.94
Netherlands 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.02
Norway 1.04 1.07 1.06 1.07
Poland 0.98 0.95 0.97
Slovak, R. 0.94 0.95 0.99
Spain 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.02
Sweden 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.05
UK 1.03 1.06 1.05 1.04
US 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.09
Note: The value 1 represents the average level of efficiency for the set of considered
countries between 2006 and 2015.
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the model and the IA index along with a set of control variables were included
as explanatory variables. The selected controls were included following some
previous results in the literature.
For example, Muralidharan, et al. (2015) highlights the importance of in-
efficiencies in the teacher performance, measured by teacher absence, and its
relationship with the governance of schools. In this line, we include controls
related to school organization in order to capture this kind of inefficiencies.
The report of OECD (2017) emphasizes the importance of the number of
classroom hours as a way to evaluate the working conditions of teachers and
their availability of time for non-teaching tasks such as preparing classes,
correcting tasks, etc. That is, given the same student-teacher ratio, differ-
ences in the number of classroom hours could imply a different quality of
teaching. Additionally, Hanushek et al. (2013) highlight the importance of
school autonomy to improve student outcomes. Therefore, school autonomy
could be another characteristic of the school organization potentially related
to the inefficiencies in the performance of the teachers. In a similar line,
West and Woessman (2010) discuss if the ownership of schools is related to
student outcomes. Taking into account this previous results, we include as
control variables in the estimations the number of classroom hours of teach-
ers (Classroom hours), the autonomy grade of educational institutions (Sch.
Autonomy), the share of private institutions in the system (% of private) and
the average size of the institutions (Sch. Size).26
In addition to school organization, Temming (2002) and Bacolod (2003)
discuss the role of the female labour market in the determination of teacher
quality. Greater gender inequality in the labour market could limit alter-
native options for women, determining that highly qualified women join the
education sector. In this way, a greater female participation could be as-
sociated with a higher teaching quality for the same teacher salary offered.
Since in our model, we do not control for differences in the gender gap of the
market wage across countries, the share of female teachers could explain part
of the residual of the EPF. For this reason, we include in our estimation the
26The information regarding the number of classroom hours per country was taken
from Education at a Glance, OECD. The index of school autonomy is calculated as the
percentage of tasks included in the questionnaire of school for which the principal, teachers
or the school governing board have considerable responsibility. See the Annex A1 of PISA
(2015)- OECD Volume II for details of the index of school autonomy. The school size is
measured as the total student enrolment.
3.4. EMPIRICAL APPROXIMATION 155
Figure 3.3: IA & EI indexes
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From table 3.7 we observe that across all the specifications the coefficient
associated to the IA measure presents a positive and significant correlation
with de EI index. As expected, these results indicate that the measure of
inefficiency in the allocation of the wage bill constructed from our theoretical
model is able to explain part of the estimated overall inefficiency of education
systems for the OECD countries included in this analysis.
All in all, the estimations of table 3.7 support our theoretical measure of
inefficiency in the allocation of the wage bill. This results is important for at
least two reasons. Firstly, because having a theoretical model behind allow
us to better understand the trade-off between quantity and quality in the
teacher selection considering not only the direct effects but also the associated
27The information regarding the percentage of women in the teaching staff were taking
from Education at a Glance, OECD.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of the Inefficiency in Education Systems,
EI index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IA 0.288*** 0.267*** 0.202** 0.217**
Sch. Autonomy -0.004 -0.013 -0.11
% of private -0.021 -0.002 0.001
Sch. Size 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*
Classroom hours 0.0002*** 0.000***
% Women 0.000 0.000
Year effect no no no yes
Observations 77 71 60 60
Adj. R2 0.195 0.206 0.389 0.407
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Data source: PISA, OECD,
and our own computations of the theoretical inefficient allocation index (IA).
general equilibrium effects. Secondly, because our model calibrated for each
one of the 22 OECD countries allow us to measure the impact of changes in
teacher wages and number of teacher on students test scores (as in figure 3.1).
Indeed, for each country we obtain a different figure –instead of assuming an
average effect of teacher wages on test scores and an average effect of class
size on average test scores as is assumed in Dolton and Marcerano (2014).
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter proposes a theoretical model of teacher selection which, together
with the empirical estimation of an educational production function, allows
us to estimate the inefficiency in the allocation of the educational wage bill.
The proposed theoretical model allows us to consider the existing trade-off
when allocating the educational wage bill between quality and quantity of
teaching hours. The consideration of this trade-off in our theoretical model as
well as the general equilibrium effects that it involves represents the greatest
contribution of this research with respect to the previous literature.
Our model show us that the efficient allocation of the wage bill in each
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country depends on a set of variables (related to the distribution of skills
among the population, the wage returns in the non-teaching sector and the
teacher wage) that affect the process of teacher selection and therefore the
link between teacher quality, teacher salaries and the number of teachers
hired.
After calibrating our model for a set of 22 OECD countries between 2006
and 2015, we compute the optimal allocation of the wage bill for those coun-
tries. Then, based on the predicted student outcomes imposing the observed
and the optimal values for teacher salaries and number of teachers respec-
tively, we build an index of inefficient allocation of the salary budget. The
results suggest that, the contribution of the wage bill to the student outcomes
could be, on average, 16% higher than its current contribution. Moreover,
in most countries, the efficiency gap is generated by a bias to prioritise the
quantity more than the quality of teachers.
Finally, in order to evaluate the results of our model, we analyse the corre-
lation between the proposed index of inefficient allocation with an empirical
estimate of the overall inefficiency of the education system which is built in-
dependently of the model. Given the importance of the wage bill inside the
educational costs and of the teaching quality as school input, it is expected
that the inefficiency in the allocation of the salary expenditure explains a
significant portion of the overall inefficiency of the education system. The
estimations, including several control variables, confirm a positive and sig-
nificant correlation between the indicator of the allocative inefficiency of the
wage bill obtained from our theoretical model and the empirical estimate of
educational inefficiency which is built independently of the model.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Appendix I. Optimal allocations (2006-2012)
Table 3.8: Observed and optimal allocations for 2012
w w* γ γ*
Australia 1.18 1.576 2.30% 1.71%
Austria 1.07 1.652 2.60% 1.68%
Belgium 1.18 1.742 3.60% 1.92%
Canada 1.38 1.379 1.70% 1.54%
Czech. R 0.72 0.939 2.10% 1.61%
Denmark 1.21 1.652 2.80% 2.03%
Estonia 0.50 0.758 2.50% 1.64%
Finland 1.06 1.697 2.40% 1.50%
France 0.94 1.394 2.70% 1.82%
Germany 1.58 1.833 1.90% 1.64%
Ireland 1.21 1.500 2.80% 2.24%
Italy 1.06 1.864 2.90% 1.64%
Japan 1.34 1.333 1.50% 1.50%
Korea 1.54 1.439 1.40% 1.50%
Netherlands 1.47 1.500 2.80% 2.74%
Norway 0.61 1.015 3.70% 2.21%
Poland 0.92 1.515 2.50% 1.50%
Slovak, R. 0.51 0.727 2.50% 1.75%
Spain 1.44 2.000 2.70% 1.92%
Sweden 0.85 1.197 2.80% 1.99%
UK 1.17 1.364 2.40% 2.07%
US 0.91 1.06 2.20% 1.89%
2012
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Table 3.9: Observed and optimal allocations for 2009
w w* γ γ*
Australia 1.19 1.561 2.30% 1.75%
Austria 1.11 1.652 2.60% 1.75%
Belgium 1.20 1.788 3.60% 1.85%
Canada 1.70%
Czech. R 0.96 1.303 2.10% 1.54%
Denmark 1.36 1.636 2.80% 1.96%
Estonia 0.77 1.076 2.50% 1.78%
Finland 1.19 1.818 2.40% 1.57%
France 0.99 1.439 2.70% 1.85%
Germany 1.70 1.849 1.90% 1.75%
Ireland 1.40 1.773 2.80% 2.21%
Italy 1.15 2.000 2.90% 1.57%
Japan 1.55 1.515 1.50% 1.50%
Korea 1.90 1.409 1.40% 1.50%
Netherlands 1.37 1.470 2.80% 2.60%
Norway 0.73 1.212 3.70% 2.21%
Poland 0.91 1.500 2.50% 1.50%
Slovak, R. 0.62 0.818 2.50% 1.89%
Spain 1.70 2.000 2.70% 1.85%
Sweden 0.98 1.394 2.80% 1.96%
UK 1.34 1.530 2.40% 2.10%
US 0.95 1.11 2.20% 1.89%
2009
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Table 3.10: Table 10 - Observed and optimal allocations for 2006
w w* γ γ*
Australia 1.16 1.515 2.30% 1.75%
Austria 1.04 1.576 2.60% 1.71%
Belgium 1.11 1.788 3.60% 1.89%
Canada 1.70%
Czech. R 1.04 1.318 2.10% 1.64%
Denmark 0.99 1.424 2.80% 1.92%
Estonia 2.50%
Finland 1.04 1.546 2.40% 1.61%
France 0.96 1.424 2.70% 1.82%
Germany 1.46 1.470 1.90% 1.89%
Ireland 1.06 1.394 2.80% 2.14%
Italy 0.95 1.833 2.90% 1.50%
Japan 1.50%
Korea 2.14 1.515 1.40% 1.50%
Netherlands 1.13 1.212 2.80% 2.60%
Norway 0.60 0.985 3.70% 2.40%
Poland 2.50%
Slovak, R. 2.50%
Spain 1.41 1.970 2.70% 1.92%
Sweden 0.85 1.212 2.80% 1.96%
UK 1.29 1.500 2.40% 2.07%
US 0.92 1.09 2.20% 1.85%
2006
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3.7.2 Appendix II. Estimations
Table 3.11: Educational Production Function
Parameter Coeff.
TQ β1 9.421***
Student-teacher ratio β2 2.463***
Student-teacher ratio (quadratic) β3 -0.791**
female -14.33***
F. Gen. Migrant -1.114***
Diff. Language -0.652
Age 16.078***
Repetition -69.001***
ESCS 32.208***
Sch. Size 0.0061***
Sch Autonomy 0.898
% of private 10.083***
GDP growth 1.3377***
GDP per capita -0.0019***
Expenditure on Educ (% of GDP) -1.532***
Country fixed effects yes
Time dummies yes
R-Squared 0.243
Sample 2006-2015
Observations 478830
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Data source: PISA 2006-2015;
OECD, IMF.
Overall Conclusions
From the research carried out in this dissertation, several relevant conclusions
are drawn that imply a contribution to the previous literature and could be
of interest to politicians and policy makers.
Firstly, my research finds that in Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries a process of change in the profile of tasks developed by workers is tak-
ing place, which is in line with the existing evidence for developed countries.
My empirical exercise shows that non-routine cognitive tasks are becoming
increasingly important to the detriment of manual tasks. Furthermore, oc-
cupations in the higher income deciles present a clear cognitive task profile.
The evidence found for Latin American and Caribbean countries suggests
that the process of labour market transformation is a result of technological
change. The pattern in these emerging countries is similar in developed
countries, despite the structural differences that exist between both types of
economies.
In this sense, the challenge for both developed and emerging countries
is similar and consists in trying to provide the workforce with the greater
number of cognitive skills required to satisfy the rise in demand for non-
routine cognitive tasks. Therefore, increasingly, an educational system that
develops these cognitive abilities is crucial for good job placement and a high
remuneration (from the individual point of view) as well as for stimulating
economic growth (from the aggregate point of view).
This challenge puts particular pressure on educational systems since it is
in the educational process where most of the skills needed to adapt to the new
labour reality are acquired. Thus, it is critical to understand why educational
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systems show a significant disparity in cognitive abilities, in order to identify
the key inputs for the educational process. Additionally, in a context of
limited resources, it is key to understand how to use educational resources in
the most efficient way to maximize student achievement. This dissertation
presents evidence in both directions.
Indeed, the second relevant conclusion that emerges from this research is
the importance of teaching quality as an educational input in explaining the
cognitive abilities of the students. The results obtained in this research in-
dicate that differences in teaching quality between countries are a key factor
in understanding the differences observed in educational results. Indeed, dif-
ferences in teaching quality explain a proportion of differences in educational
outcomes between countries similar to that explained by differences in family
background and clearly higher than the proportion explained by differences
in any other school input like school organisation (proxy by school autonomy
and school size), student teacher ratio and educational expenditures. Since
the effect size estimated for teacher quality is really large, compared to other
school inputs, educational programs that promote good teachers will be re-
ally effective and may be not too costly to implement. This is why the last
part of this dissertation analyses the trade-off between quantity and quality
of teacher. When faced with a lack of resources, policy makers need to choose
between both alternatives.
In this way, the final relevant empirical finding from this dissertation
is that most of the OECD countries present a bias towards the quantity
instead of the quality of the teaching staff that makes them inefficient in the
allocation of the educational wage bill. That is, a prioritization of teacher
salaries instead of the number of hours hired would allow a better educational
result to be obtained, using the same level of resources.
Conclusiones Generales
(Spanish)
A partir de la investigacio´n llevada a cabo en esta tesis doctoral, se extraen
varias conclusiones relevantes que proporcionan una contribucio´n a la liter-
atura previa, a la vez que resultan de intere´s general para los responsables
en la formulacio´n de pol´ıticas educativas.
En primer lugar, mi investigacio´n encuentra que en los pa´ıses de Amrica
Latina y el Caribe se esta´ produciendo un cambio en el perfil de las tar-
eas desarrolladas por los trabajadores, lo que se encuentra en l´ınea con la
evidencia existente para los pa´ıses desarrollados. El ejercicio emp´ırico desar-
rollado en el primer cap´ıtulo muestra que las tareas cognitivas no rutinarias
son cada vez ma´s importantes en el mercado laboral al tiempo que las tar-
eas manuales pierden importancia. Adema´s, las ocupaciones en los deciles
de mayores ingresos presentan un claro perfil de tareas cognitivas, particu-
larmente no rutinarias. La evidencia encontrada para los pases de Ame´rica
Latina y el Caribe sugiere que el proceso de transformacio´n del mercado lab-
oral es resultado de un proceso de cambio tecnolo´gico. El patro´n en estos
pa´ıses emergentes es similar al observeado en los pa´ıses desarrollados, a pesar
de las diferencias estructurales que existen entre ambos tipos de economı´as.
En este sentido, el desaf´ıo para los pa´ıses desarrollados y emergentes es
similar y consiste en tratar de proporcionar a la fuerza laboral el mayor
nu´mero de habilidades cognitivas requeridas para satisfacer el aumento de
la demanda de tareas cognitivas no rutinarias. Por lo tanto, cada vez ma´s,
un sistema educativo que desarrolle estas capacidades cognitivas es crucial
para una buena insercio´n laboral y una alta remuneracio´n (desde el punto de
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vista individual), as´ı como para estimular el crecimiento econo´mico (desde el
punto de vista agregado).
Este desaf´ıo ejerce una presio´n particularmente importante sobre los sis-
temas educativos, ya que es en el proceso educativo donde se adquieren la
mayor´ıa de las habilidades necesarias para adaptarse a la nueva realidad lab-
oral. Por lo tanto, es fundamental entender por que´ los sistemas educativos
muestran una disparidad significativa en las capacidades cognitivas, con el fin
de identificar los imputs claves en el proceso de aprendizaje. Adema´s, en un
contexto de recursos limitados, es clave para comprender co´mo usar los re-
cursos educativos de la manera ma´s eficiente para maximizar el rendimiento
estudiantil. Esta tesis doctoral presenta evidencia en ambas direcciones.
En efecto, la segunda conclusio´n relevante que surge de esta investigacio´n
es la importancia de la calidad del profesor para explicar las capacidades
cognitivas de los estudiantes. Los resultados obtenidos en esta investigacio´n
indican que las diferencias en la calidad del profesorado entre pa´ıses resulta
un factor clave para comprender las diferencias observadas en los resultados
educativos medidos con los datos de PISA. De hecho, las diferencias en la
calidad del profesor explican una proporcio´n de diferencias en los resultados
educativos entre pa´ıses similar a la explicada por las diferencias en el entorno
familiar y claramente ma´s alta que la proporcio´n explicada por diferencias
en cualquier otro input o caracter´ıstica de organizacio´n escolar (por ejemplo
autonomı´a escolar o taman˜o de la escuela ), el taman˜o de la clase y el gasto
educativo. Dado que el efecto estimado para la calidad del docente es real-
mente significativo en comparacio´n con otros inputs escolares, los programas
educativos que promuevan buenos docentes en su plantilla sera´n realmente
efectivos y pueden no ser demasiado costosos de implementar. Esta es la
razo´n por la cual la u´ltima parte de esta tesis analiza la disyuntiva entre la
cantidad y la calidad del profesor. Ante la falta de recursos, los responsables
de las pol´ıticas deben elegir entre ambas alternativas.
De esta forma, el ltimo hallazgo emp´ırico relevante de esta tesis doctoral es
que la mayora de los pa´ıses de la OCDE presentan un sesgo hacia la cantidad
en lugar de la calidad docente que los hace ineficientes en la asignacio´n de
la masa salarial educativa. Es decir, una priorizacio´n de los salarios de los
docentes en lugar del nu´mero de horas contratadas permitir´ıa obtener un
mejor resultado educativo, utilizando el mismo nivel de recursos.
